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This dissertation examines the development of environmental cooperation 
in the South China Sea from the late 1970s when the first modest cooperative 
activities emerged among the small number of members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  Since the 1990s, the membership of the 
community has broadened and its efforts have become more focused and energetic.  
Through a study of the interactions among the three main actors engaged in 
regional seas cooperation, namely the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), ASEAN, and China, this dissertation seeks to explain the evolution of 
cooperation in the highly contentious South China Sea; the changing motivations, 
strategies and roles of the main actors; and the level of success with environmental 
politics in the region. 
The study is driven by an intriguing puzzle.  While the South China Sea 
remains one of the most volatile, dangerous and intractable areas, environmental 
cooperation has developed rapidly since 1990s.  This is particularly puzzling when 
the geopolitical context, the large number of littoral states with a history of 
hostility among them, the domestic priorities these countries place on 
development, and their diplomatic preferences are taken into account.  The key to 
the puzzle lies in UNEP’s strategizing.  UNEP utilized the United Nation’s 
potential power of legitimization, independence and knowledge in areas that were 
not limited to the environment per se to induce cooperation among the littoral 
countries of this highly contentious region.   
UNEP has played both inductive and instrumental roles in promoting 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  On the one hand, by framing 
environmental protection as a neutral, non-political and “low politics issue”, UNEP 
has been able to draw the littoral countries to the negotiating table.  This has 
internationalized environmental protection in the South China Sea, making non-
participation in these cooperative efforts problematic since it could reduce the 
international prominence of a country’s territorial claims.  In this sense, UNEP has 
been able to induce cooperation.  On the other hand, UNEP has played an 
instrumental role in promoting regional cooperation by helping countries to 
address common marine environmental problems and promoting confidence 
building measures between ASEAN countries and China. 
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REGIONALIZING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CASE 
 
This is a fascinating time to study China and Southeast Asia.  They form 
the world’s most rapidly growing region, and set a model for how developing 
countries can pursue economic development and improve the welfare of growing 
populations.  Although the region’s economic miracle has been watched by the 
world, a series of tragic region-wide events has afflicted the region: the 1997-1998 
financial crisis, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the 
spread of avian flu, and, most recently, the disastrous Indian Ocean tsunamis.  All 
of these events and their transboundary impacts have shown that the countries and 
peoples in the region are closely connected and interdependent.  Without 
coordinated government measures, the region as a whole faces serious, and in 
some cases devastating, financial, health and ecological problems.  Effective 
regional cooperation would have reduced the impacts of these events, even if it 
could not eliminate the causes or impacts entirely. 
Connecting China and Southeast Asia is one of the world’s busiest and 
most volatile seas, the South China Sea.  The sea is also endowed with rich tropical 
marine biological diversity.  In recent decades, due to growing economies, 
increasing population and advanced technologies, which make it possible to exploit 
the region’s natural resources at an unprecedented rate, the South China Sea is 
experiencing profound environmental changes and increasing scarcities of natural 
resources, and has suffered serious environmental degradation, especially in 
coastal habitats.   
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Since the 1990s, however, the region has also witnessed a growing trend in 
environmental cooperation at both policy and operational levels.  A cursory review 
of these environmental cooperation activities shows that most have been 
undertaken under the umbrella of UNEP or other international organizations 
(IOs).1  Marine environmental cooperation in the region originated in the late 
1970s when UNEP initiated the development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan 
under UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme.  Until recently, projects under the 
Action Plan tended to be small national research projects; efforts by governments 
to address marine environmental degradation have tended to be sporadic, ad-hoc, 
and individualistic.  It is only in the 1990s that activities to develop systematic 
substantive regional cooperation in the South China Sea have emerged.   
The dissertation seeks to explain why environmental cooperation occurs in 
such a sensitive and contentious sea as the South China Sea.  I believe the key 
factor lies in the changing roles and functions of UNEP in interaction with regional 
political dynamics, and in particular, the interaction between the member states of 
ASEAN and China, which is not a member of that organization.  In this process, I 
will argue that UNEP played catalytic, inductive and instrumental roles, 
strategically utilizing its power to foster and forge regional environmental 
cooperation in the region.  One reason UNEP was able to play these roles is that 
for both ASEAN states and China, environmental cooperation is part of a state’s 
overall foreign policy.  Hence the significance and implications of environmental 
cooperation go beyond protecting the marine environment; cooperation serves as a 
mechanism for building confidence and trust in the highly contentious sea area and 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, international organizations are used to refer to formal international 
organizations, unless otherwise specified. 
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for sustaining the regional prosperity shared by both parties.  In exploring the 
interactions among UNEP, ASEAN and China, the dissertation explains why 
environmental cooperation has developed in a highly sensitive area and explores 
the conditions under which environmental cooperation take place.   
 
When Global Ideas Meet Regional Politics 
In many developing countries, environmental policy developments take a 
top-down approach, reacting to international policy diffusions.  Activists, the 
media and politicians pushed for environmental protection measures first in 
developed countries, and later at the international level.  In the 1960s, a series of 
environmental disasters sparked international concern about the natural 
environment.  In the marine environmental area, a number of oil spills attracted 
attention, including the 1967 Torrey Canyon spill between France and Britain 
(121,200 tons) and the 1978 Amoco Cadiz spill off the coast of Brittany (228,000 
tons).2  Pictures of oil on beaches and oil-smeared birds and fish were publicized 
by the media and non-governmental organizations, raising people’s environmental 
awareness.  Events such as these contributed directly to the internationalization of 
environmental protection. 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) is frequently described as a watershed in the development of 
international environmental law.3  It represented a formal acknowledgement of the 
importance of multilateral efforts to deal with transboundary environmental 
                                                 
2 Peter Haas.  1990.  Saving the Mediterranean Sea.  New York: Columbia University Press.  p. 3. 
 
3 Peter M. Haas with Han Sundgren.  1993.  “Evolving International Environmental Law: Changing 
Practices of National Sovereignty.”  In Nazli Choucri, ed.  Global Accord: Environmental 
Challenges and International Responses.  Cambridge: MIT Press. 
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problems.  Since then, there has been a proliferation of international environmental 
agreements and organizations.  Various international environmental conventions 
and agreements have been negotiated and signed by countries at the global level.  
Currently, there are over 700 international environmental agreements.4  Numerous 
IOs have been established to address global environmental problems.  Particularly 
important is the establishment of UNEP in 1972 following the Stockholm 
Conference, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1991.   
Two decades after Stockholm, representatives of governments, IOs and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) met in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 for the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).  This 
conference was designed to act as a catalyst for injecting the concept of sustainable 
development into IOs, national governments and the private sector around the 
world.  Its outcome was agreement on three general documents (the Rio 
Declaration, Agenda 21 and the Forest Principles), one new institution (the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development), and two new environmental 
conventions (on climate change and biodiversity).5 
Ten years after UNCED, the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
took place in 2002 in Johannesburg.  The Johannesburg conference mainly 
reviewed the progress made to implement the Agenda 21 of UNCED.  The 
conference restated the commitment to implement the plan for sustainable 
development, and produced a 54-page document called the “World Summit on 
Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation” and a short “Johannesburg 
                                                 
4 Ronald B. Mitchell.  2003.  “International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Their Feature, 
Formation, and Effects.”  Annual Review of Energy & the Environment: 429-461. 
 




Declaration on Sustainable Development” signed by roughly 100 heads of state 
and government.6 
Besides the three major UN earth summits, numerous other international or 
global conferences or meetings have been convened on various environmental 
protection issues, such as those convened under major global environmental 
conventions.  In international environmental politics, policies, ideas and principles 
are formed, developed and agreed at the global level, and are then implemented at 
the national or regional levels through various partners, including IOs.   
Scholars have attempted to explore the intersections between the 
international environmental movement and the domestic politics of environmental 
protection in specific countries.7  Few studies, however, have investigated the 
interactions between international environmental movements and regional politics.  
When countries at the global level decide and agree that regional-level actions are 
the most appropriate measures to implement some global policies or ideas, various 
regions may react to these polices or ideas differently, leading to completely 
different results. 
The UNEP Regional Seas Programme is an example of such a top-down 
approach.  In 1974, UNEP decided that a regional approach was most appropriate 
for addressing coastal and marine environmental issues, and launched its Regional 
Seas Programme as a global framework for regional initiatives.  Since 1974 
thirteen regional seas action plans have been developed and implemented around 
                                                 
6 See the World Summit on Sustainable Development: http://www.iied.org/wssd/. 
 
7 See e.g. Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy, eds.  1997.  The internationalization of 
Environmental Protection.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Elizabeth R. Desombre.  
2000.  Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and 
US Power.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  Xinyuan Dai.  2005.  “Why Comply? The Domestic 
Constituency Mechanism.”  International Organization 59: 363-398.  Lester Ross.  1998.  “China: 
Environmental Protection, Domestic Policy Trends, Patterns of Participation in Regimes and 
Compliance with International Norms.”  The China Quarterly, No. 156: 809-835. 
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the world.  Table 1.1 lists these plans, member countries and their legal status 
(existence or non-existence of a regional convention).  These action plans were 
designed with similar principles, structures and approaches.  They are usually 
made up of the following parts: environmental assessment, environmental 
management, environmental legislation, institutional arrangements and financial 
arrangements.8  Their performances and results however vary greatly between 
regions. 
I selected the case of UNEP’s activities in developing the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan and promoting regional environmental cooperation in the South China 
Sea in order to study the interactions between globally initiated actions and 
regional politics, to explore the changing roles of UNEP as it adapts to changing 
regional politics, and to investigate the impacts of regional politics on the 
development and evolution of these activities. 
                                                 




Table 1.1.  Status of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme9 
Action Plan Date of 
Adoption 
Legal Status Member Countries or Parties 
Mediterranean  1975 Barcelona Convention (1976) 
Entry into force: 1978 
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, European Community, France, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, 
Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey 
Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden  
1976 Jeddah Convention (1982) 
Entry into force: 1985 
Egypt, Jordan, Eritrea, Palestine (PLO), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen 
ROPME Sea  1978 Kuwait Convention (1978) 
Entry into force: 1979 
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 
Wider Caribbean 1981 Cartagena Convention (1983) 
Entry into force: Pending 
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, 
Nicaragua, Panama, St Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad 
& Tobago, United States of America, Venezuela, European Commission, United Kingdom, and France 




1981 Lima Convention (1981) 
Entry into force: 1986 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 
West and Central 
Africa 
1981 Abidjan Convention (1981) 
Entry into force: 1984 
Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of Conga, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatoria 
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Congo and South Africa 
South Pacific 1982 Noumea Convention (1986) 
Entry into force: 1990 
American Samoa, Northern Mariaua Islands, Australia, Cook Islands, Palau, Micronesia, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Pitcairn Islands, French Polynesia, Solomon Islands, Guam, Tokelau, Kiribati, Toga, 
Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, New Zealand, Western 
Samoa, Niue 
Eastern Africa 1985 Nairobi Convention (1985) 
Entry into force: 1996 
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, France (La 
Reunion), Seychelles 
Black Sea 1996 Bucharest Convention (1992) 
Entry into force: pending 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine 
North-West 
Pacific 
1994 No convention negotiated China, Japan, Russia, South Korea 
South Asian Sea 1997 No Convention negotiated Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
North-East 
Pacific 
2002 Antigua Convention (2002) 
Entry into force: Pending 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama 
Source: www.unep.org/regionalseas/ 
                                                 
9 Kuwait Sea developed a Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME).  The South Pacific region established the South Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) in 1982 with no action plan adopted.  The Black Sea region developed a regional convention before action plan.  The South 
Asian Sea developed the South Asian Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP), which became a legal entity in 1982.   
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The South China Sea Case 
The South China Sea is defined by the International Hydrographic Bureau 
as the semi-enclosed body of water stretching in a Southwest to Northeast 
direction, whose southern border is three degrees South latitude between South 
Sumatra and Kalimantan (Karimata Straits), and whose northern border is the 
Strait of Taiwan from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China10 
(See Figure 1.1).  The South China Sea area includes more than 200 small islands, 
rocks and reefs, with the majority located in the Spratly and Paracel chain islands.  
The bordering countries of the South China Sea are Brunei, Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.  Competing 
territorial claims over the South China Sea and its resources are numerous, with the 
most contentious revolving around the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands.  
Between 1974 and 1999, thirteen significant military clashes have taken place 
among the claimants, with four between China and Viet Nam, five between China 
and the Philippines, two between Viet Nam and the Philippines, one between 
Taiwan and Viet Nam, and one between Malaysia and the Philippines.11   
The South China Sea involves various interacting issues that form complex 
relationships to forge regional cooperation.  These issues include territorial 
disputes, economic development, and environmental degradation.  Chapter 3 will 
provide a detailed review of the geopolitical context of the sea and the complex 
relationships among regional military, economic and environmental trends. 
 
                                                 
10 David Rosenburg.  1999.  “Environmental Cooperation around the South China Sea: Developing 
a Regional Response to a Regional Problem.”  Resource Management in Asia Pacific Working 
Paper No. 20.  The Australian National University Press. 
 
11 See EIA website (www.eia.doe.gov).  
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Figure 1.1.  Geographical Coverage of the South China Sea 
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) (www.eia.doe.gov) 
 
 I choose the South China Sea case for three reasons.  First, it is a region 
with little record of historical cooperation before the late 1970s, when UNEP 
started to initiate regional environmental cooperation.  The only sign of regional 
cooperation was the establishment of a loose regional organization, ASEAN, in 
1967 through Bangkok Declaration.  Up until the late 1970s, ASEAN was often 
criticized by commentators as “a club of ministers of foreign affairs,” or a 
talkshop.  Cooperation within ASEAN was extremely limited, nothing substantive 
other than some meetings among political leaders occurred.12  Scholars observed 
that ASEAN emphasized military and security issues rather than economic and 
non-military cooperation.  Hence when UNEP initiated the development of a 
regional seas action plan, the region was devoid of any sort of prior environmental 
cooperation.  The environment was not even considered as part of the issues to be 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Michael Leifer.  1973.  “The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook.”  International 
Affairs Vol. 49: 600-607.  Russell H. Fifield.  1979.  “ASEAN: Image and Reality.”  Asian Survey 
Vol. 19: 1199-1208. 
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dealt with by ASEAN.  This makes the region a strong test of UNEP’s ability to 
seed environmental cooperation. 
Second, this region provides a good case to study how newly established 
regional organizations with weak institutional capacity deal with complex political 
and environmental problems simultaneously, and how they react to an initiative 
from an intergovernmental organization.  It is important to understand how 
ASEAN, as a young, immature, and loose regional organization, reacted to the 
calls of international environmental protection at a time when it was engaged in a 
process of exploring its own structure, roles and functions.  At a time when 
international environmental initiatives are increasingly regional in scale, and when 
many world regions are seeking to develop stronger regional political institutions 
and promote regional integration, there may be valuable lessons to be learned from 
this case. 
Third, the South China Sea region is rich in tropical marine biological 
diversity, consists of the most prosperous developing countries in the world, and 
has been haunted by over-lapping territorial claims and potential territorial 
conflicts.  The complex political, economic and environmental situation provides a 
good opportunity to study and explore environmental cooperation in a complicated 
geopolitical setting.  It provides a good case to test whether such complexities 




Political Difficulties for Regional Environmental Cooperation 
Most of the existing literature on the South China Sea centers on conflicts 
and disputes in the sea; much less has been written on cooperation in the region.13  
The lack of literature on cooperation in the region is actually a reflection of reality.  
Until recently, the South China Sea region has not been noted for extensive co-
operative mechanisms.   
International cooperation is never an easy task.  The international system is 
anarchic in that there is no overarching authority (in this case, a world government) 
that can dictate to individual states or actors within those states what they must do.  
Beyond this general feature of world politics, the recent, rapidly emerging 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea requires extra efforts or 
motivations for countries because of the distinctive characteristics and political 
difficulties in the region.   
First, competing territorial claims over the South China Sea and its 
resources are numerous, with the most contentious revolving around the Spratly 
Islands and Paracel Islands.  Frequent skirmishes and conflicts have been seen in 
the past two decades, and numerous provocative actions, including fishing 
activities, have cast some shadows in the economically prosperous region.  While 
the region’s states seek to reclaim/consolidate sovereignty over disputed territory 
in the common sea area, they also need to relinquish their sovereignty to develop a 
cooperative solution to the deteriorating situation of the common resources in order 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Mark J. Valencia.  1995.  China and the South China Sea Disputes.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat.  1997.  Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China 
Sea.  Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.  Timo Kivimaki.  2002.  War or Peace in the South China Sea.  
Copenhagen: The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press.  Liselotte Odgaard.  2002.  Maritime 
Security between China and Southeast Asia.  Burlington, VT: Ashgate.  Marwyn S. Samuels.  1982.  
Contest for the South China Sea.  New York and London: Methuen.  Literature in Chinese mainly 
focuses on historical evidences of China’s claims of the South China Sea, and political justifications 




to protect the living resources of the South China Sea.14  Territorial disputes 
impose a challenge to any efforts to achieve cooperation in the region.  As Mark J. 
Valencia has put it, 
The foremost obstacles to multilateral maritime management regime 
formation in the South China Sea are the conflicting territorial and 
maritime claims and the concomitant lack of confidence and trust 
between some of the claimants.  Settlement or the setting aside of 
jurisdictional boundary disputes may be a prerequisite for 
cooperation on other issues.  Regional cooperation in the South 
China Sea must overcome or accommodate the conflicting 
sovereignty claims to features and the need to demilitarize them; the 
conflicting claims to maritime space; the conflicting definitions of 
the area that might be subject to a resource management agreement; 
the claimants’ primary interest in the petroleum potential of the 
area; and the interests of non-claimant South China Sea countries.15 
 
Second, there is a historical animosity among Southeast Asian countries, 
and between China and Southeast Asia.  In addition, there are problems associated 
with the activities of communist movements and overseas Chinese in several 
countries.16   Although the animosity has been somewhat relieved since the 1990s 
due to the end of Cold War and the increasing economic interactions in the region, 
the geopolitical context (China as a rising power) continues to be an ambivalent 
factor for Southeast Asian countries.17   
                                                 
14 Here I am using the Karen Litfin’s conceptualization of sovereignty.  Accordingly, sovereignty 
has three components: independence, control and legitimacy (Karen T. Litfin. eds.  1998.  The 
Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.) 
 
15 Mark J. Valencia.  2000.  “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia.”  Ocean Development and International Law 31.  p. 240. 
 
16 See Leo Suryadinata.  1985.  China and the ASEAN States: the Ethnic Chinese Dimension.  
Singapore: Singapore University Press.   
 
17 See e.g. Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed.  2002.  The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications.  
Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.  Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard 
H. Yang.  1998.  In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and 
Military Development.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND.  Rommel C. Banlaoi.  2003.  “Southeast Asian 
Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11.”  Parameters: 98-107.  Shee Poon 
Kim.  1982.  “China and the ASEAN States: From Hostility to Rapprochement.”  In China’ Foreign 
Relations, ed. Chut Tu Hsueh.  New York, NY: Praeger.   
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Third, the South China Sea has been one of the most rapidly industrializing 
regions of the world in the past two decades, and littoral countries are strongly 
development-minded.  Maximizing national economic growth is the major goal of 
state-led industrialization, and environmental protection is not considered a priority 
for national policies.18  People may argue that environmental cooperation in the 
region may be a result of the so-called “environmental Kuznets effect,” which 
suggests that economic growth and rising income levels eventually lead to 
environmental improvement after an initial period of degradation.19  However, the 
environmental Kuznets’ effect is not apparent in this region.  First, all countries 
bordering the South China Sea except Singapore are nowhere near the income 
range associated with maximum pollution on the conventional environmental 
Kuznets curve.20  Second, the causal mechanism of the Kuznets-curve theory is 
that economic development will contribute to the growth of a middle class, which 
will demand better environmental quality and pressure governments to take actions 
to improve the environment.  Households’ demand for better environmental quality 
is therefore a critical factor for improved environmental protection caused by 
                                                                                                                                       
 
18 Andre Dua and Daniel C. Esty.  1997.  Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Environmental 
Protection and Economic Integration.  Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. 
 
19 See G. Grossman and A. Krueger.  1993.  “Environmental Impacts of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.”  In The US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement.  P. Garber, ed.  Cambridge: MIT 
Press.  p. 13-56.  G. Grossman and A. Krueger.  1995.  “Economic Growth and the Environment.”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 353-377.  W. T. Harbaugh and A. Levinson and D. M. 
Wilson.  2002.  “Re-examining the Empirical Evidence for an Environmental Kuznets Curve.”  
Review of Economics and Statistics 84: 541-551. 
 
20 Applied econometricians suggest that air and water pollution increase with development until per 
capita income reaches a range of $5000 to $8000.  When income rises beyond that level, pollution 
starts to decline.  See Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Hua Wang and David Wheeler.  2002.  




economic growth.21  However, the region’s coastal zones and marine environment 
are relatively far away from the urban middle classes, and the impacts of the 
deteriorating marine environment on the daily life of the middle classes are less 
palpable than is the case with the air pollution, waste, and sewage problems of 
urban cities. 
Fourth, to achieve formal multilateral environmental cooperation in the 
South China Sea is even more difficult due to political reasons.  China has resisted 
calls for multilateral discussions of the Spratly Islands issue in an official setting, 
insisting on bilateral negotiations involving China while condemning bilateral 
negotiations involving other claimants.  China opposes the internationalization of 
the South China Sea issue; in the mid-1990s, mentioning the “South China Sea 
issue” in a regional or international forum would trigger Chinese formal objections 
and resentment.22 
The first two difficulties pose challenges to any kind of interstate 
cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries, while the third 
specifically reduces the possibility of governmental initiatives in environmental 
protection and the fourth presents an additional challenge to formal multilateral 
cooperation.  Yet despite the unfavorable geopolitical difficulties and domestic 
politics for environmental protection and cooperation, multilateral environmental 
cooperation activities have been developing since the 1990s under the auspices of 
UNEP.  This fact provides the central puzzle of the dissertation. 
 
                                                 
21.  Neha Khanna and Florenz Plassmann.  2004.  “The Demand for Environmental Quality and the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis.”  Ecological Economics 51: 225-237. 
 
22 See Craig A. Snyder.  1997.  “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China 




Brief Description of the Development of Environmental Cooperation   
I study two major initiatives under UNEP: the East Asian Seas Action Plan 
(1981-present) and the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project entitled “Reversing 
Environmental Degradation in South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand”23 (2002-
present). The latter was developed under the auspices of, and approved by, the 
Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), the inter-governmental 
decision-making body of the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  Thus, these two 
initiatives are closely linked and partly overlapping.  
The East Asian Seas Action Plan is part of UNEP’s globally managed 
Regional Seas Programme.  Initiatives were undertaken since late 1970s to prepare 
the Action Plan, which was then adopted by an intergovernmental meeting of the 
five founding members of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand.  During the first decade of the East Asian Seas Action Plan (1981-
1990), the plan served as the ASEAN marine program, and played an important 
role in building the networks of marine scientists and providing research, training 
and other capacity-building assistance to the member countries.  ASEAN gained 
tremendous experience in regional environmental cooperation through the East 
Asian Seas Action Plan, and established its own marine program in 1990.  Despite 
the establishment of ASEAN’s own program, membership of the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan was still limited to ASEAN countries until 1994.  During this period of 
engagement with ASEAN, UNEP initially played a catalytic role in environmental 
cooperation by providing information, setting agendas, and choosing participants.  
UNEP helped ASEAN to establish ASEAN environmental working groups, but no 
                                                 
23 Hereafter the project will be referred to as the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project. 
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ASEAN marine environmental working group was established due to the existence 
of the Action Plan and COBSEA.   
In 1994, Australia, Cambodia, China, the Republic of Korea, and Viet Nam 
joined the Action Plan, making it a real “East Asian” Seas Action Plan for the first 
time.  In 1996, UNEP initiated an important activity to develop a large marine 
project for the South China Sea under the East Asian Seas Action Plan, to secure 
funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF).  When UNEP submitted a 
Project Development Funding (PDF-B)24 proposal for a UNEP/GEF South China 
Sea Project to the GEF Secretariat in 1996, it was the first effort to internationalize 
environmental protection, and indeed any issue, in the South China Sea.  Until 
then, China had been adamant that the South China Sea issue should not be 
internationalized.   
As late as the 1995 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Chinese delegates 
adamantly insisted that South China Sea issues should be settled bilaterally.  China 
resented interference from third parties and resist internationalization of the issue.25  
ASEAN, in contrast, preferred to talking about South China Sea issues in 
multilateral forums especially after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident between China 
and the Philippines (China was found to have built infrastructure in the Mischief 
Reef, about 135 nautical miles from the Philippines coast).26  China’s aversion to 
multilateral talks concerning the South China Sea, along with ASEAN’s preference 
                                                 
24 PDF-B is a funding mechanism for supporting further preparation of project proposal. 
 
25 Lee Lai To.  1999.  China and the South China Sea Dialogues.  Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 
press.  p. 36. 
 




for multilateral talks, can be explained by the substantial differences in national 
capability between China and each of the ASEAN countries.   
It took UNEP three years to develop the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
project and get the approval from six countries bordering the South China Sea, and 
another one and one-half years to negotiate and obtain the Chinese government’s 
approval. China’s dramatic change of position in support of a multilateral approach 
is another fundamental puzzle the dissertation seeks to address. 
Following the approval of the project, UNEP established a separate Project 
Coordinating Unit (PCU) in February 2002 to implement the South China Sea 
Project. This was done because of the complexity and large budget of the project, 
and the desire of China that countries other than those bordering the South China 
Sea should not be involved in any management decision regarding the project. 
COBSEA, with its wider membership including Korea, Australia and Singapore, 
could not therefore serve as the Steering Committee for this project.  Since 2002, 
UNEP activities in the East Asian Seas have followed two parallel courses: 
activities under the East Asian Seas Action Plan focused on implementing global 
programs within the region and the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  In the 
dissertation, each of these initiatives to institutionalize cooperation is treated as a 
domain to study the core questions about the triangular interactions among states 
and regional extra-regional intergovernmental organizations. Although the South 
China Sea has been the setting for more rapid and dramatic success in fostering 
cooperation, the successes and failures at the broader level of the East Asian plan 





In the context of the political difficulties for regional cooperation, the 
emergence of environmental cooperation in the South China Sea poses a series of 
interesting questions for both political economy and international relations 
theories.  Generally, why has environmental cooperation occurred in the sea of 
conflict?  More specifically, 1) under what conditions are these development-
minded states able to negotiate institutional arrangements to overcome collective 
action problems in situations where the incentive structure severely complicates 
cooperation?  2) Under what conditions can countries with political disputes still 
achieve environmental cooperation in shared sea areas?  3) What are the patterns of 
environmental cooperation occurring in a highly disputed resource abundant area?  
How are these patterns fostered or constrained by domestic, regional and 
international politics?  
To study these questions, I have focused on UNEP and its interactions with 
ASEAN and China in creating conditions conducive to environmental cooperation.  
Operationally, the dissertation explores:  1) The mechanisms through which UNEP 
has drawn disputing development-minded countries into environmental 
cooperation in a highly politically sensitive and contested area; 2) How China and 
the ASEAN countries have reacted to UNEP’s involvement, and how the 
interaction among UNEP, ASEAN and China has shaped the patterns and forms of 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea; 3) How UNEP has managed to 
draw China to multilateral cooperation, despite China’s persistent preference for 
bilateral dialogue on the South China Sea issues.27   
                                                 
27 UNEP’s role is particularly important, considering that the World Bank has failed to persuade 
China to participate as a full member in the Mekong River Commission.  China was reluctant to 




I am applying an approach that combines archival research, interviews, and 
participatory research to study environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.   
Prior to the defense of the dissertation proposal, I worked as a short-term 
consultant from September to December 2002 for the PCU of the UNEP/GEF 
South China Sea Project.  The short-term assignment with UNEP provided me 
abundant first-hand and second-hand data for the formulation of the hypotheses of 
the dissertation prospectus.  Since the defense of the dissertation prospectus, I have 
been working full-time for the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  My 
dissertation research has been fully supported by the Project Director and other 
staff members in the office, which has provided me with access to inside 
information and materials, and made it possible to interview a large number of 
senior government officials and environmental experts in the region. 
Archival research. I have conducted thorough research on the literature on 
cooperation and conflict in the South China Sea, and followed specific activities 
using newspapers and Internet.  In order to identify developing trends of 
environmental cooperation, I have traced the historical development of ASEAN 
environmental cooperation, the UNEP East Asian Seas Action Plan (1978-present), 
the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project (1996-present), the South China Sea 
Informal Working Group, and other past and present environmental cooperative 
activities in the region.  I have collected all of the meeting minutes and reports of 
COBSEA and UNEP executive reports to the intergovernmental meetings since 
1978.  I have reviewed past and ongoing regional activities and organizations for 
                                                                                                                                       
development, such as the termination of dam-building.  The World Bank failed to create an 
additional interest for China to participate in the Commission as a full member.   
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marine environmental protection related to the South China Sea region, and 
analyzed 15 existing regional and subregional environmental agreements and soft 
laws. 
Interviews.  During the formulation of the research program and prior to 
the defense of the dissertation proposal, I conducted some pre-interview research 
and chose more than 50 individuals as interviewees for my research.  A list of 
interviewees was included in the annex of the dissertation proposal.  These 
interviewees were chosen based on their involvement in regional marine 
cooperation and domestic policy-making processes, and their contributions to the 
formulation and development of national reports and the transboundary diagnostic 
analysis under the framework of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  This 
list of interviewees was changed dramatically when I started to conduct the 
interviews in the region.  Many of the original interviewees were domestic 
researchers, scientists, and scholars, who were usually the authors for technical 
reports for international organizations and national governments, but did not have 
adequate information on the process of regional cooperation. 
Due to my working experience, I have had the privilege to meet up to 120 
government officials and environmental experts from the South China Sea littoral 
countries.  I have formally interviewed more than 30 international civil servants, 
government officials and environmental experts.  My work with UNEP enabled me 
to meet with and interview these people multiple times, which helped me to clarify 
points and update developments.  More importantly, many discussions have been 
conducted in a less formal way during the break of meetings or over coffee or 
meals, due to sensitivities related to my research topic.  
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My own position with UNEP also imposed some constraints on my 
interviews with relevant individuals.  Governments are very sensitive about the 
South China Sea issues, and are afraid of losing their sovereign claims to the 
disputed areas.  It took UNEP a long time to reduce the level of suspicion that 
governments had and make it possible to initiate certain forms of formal 
multilateral cooperation, therefore, the senior management of UNEP was very 
careful about who I met and what questions I could ask.  It was expected that my 
research would be done in such a way as to not impair, to any extent, the trust and 
confidence that UNEP had worked hard to obtain.  Therefore, this method served 
as only a supplementary tool to the participatory research approach, which I have 
mostly relied on to collect the raw data and information for this dissertation. 
Participatory Research Approach.  Since September 2002, I have 
participated in and served as Secretary to more than twenty intergovernmental and 
regional expert meetings in implementing the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project.  In particular, I participated in the Regional Scientific Conference in 
February 2004, attended by about 120 senior government officials and senior 
environmental experts from the region, and observed the discourse on regional 
environmental cooperation and the possibilities to develop a regional convention in 
the South China Sea, after two years’ implementation of the project.  Table 1.2 
includes all the intergovernmental meetings related to environmental cooperation 
in the South China Sea, in which I have participated between 2002 and 2005. 
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Table 1.2.  Author’s Participation in Inter-governmental and Expert Meetings 
related to Environmental Cooperation in the South China Sea 
 
Meetings Date Participation Status 
First Regional Partners Workshop on Regional Coordination 
Mechanisms in the East Asian Seas Region, Bangkok, 
Thailand 
9–10  May 2005 
 
Observer 
Third Meeting of the Regional Task Force on Economic 
Valuation, Fangchenggang City, China 
18–21 Apr. 2005 Secretary 
Third Meeting of the Regional Task Force on Legal Matters, 
Olongapo City, Philippines 




Fourth Meeting of the Project Steering Committee, Guilin, 
China 
13–15 Dec. 2004 Secretary 
Fifth Meeting of the Regional Scientific and Technical 
Committee, Fangchenggang City, China 
9-11 Dec. 2004 Secretary 
Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Land-based 
Pollution, Shenzhen, China 
24-27Nov. 2004 Secretary 
Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Wetlands, 
Ha Long Bay, Viet Nam 
5-8 Oct. 2004 Secretary 
Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Coral 
Reefs, Koh Chang, Thailand 
13-15 Sep. 2004 Secretary 
Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Seagrass, 
Bintan, Indonesia 
24 - 27 Aug. 2004 Secretary 
Second Meeting of the Regional Task Force on Economic 
Valuation, Seam Reap, Cambodia 




Second Meeting of the Regional Task Force on Legal 
Matters, Phu Quoc Island, Viet Nam 
3-6 May 2004 Secretary 
Fourth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Fisheries, 
Manila, Philippines 
26-29 Apr. 2004 Secretary 
Fourth Meeting of the Regional Scientific and Technical 
Committee, Pattaya, Thailand  
15-17Feb. 2004 Observer 
First Regional Scientific Conference, Bangkok, Thailand 11-13 Feb. 2004 Presenter 
Fourth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Wetlands, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
15-18 Dec. 2003 Secretary 
Fourth Meeting of the Regional Working Group on Seagrass, 
Guangzhou, China 
29 Nov.-2 Dec. 
2003 
Secretary 
First Meeting of the Regional Task Force on Legal Matters, 
Phuket, Thailand 
15-17 Sep. 2003 Member and 
Secretary 
Second Meeting of the Project Steering Committee, Hanoi, 
Viet Nam 
16-18 Dec. 2002 Observer 
Second Meeting of the Regional Scientific and Technical 
Committee, Nha Trang, Viet Nam 
11-13 Dec. 2002 Observer 
 
The participatory research approach was allowed by UNEP only on the 
condition that my opinions or observations would not represent those of UNEP.  
However, my academic thinking or ideas have certainly influenced my ways of 
acting as a pro-cooperation UNEP officer in drawing countries’ participants to 
participate in the meetings and act collectively.  I have found through my own 
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working experience that the Sectary’s thinking and ways of framing an issue could 
have a great impact on the opinions of meeting participants.   
This approach has both a constraint and a strength.  A constraint of this 
approach is that many countries’ participants attended regional meetings in their 
personal capacity.  As a result, they did not wish to include their personal 
comments or observations in official meeting reports or to be quoted when 
sensitive issues were considered.  The strength of this approach is that I obtained 
access to senior government officials and experts’ frank opinions and thoughts 
about the issues.  As a result, I could obtain a relatively realistic estimate of the 




The dissertation proposes an interactive model between an IO (UNEP), a 
regional organization (ASEAN) and a regional power (China) in explaining 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.   Through the analysis of the 
interests, motivations, and mechanisms that have shaped the interactions between 
them, this dissertation seeks to explain the evolution of cooperation, the changing 
roles, strategies and mechanisms of the actors, and the levels of success of the 
environmental policies of these various actors in this highly contentious region.   
I contend that UNEP has played both instrumental and inductive roles in 
facilitating and forging environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  On the 
one hand, in claiming environmental protection as a neutral and non-political issue, 
UNEP drew the littoral countries to the negotiation table and hence 
internationalized South China Sea environmental protection, making non-
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participation in UNEP-sponsored environmental cooperation a politically costly 
and thus unfavorable strategy for the littoral countries.  On the other hand, UNEP 
has provided an instrument to address collective environmental problems, and a 
mechanism for political confidence building between China and the ASEAN 
countries.   
Changing Roles of Major Actors.  Since 1978, environmental cooperation 
in the South China Sea has grown from sporadic, ad hoc and individualistic 
activities to systematic, planned and coordinated activities.  The development of 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea reflects several trends: from a 
general approach that covers broad sea areas (East Asian Seas Action Plan) to a 
more specific but inclusive approach, from a formal to an informal and then back 
to a formal approach, from a policy oriented to an action focused approach, and 
from a top-down to a bottom-up approach.  Table 1.3 outlines the evolution of 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
 
Table 1.3.  Evolution of Environmental Cooperation from the East Asian Seas 
to the South China Sea 
 
 Traditional (1978-1995) Transitional (1996-2001) Current (2002-Present) 
Geographic
al Coverage 
Sub-regional Supra-regional Regional/supra-regional 
Format Formal Informal (1990-2000) Formal 
Area of 
cooperation 
Policy-oriented Policy-oriented Action-oriented 
Approach Top-down Top-down Bottom-up 
Legal 
Status 
Non-legally binding Non-legally binding Non-legally binding 
Nature Technical Technical and political Technical and political 
 
During the evolution of environmental cooperation in the South China Sea, 
major actors, driven by different interests, have transformed their roles in forging 
and shaping environmental cooperation in its current form in the South China Sea.  
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UNEP adapted its roles from a mainly technical and financial provider to a 
political negotiator in bringing these completely differently positioned parties to 
formal inter-governmental cooperation.  ASEAN transformed its role from a 
“passive recipient” of financial resources and technical assistance, to an active 
advocate of multilateral environmental cooperation.  China, faced with the 
changing situations and strategies of the other major actors in the process, has 
turned from a laggard on multilateral cooperation to an active implementer and a 
strong sponsor for UNEP’s role in the region.  Table 1.4 summarizes the changing 
roles of the major actors during the development of marine environmental 
cooperation in the South China Sea. 
Table 1.4.  Changing Roles of Major Actors 








(catalytic through actions) 
and political 
ASEAN Recipient of financial 
and technical assistance 
from UNEP 
 
Provider of institutional 
arrangements 
Pressuring political entity 
for multilateral cooperation 
in the South China Sea 
Advocator of multilateral 
environmental cooperation 
China Laggard of multilateral 
cooperation 
Hard negotiator Active implementer of 
activities under UNEP’s 
multilateral project, and 





The Period of 1978-1995.  UNEP, in its early involvement in the East 
Asian Seas, took ASEAN as a convenient institutional setting for the development 
of the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  During this period, UNEP played a traditional 
technical role in catalyzing national environmental protection efforts, by providing 
financial resources, information and technical assistance, setting agendas, and 
choosing participants.  The implementation of the Action Plan contributed directly 
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to the development of marine environmental cooperation within ASEAN countries, 
enabling ASEAN to build its own environmental program after a decade of UNEP 
involvement.  However, ASEAN left an institutional hallmark in the Action Plan, 
which to date has failed to reach a legally-binding convention or agreement, due to 
ASEAN’s traditional aversion to legally binding commitments, the so called 
“ASEAN Way”.   
During this period, China’s participation in multilateral cooperation was 
limited.  Prior to the mid-1990s, China always believed in bilateral negotiations, 
taking an approach of “divide and conquer.”  China believed that it could reap 
maximum benefits through bilateral negotiations.  The approach remained 
successful and unchallenged, since military conflict had occurred only between 
China and Viet Nam, which was not a member to ASEAN.  Hence China remained 
a laggard in multilateral actions in the South China Sea in all fields, including 
security talks and environmental cooperation.   
The Period of 1996-2001.  In 1994, China joined the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan upon the invitation of UNEP.  Starting in 1995, UNEP initiated 
discussions to develop a multilateral cooperative project for the South China Sea 
under the framework of the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  This idea later matured 
in 1996, when all the member countries endorsed the idea to develop the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  The project document was developed and 
endorsed by the six countries other than China within three years.  UNEP spent 
another one and one-half years to negotiating with and persuading China to 
participate in this project.  UNEP’s bottom line was that even if negotiations failed 
to draw China to participate in this project, it would still be funded with the 
participation from the rest of the countries bordering the South China Sea.   
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By internationalizing environmental protection in the South China Sea, 
UNEP made non-participation a less attractive/more costly strategy for the littoral 
countries because participating countries did not want to lose their voices in an 
authoritative forum on any issues related to the South China Sea.  Therefore, 
UNEP managed to persuade the littoral countries to cooperate on environmental 
protection in the South China Sea, due to its neutral and authoritative status in the 
regional setting and international context.  During the process, UNEP has 
transformed its traditional technical functional role into a political role as a 
“mediator” and “broker” of environmental cooperation.   
ASEAN has played a role as a pressuring regional political entity in 
pushing China to participate in multilateral cooperation.  ASEAN’s members 
formed a united stand in supporting a multilateral project.  This put China in a 
dilemma: if China did not participate, it would blemish its image as a cooperative 
and friendly country.  More importantly, multilateral cooperation has been 
developing rapidly among the ASEAN countries in addressing the South China Sea 
issue, through various political declarations. This meant that ASEAN countries 
internationalize and multilateralize the South China Sea issues within ASEAN, 
without the full participation of China.  This tends to foster a united ASEAN stand 
against China.  China does not want to see itself excluded from this kind of forum 
as it would leave China with no control over decision-making processes.   
China was left without much choice.  If China did not participate in the 
proposed multilateral cooperation, it would lose the opportunity to get involved in 
the activities and have a control on the process, and lose possible say over the 
future of the South China Sea.  Due to UNEP’s involvement, multilateral 
cooperation has a particularly important implication for the future, because the UN 
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could become the ultimate forum for countries to legitimize their territorial claims.  
If the territorial disputes were to go for adjudication under the UN system, then 
China’s position could be undermined if it were not an active participant in 
cooperative endeavors, and non-participation in the UNEP sponsored activities 
could serve as an argument against China’s territorial claims. 
China’s choice was further constrained by its foreign policy goal of 
developing a peaceful and friendly relationship with ASEAN countries in order to 
promote economic development and foreign trade with these countries.  Politically, 
China did not wish to conflict with ASEAN as it would have to deal with larger 
political issues with other external powers, including the United States or Russia.  
China has tried very hard to appease its neighbors and express that it does not wish 
to become a dominant regional hegemon.  China has to care about its image in the 
eyes of its neighboring countries. 
The Period of 2002-Present.  UNEP has carefully de-politicized 
environmental cooperation and “downgraded” its role as a political mediator, by 
mainly focusing its role on the provision of intellectual, scientific and technical 
leadership.  It has done this to avoid plunging the project into any political 
quagmires.   
ASEAN has in this period become an active advocator of multilateral 
cooperation in the South China Sea.  There has been a trend of growing 
cooperative activities for the South China Sea under the framework of ASEAN.  
ASEAN played a role as a “broker” of multilateral cooperation, seen in the signing 
of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea by all ten 
ASEAN members and China in November 2002.   
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China has witnessed a growing trend of consolidation of voices among 
ASEAN members willing to condemn China’s assertive actions in the South China 
Sea.  To China, ASEAN and UNEP have treated it differently.  Under the 
framework of ASEAN, China is only a dialogue partner, and is presented with 
results from negotiations among full members of the organization.  Under the 
umbrella of UNEP, in contrast, China is a full member, the most powerful member 
among all, participating in the negotiation process from the beginning.  Realizing 
its inability to prevent the trend of multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea, 
and pressured by ASEAN’s aggressive activities in multilateralizing the South 
China Sea, China has become a strong sponsor of UNEP-led multilateral 
cooperative initiatives, because it believes it has a better position in UNEP-led 
cooperation than in ASEAN-based cooperation.   
Mechanisms.  During the process of getting China involved in a 
multilateral initiative in the highly sensitive South China Sea, UNEP has taken a 
“pull” strategy, while “ASEAN” applied a “push” strategy.  As discussed in 
Chapter 4 and 5, UNEP’s inductive power has been leveraged through the 
following mechanisms: potential legitimization, domestic politics, and linkage 
politics.  Its instrumental power to facilitate regional cooperation has been 
manifested through two mechanisms, i.e. confidence building and identity politics.   
Potential legitimization.  UNEP does not possess the necessary “hard” 
power to force the countries to cooperate; however, it has potential “soft” power as 
a neutral and authoritative IO.  This “soft power” is closely linked with the 
symbolic power of the United Nations, which could influence possible 
legitimization of various territorial claims by international society.  UNEP’s 
involvement has created a situation in which countries were afraid that non-
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participation in environmental cooperation might endanger their future claims to 
the disputed areas.   
Domestic Politics.  At the national level, there are inter-agency conflicts 
and factions of government agencies or officials.  UNEP promotes regional 
cooperation by allying with and strengthening the pro-cooperation agencies or 
factions, through information provision and technical support. 
Linkage politics.  The sphere of activity of an IO need not be restricted to a 
particular issue-area of international relations.28  In the South China Sea, where 
multiple issues overlap and interact, the study of environmental cooperation must 
be based on a larger geopolitical context rather than focus purely on environmental 
protection activities.  The UN system is the forum for various issues and a node for 
issue linkages.  UNEP’s involvement in regional cooperation represents the UN’s 
initiative, which countries tend to support, possibly due to their overall 
considerations of the general benefits that derive from a relationship with UN 
agencies.  
Confidence and trust building.  When discussing the interaction between 
IOs and states, especially developing countries, scholars mainly treat developing 
countries as passive recipients of financial and technical assistance, knowledge, 
ideas or norms.29  However, in this case the littoral countries did not stay passive in 
reacting to UNEP initiatives.  Using UNEP as a mediator, the littoral countries 
have successfully transformed environmental protection efforts into an instrument 
for building confidence and trust between China and ASEAN, to achieve their 
                                                 
28 A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger.  1997.  Theories of International Regimes.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
29 See Peter Haas.  1992.  Saving the Mediterranean: the Politics of International Environmental 
Cooperation.  New York, NY: Columbia University Press.  Martha Finnemore.  1996.  National 
Interests in International Society.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.   
 
 31
other diplomatic goals.  At the same time, UNEP has also implanted and 
demonstrated the idea that successful environmental cooperation can be achieved 
without necessarily addressing territorial disputes.   
Identity Politics.  Over time, ASEAN has successfully formed a community 
and an “ASEAN” identity.  The Philippines and Viet Nam in particular have 
successfully transformed the South China Sea into a regional issue, and made 
ASEAN issue several declarations regarding the South China Sea.  China is also 
very concerned about its image to the Southeast Asian countries, and is trying hard 
to create a “friendly” image and act as a good citizen of the community.  UNEP 
activities provide an arena for ASEAN and China to socialize with one another for 
their overall diplomatic goals. 
 
Contribution to International Relations Scholarship 
The dissertation contributes to international relations and Sino-ASEAN 
relations’ literatures the first systematic theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
dynamics between global, regional and domestic forces in forging environmental 
cooperation in the South China Sea.  The dissertation explores not only the effects 
of international environmental initiatives on the regional dynamics of ASEAN and 
China, but also their responses to global initiatives.  It allows the reader to gain a 
detailed perspective on how a newly established regional organization and a rising 
power respond to global environmental movements, and turn environmental 
cooperation into an instrument for regional consolidation of ASEAN and 
confidence building mechanism between ASEAN and China.  Beyond capturing 
important transformations in Southeast Asian politics and Sino-China relationships 
and their impacts on environmental cooperation, this dissertation adds to the 
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broader political science literature that bridges the divide between global, regional 
and domestic politics.  In an era of globalization and regionalism, it is particularly 
essential for scholars and policy makers to understand the dynamics between 
global actors, regionalization and domestic politics. 
The dissertation also formulates a framework to analyze the sources and 
mechanisms of under-studied dimensions of the power of IOs in promoting 
regional environmental cooperation in a contentious area.  This framework is 
particularly important at this time, as environmental cooperation studies to date 
have mainly focused on regime analysis and formulation.  With the increased 
number of IOs active in promoting environmental cooperation, this dissertation 
offers a generalizable framework to analyze IOs’ roles in influencing international 
politics, beyond the environmental politics field. 
The dissertation also strengthens the approach to analyzing environmental 
politics in a larger framework of political dynamics, and bridges the traditional 
divide between realists and institutionalists in analyzing and explaining 
international cooperation.  This study highlights the dynamics between traditional 
“high politics” and “low politics” issues, and illustrates the conditions for their 
intertwining relationships in the complexity of a regional political setting. 
 
The Plan of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 will first review the literature on international cooperation, and 
will contend that there is an inadequacy of both empirical and theoretical studies of 
the roles of IOs in facilitating and forging environmental cooperation.  After 
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of various international relations theories, 
the chapter will propose my theoretical framework to investigate and explain 
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international environmental cooperation in the South China Sea region.  I contend 
that neither international regimes nor NGOs can supplant the roles of formal IOs in 
facilitating environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  The distinctive 
characteristic of IOs, not possessed by either regimes or NGOs, is the symbolic 
power of the organization itself in inducing or forcing states to cooperate on 
international environmental protection.  Due to IO’s involvement in the South 
China Sea, participation per se is a selective incentive to force states to take part in 
IO-sponsored environmental cooperation. 
Chapter 3 describes the environmental, economic and geopolitical 
conditions of the South China Sea, and examines the obstacles to and the necessity 
of environmental cooperation in the region.   It will survey the significance of the 
South China Sea in terms of its strategic location, oil resources, and marine 
biological diversity.  It will review different countries’ competing claims to the 
same sea area, territorial disputes among the countries, and marine environmental 
degradation in the region; and analyze the political and socio-economic causes and 
consequences of environmental degradation caused by fast economic development 
and sovereign disputes.  I contend that environmental degradation may worsen the 
already contentious and volatile situation in the South China Sea due to increasing 
competition for oil resources and fishery resources.  Environmental cooperation is 
therefore important not only in protecting and maintaining marine biological 
diversity, but also in achieving regional security in the highly volatile area. 
Chapter 4 reviews the development and implementation of the East Asian 
Seas Action Plan from the late 1970s to the present.  The chapter argues that 
UNEP has played a significant role in catalyzing early environmental cooperation 
among Southeast Asian countries by providing intellectual, technical and financial 
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assistance in the early stage of the Action Plan, including the development of 
ASEAN marine environmental cooperation.  However, the Action Plan was 
embedded in ASEAN for more than a decade, and thus inherited the institutional 
legacy of the “ASEAN way”.  This has resulted in the inability of the countries to 
reach a regional convention.    
Chapter 5 focuses on recent efforts in engaging China in environmental 
cooperation in marine environmental protection in the South China Sea, and 
examines the interactions among UNEP, China and ASEAN in forging 
cooperation.  This chapter illustrates how UNEP has induced China and ASEAN 
countries to marine environmental cooperation.  During the process, UNEP has 
transformed its traditional technical roles into political roles, and has played both 
inductive and instrumental roles.  UNEP’s involvement in the interactions among 
China and ASEAN countries provides additional political incentives for countries’ 
participation in regional cooperation in addressing shared marine environment 
problems. 
Chapter 6 concludes that the interactions between UNEP, ASEAN and 
China explain the development and evolution of environmental cooperation in the 
South China Sea.  It will then propose some recommendations for strengthened 
regional environmental cooperation, for UNEP’s roles, and for other IOs’ 










Since the Stockholm Conference in 1972, IOs1 have played an increasing 
role in carrying out environment protection activities and promoting international 
environmental cooperation.  What attributes of IOs account for their roles, and how 
do these characteristics set formal organizations apart from alternative institutional 
arrangements?  Under what conditions can IOs play their roles better, and through 
which mechanisms can they leverage their powers to execute these roles?  These 
questions are embedded in a larger theoretical debate among scholars of 
international relations in explaining and promoting international cooperation, a 
perennial question in the field of international relations.2  The debate encompasses 
many of the principal questions in the discipline, and has stimulated scholars to 
write in length on questions such as: 1) why states cooperate while rationalist 
deduction leads to the prediction of the difficulties of cooperation in international 
relations; 2) whether institutions matter in promoting international cooperation. 
This chapter will review major international relations theories in explaining 
the emergence of international cooperation, and the debates on the relevance or 
irrelevance of international institutions in promoting international cooperation, 
                                                 
1 In this chapter, I will use IO to refer to formal international organization.  When I talk about 
international organization as a field, which covers the studies of various forms of international 
institutions, I will not use acronyms, but refer to international organization. 
 
2 See e.g., Stephen Krasner, ed.  1983.  International Regimes.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.  Robert Keohane.  1984.  After Hegemony.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  Robert 
Axelrod.  1984.  The Evolution of Cooperation.  New York: Basic Books.  Kenneth A. Oye, ed.  
1986.  Cooperation Under Anarchy.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  Robert Putnam and 
Nicholas Bayne.  1987.  Hanging Together.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  Martin 
Feldstein.  1988.  International Economic Cooperation.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Oran Young.  1989.  International Cooperation.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.   
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with a view to identifying theoretical weaknesses and empirical gaps of the 
existing literature.  I contend that none of the existing theories can adequately 
explain the development and evolution of environmental cooperation in the South 
China Sea, although each holds key insights.  I will then propose an approach 
based on institutionalist arguments, while integrating realist elements, to study 
environmental cooperation.  I argue that there has been a shift of academic 
attention from formal IOs to less informal regimes in studying environmental 
cooperation, and contend that more attention should be paid to the unique attributes 
and special roles of IOs, in comparison with other forms of institutions.  I will then 
propose an approach to study IOs in facilitating international cooperation, by 
examining the sources of power, roles, and mechanisms of IOs as independent 
actors in international cooperation.  Finally, I will present the South China Sea as a 
case to study with the integrated approach, and derive my working hypotheses 
from the theoretical reviews and the specific considerations of the South China 
Sea. 
A review of the existing theoretical and empirical literature shows two 
weaknesses in the study of international cooperation.  First, there is a general 
tendency to focus on international institutions, regimes and norms,3 with little 
attention to the roles of IOs that bear or implement these institutions, regimes or 
norms.4  Although some recent research has sought more systematically to 
                                                 
3 These concepts are generally inter-changeable for many scholars.  Literature include, e.g., 
footnote 2.   
 
4 Regime theories, for example, treat international organizations as empty shells or impersonal 
policy machinery.  States bargain within the machinery in pursuit of their policy goals.  During the 
process, the machinery’s norms and rules may constrain what states can do, but the machinery itself 
is passive and has no role.  See Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore.  1999.  “The Politics, 





demonstrate that institutions are sometimes significant for political outcomes, 
much less has been written about the mechanisms through which these institutions 
matter and work to facilitate international cooperation.  Second, the ongoing 
theoretical debates treat cooperation and conflict as a binary phenomenon 
(cooperation versus defection).  They often treat the two as competing alternatives 
or as analytically separable, rather than inherently bound together.  In existing 
empirical studies on international cooperation, scholars writing on international 
cooperation in issue areas such as economy, trade, and environment, tend to ignore 
the constraints imposed by security and structural conditions, outlined by realist 
theorists, under which states behave.  As a consequence, realists conclude that 
rational institutionalist arguments on “institutions matter” are only applicable to 
the issues of low politics.5 
To fill in the above-mentioned theoretical and empirical gaps in the existing 
literature on international cooperation and IOs, this chapter develops an interactive 
and integrative approach rooted in rational and sociological institutionalism to 
study the roles of IOs, the sources of their power, and the mechanisms through 
which they influence state behavior and shape the scope, form and pattern of 
international cooperation.  IOs are treated as independent actors interacting with 
other actors in influencing and changing political outcomes.  My approach differs 
from most institutionalist analysis, in which actors interact and foster the results in 
a “power vacuum,” an assumption that has been criticized by realists.  The 
                                                 
5 John Mearsheimer, in a critical review of rational institutionalism, pointed out that institutionalist 
theory is based on “the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realms—
security and political economy—and that institutionalism mainly applies to the latter.” See John J. 
Mearsheimer.  1994.  “The False Promise of Institutions.”  International Security, Vol. 19, Issue 3: 
5-49.  p. 15. 
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interactive approach takes into account countries’ competition for power and desire 
to pursue relative gains.   
The approach echoes rational institutionalist arguments that IOs are an 
instrument to facilitate cooperation by helping states to reduce transaction costs 
and overcome market failures, collective action dilemmas, and problems associated 
with interdependent social choice.  The instrumental power of IOs in addressing 
collective action problems derives from their possession of expertise, information, 
and knowledge.6  Another type of instrumental power with realist flavor, which has 
been much less studied by institutionalists, is realized through IOs’ interactions 
with other major actors, in which IOs serve as an instrument for countries to 
achieve their top national policy goals, a result which may be unintended by IOs 
themselves.  
The approach also builds upon sociological institutionalist arguments that 
the authority and legitimacy embodied by IOs bestow them with the power to 
induce countries to engage in international cooperation.  The inductive power of 
IOs lies in the obligations felt by countries to comply with IOs due to their special 
attributes and power.  Other forms of international institutions, including non-
governmental organizations, rules and/or norms can provide similar motivations 
for addressing collective action problems, but do not possess the inductive power 
derived from the authority and legitimacy of IOs.   
This integrated approach argues that the power of an IO is realized in 
interacting with other major actors, and emphasizes the interactions among actors 
in deciding the forms and content of cooperation.  The results of this interaction 
may vary by region or issue area.  I identify three specific mechanisms through 
                                                 
6 See Keohane.  1984. 
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which IOs can leverage their powers and execute their roles: identity politics, 
domestic politics, and linkage politics.  Even if we take the realist assumption 
about states’ competition for power (relative gains) as a variable in deciding states’ 
preferences, strategies, and policies during the process of forging international 
cooperation, IOs still matter and play a role in deciding political outcomes of 
international negotiations.   
Lastly, the chapter presents the South China Sea environmental cooperation 
as a highly interesting case to examine specific propositions related to the question 
of “why institutions matter”, provide a more focused view on the roles of IOs, and 
fill in empirical gaps in linking security, economic development, and environment 
protection.  IOs at the regional level are more prominent than those acting in the 
global arena.  I posit that, when an IO created at the global level acts at the regional 
level, both its instrumental and inductive power will be elevated.  A region cannot 
disband a globally established organization; neither can rules or procedures be 
changed at the regional level unless countries take the issue to the global level.  At 
the regional level, an IO is not merely an arena or instrument for countries to 
pursue national interests or compete for national power, but acts independently 
with its mandates, visions and interests influencing how it interacts with countries.   
 
Theories of International Cooperation 
Keohane defines cooperation as occurring “when actors adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of 
policy coordination.”7   Following this definition, Helen Milner, in a review article, 
conceptualizes cooperation as “goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy 
                                                 
7 Robert Keohane.  1984.   
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adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be.”8  
These two similar definitions share three components, which could help us to 
identify what cooperation is in reality.  First, they assume that states are rational 
actors with some goal(s).  Accidental behaviors cannot be considered as 
cooperation.  Second, the definitions imply that mutual gains and rewards result 
from the cooperative behaviors, which could not be achieved if actors were not to 
cooperate.  The gains need not be the same in amount or kind for each state, but the 
gains must be mutual.  Third, states need to make extra efforts (policy adjustment) 
to achieve the goals, so cooperation usually means an extra policy or action.9  
Therefore, in order to diagnose causes of states’ participation in international 
cooperation, we have to identify the major actors, and analyze the goals of the 
actors, the gains (amount and kind) that they aim to achieve, and the efforts they 
are undertaking in international cooperation.   
There are basically three groups of theories involved in the ongoing project 
of explaining the presence and absence of policy cooperation under conditions of 
international anarchy: realism, rational institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism.  Realism does not consider institutions as a central variable in 
deciding international political outcomes, while rational and sociological 
institutionalism believe institutions can fundamentally change state policy, but they 
vary in the ways how institutions change state policies.   
                                                 
8 Helen Milner.  1992.  “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and 






Realism.    In the realist perspective, states are fundamentally motivated by 
relative gains because their major concerns are a relative measure such as power.10   
Realism presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international 
cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.  For realists, 
international institutions do not have independent roles in international politics, 
because they are barely arenas for states to compete and pursue their interests and 
do not have structural powers over individual states.11  International institutions are 
a reflection of the balance of power, created by powerful states to maintain the 
existing power structure, and hence are “merely an intervening variable”12 in 
international politics.  Realists tend to have a gloomy view of the prospects for 
collective action to address global problems, including what Kenneth Waltz calls 
“the four p’s”—pollution, poverty, population and proliferation.13   
                                                 
10 This chapter does not distinguish between realism and “neorealism,” because on crucial issues—
the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states, and problem of cooperation—modern 
realists like Waltz and Gilpin are very much in accord with classical realists like Carr and 
Morgenthau.  This has been pointed out by Joseph M. Grieco in his critical review of rational 
institutionalism, see Joseph M. Grieco.  1988.  “Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: a Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.”  Major contemporary realist works include:  Hans 
J. Morgenthau.  1957.  Politics among Nations, 4th ed.  New York: Afred A. Knopf.  E. H. Carr.  
1964.  The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations.  London and New York: Harper Torchbooks.  Kenneth Waltz.  1959.  Man, the State and 
War: a Theoretical Analysis.  New York: Columbia University Press.  Kenneth Waltz.  1979.  
Theory of International Politics.  Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  Robert Gilpin.  1981.  War and 
Change in World Politics.  New York: Cambridge University Press.  Joanne Gowa.  1986.  
“Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations.”  
International Organization 43: 167-186.  Joseph M. Grieco.  1988.  “Realist Theory and the 
Problem of Cooperation.”  Journal of Politics 50: 600-624.  Joseph M. Grieco.  1990.  Cooperation 
among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.     
 
11 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson.  1992.  “Regime Theory and the English School of International 
Relations: A Comparison.”  Millennium: Journal of International Studies Vol. 21, p. 330.   
 
12 John J. Mearsheimer.  1994.  “The False Promise of International Institutions.”  International 
Security Vol 19, p. 13.  
 




The realist “theory of hegemonic stability” claims that the presence of a 
single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively 
desirable outcomes for all the states in the system.14  China is clearly the regional 
hegemon in the South China Sea region.  If the theory holds, the variation of 
cooperation in the region would be, then, a function of (or at least strongly 
influenced) by Chinese foreign policy decisions.  Therefore, if we want to 
understand the features, patterns, and activities of any cooperation in the region, 
we need to examine the preference structure and activities in Beijing.  Empirical 
studies notwithstanding show that there are problems with this hegemonic 
proposition in this region.  In practice, China was the biggest obstacle to reaching 
multilateral environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  China has been 
opposed to any sort of internationalization of the South China Sea issue, and it acts 
as a “reluctant” regional hegemon when it comes to providing “public goods” and 
stabilizing the regional political environment.  From the ASEAN countries’ point 
of view, China continues to be a potential threat to the peace and stability of the 
South China Sea.   
Rational Institutionalism.  Rational institutionalist theories share the basic 
assumption of realism, that states are unitary rational actors determined to 
maximize their interests in dealing with one another.  They reject realist 
propositions about international cooperation and its gloomy understanding of 
                                                 
14 See Robert Gilpin.  1975.  US Power and the Multinational Corporation: the Political Economy 
of Foreign Direct Investment.  New York: Basic Books.  Robert Guilpin.  1981.  War and Change 
in World Politics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Robert Gilpin.  1987.  The Political 
Economy of International Relations.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  Robert Keohane.  
1984.  After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.  Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  Charles P. Kindleberger.  1981.  “Dominance and Leadership in the 
International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods and Free Riders.”  International Studies 
Quarterly 25: 242-254.  Charles P. Kindleberger.  1986.  “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation.”  
International Organization 40: 841-848.  Duncan Snidal.  1985.  “The Limits of Hegemonic 




world politics, and attribute to international institutions a wide range of effects on 
international cooperation.  Accordingly, institutions change the incentives for 
states to cooperate, reduce transaction costs, link issues and provide focal points 
for cooperation.15  For rational institutionalists, international institutions matter, 
but their roles are only constrained to changing incentives structure of the players 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games. Although they argue that international 
institutions can help states cooperate, they view international institutions as 
instruments to achieve collective solutions, and the roles of international 
institutions are exemplified in changing the incentives for states to cooperate or 
defect.   International institutions are a context in which state actors play their 
games.  They do not participate in the games as independent actors; neither do they 
create values or change states’ definition of interests.   
Sociological Institutionalism.  Sociological institutionalists argue that 
states’ definitions of national interests are deeply embedded in the social context of 
the international society.16  World politics is heavily regulated by norms that 
prescribe appropriate behavior and are embedded in formal and informal 
institutions of the international society.17   Sociological institutionalism also bases 
its argument on the assumption that ideas—worldviews, principled beliefs, and 
                                                 
15 Robert Koehane and Lisa Martin.  1995.  “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” 
 
16 As Martha Finnemore has put it: “States do not always know what they want.  They and the 
people in them develop perceptions of interest and understandings of desirable behavior from social 
interactions with others in the world they inhabit.  States are socialized to accept certain preferences 
and expectations by the international society in which they and the people who compose them live.”  
See Martha Finnemore.  1996.  National Interests in International Society.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
17 See Jeffrey T. Checkel.  1999.  “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary 
Europe.”  International Study Quarterly Vol. 43: p. 83.  Gregory A. Raymond.  1997.  “Problems 





knowledge18—not only define the meaning of power but also affect the reasoning 
process by which state actors define their interests.  States can learn new patterns 
of reasoning and may consequently begin to pursue new state interests.19   
Sociological institutionalism holds a relatively modest view on the roles of 
IOs in spreading norms and disseminating certain ideas on the causal chain 
analysis of some problems.  IOs, as norm-makers and norm promoters, promote 
international cooperation by creating and disseminating these norms, but are not 
necessarily an essential condition.  Norms can have influences on states’ 
preferences and policy directions even in the absence of formal organizations to 
enforce compliance with their injunctions.20   
Sociological institutionalism assumes that states can learn new patterns of 
reasoning and may consequently begin to pursue new state interests.21  
Accordingly, diffusion of ideas, knowledge or conceptualization of problems can 
transform states’ perception of self-interests and their calculations of costs and 
benefits on a specific issue, leading to a convergent attitude among states with 
regard to an issue, which in turn contributes to environmental cooperation.22   
Assuming states’ capability to learn, Haas argues the importance of the 
epistemic community, i.e. the networks of knowledge-based experts, in teaching 
government officials and persuading them to adopt environmental policies to 
                                                 
18 On these distinctions, see Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane eds.  1993.  Ideas and Foreign 
Policy.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
 
19 Andrew Farkas.  1998.  State Learning and International Change.  Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
20 Gregory A. Raymond.  1997.  “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms.”  
Mershon International Studies Review Vol. 41: 205-245. 
 
21 Andrew Farkas.  1998.  State Learning and International Change.  Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
22 See Goldstein and Keohane.  1993. 
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address marine environmental problems in the Mediterranean.23  The epistemic 
community approach argues that the involvement of IOs is not a necessary 
condition for the epistemic community to execute its roles in promoting 
environmental cooperation.  Although fully aware that UNEP professionals are 
members of the epistemic community, Haas considers that these professionals act 
out of their beliefs in science and causal relationships shared with their scientific 
counterparts, rather than their mandates to behave as UN officials.  Hence, UNEP 
is not a necessary condition for the establishment of such an epistemic 
community.24 
 
Alternative Explanations for Environmental Cooperation 
Most empirical studies on international environmental cooperation are 
centered on explaining institution building and regime formation, or investigating 
the roles of institutions or regimes in facilitating cooperation.25  In the study of 
                                                 
23 See Peter Haas.  1990.  Saving the Mediterranean: the Politics of International Environmental 
Cooperation.  New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
24 Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas.  1992.  “Conclusions: Epistemic Community, World Order 
and the Creation of a Reflective Research Programme.”  International Organization, Vol. 46, Issue 
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25 See Edward L. Miles et al, eds.  2002.  Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting 
Theory with Evidence.  Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press.  Oran R. Young, ed.  1997.  Global 
Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
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how the environment entered the political agenda, including environmental 
awareness raising and issue identification, the roles of non-state actors, namely 
advocacy networks, social movements and global civil society, have been better 
theorized in the process of international environmental politics than the roles of 
IOs.26  Scholarship has also examined how non-state actors influence the process 
of IOs and “green” IOs.27   
In a major review on the research of international environmental policy, 
Michael Zürn reviewed the development of international environmental politics as 
a field, and identified five research themes in the field: 1) holistic perspectives, 2) 
agenda setting, 3) regime formation, 4) regime effects, and 5) transnational 
networks.28  All of these themes are based on a post realist consensus, which holds 
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that international institutions do matter.  World politics is much than just 
intergovernmental politics and includes a wider range of actors other than states.  It 
is not only about power and material interest but is also about nonmaterial 
interests, ideas, knowledge, and discourses.  Zürn points out that the study of 
regime effectiveness and transnational networks has the most potential for 
producing an enduring research program.29  Scholars indeed have written most in 
these two subjects in the field of environmental politics.30  In this section I will 
mainly review the major arguments of how regimes and NGOs facilitate 
environmental cooperation in existing literature, and explain why they do not 
provide adequate explanation for the environmental cooperation in the South China 
Sea. 
Regimes and Environmental Cooperation.  As a form of international 
institutions, international regimes facilitate international environmental 
cooperation by providing information to participants, reducing transaction costs 
and acting as a monitoring mechanism.31  Some scholars measure the effectiveness 
of regimes in promoting international cooperation, and contend that 
“demonstrating that regimes matter is an essential step in understanding the role of 
institutional arrangements as determinants of collective outcomes in international 
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society.”32  Young measures regime effectiveness by measuring how regimes 
influence the behaviors of the states and other actors, including IOs, 
nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and even individuals, whose 
behavioral changes contribute to the solution of collective problems.33  Taking a 
behavioral approach, Young contends that regimes have effects always through 
influencing the behaviors of actors in an issue area.  Additionally, in order to gain 
deeper insights into the roles regimes play as determinants of collective outcomes, 
it is essential to explore the behavioral pathways or mechanisms through which 
regimes produce results.  Regimes are proposed as utility modifiers, enhancers of 
cooperation, bestowers of authority, learning facilitators, role definers and agents 
of internal alignment.34   
It is well established that regimes can promote international cooperation.  
However, the definition of regimes has been always an ambiguous concept.  
According to Stephen Krasner, regimes are: 
Implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations.  Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude.  Norms are standards of behavior defined 
in terms of rights and obligations.  Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action.  Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice.35 
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Susan Strange directed what has become a classic volley of criticisms 
against the study of international regimes, and asserted that regime analysis was 
doomed to failure because of the “imprecision” and wooliness” of the concept.36  
In addition to the well-known ambiguity of the definitions used to explain the 
concept, regime analysis has two other weaknesses.  First, the canonical definition 
of regime encompasses only norms and collective choice procedures, making no 
provision for the active and independent IO functions and the corresponding 
institutional forms.37  Regime theory deals with institutions at such a general level 
that it has little to say about the particular institutional arrangements that organize 
international politics.  Second, as many scholars have noted, the very existence of a 
regime indicates a prior series of decisions by states to cooperate and that the 
regime formation itself is kind of collective action problem.   
Environmental NGOs.  Due to the tremendous growth in the size and 
numbers of environmental NGOs, the roles of NGOs in international 
environmental politics have drawn increasing scholarly attention, resulting in a 
proliferation of literature on environmental NGOs.38  To simultaneously reach up 
to the states and formal IOs and down to the local communities, environmental 
NGOs have played an important role in social learning, awareness raising, 
monitoring and research as a complementary function to the state’s activities.  In 
regime formation, environmental NGOs influence issue identification, agenda 
setting and negotiation processes.  In addition to the role of NGOs as pressure 
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groups that “change states’ policies or create conditions in the international system 
that enhance or diminish interstate cooperation,”39 some scholars ambitiously 
contend the emergence of “global civil society” or “world civic politics,”40 defined 
as “a set of relational networks…(that) can and do directly shape widespread 
behavior in matters of public concern and involvement.”41 
Environmental NGOs do raise awareness of environmental protection, such 
as tropical deforestation in Southeast Asia.42  But few international environmental 
NGOs are engaging in marine environmental protection, partly because most of the 
governments in the South China Sea region still impose strict restrictions on 
NGOs’ activities, and partly because of the low number and capacity of NGOs in 
the developing countries that can hardly meet the requirement of dealing with 
complex regional seas’ problems.  Therefore, the extent of NGOs’ influence in the 
emerging environmental cooperation in the South China Sea tends to be 
constrained and limited.  
 
Weaknesses of Theories and Empirical Studies on Environmental 
Cooperation 
There are three weaknesses of theories and current empirical studies on 
environmental cooperation.  First, the three bodies of theories have different 
assumptions on the situations under which states develop international cooperation 
or incur conflicts, and hence reach completely disparate conclusions on the 
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possibility and prospect of international cooperation.  Students of international 
relations have to choose their camps among the three, and assume one of the 
conceptualization of states: relative gain players (realist), absolute gain players 
(rational institutionalist), or citizens of the international society (sociological 
institutionalist).  Scholars in support of each have spent too much time and poured 
too much ink in debating which one is valid and more powerfully explanatory.  
Similarly, empirical studies developed to test or prove the theories do not transcend 
one another, and mostly choose the selected issue areas as if other issue areas of 
states’ concerns do not influence them.  As a result, each theory has claimed 
certain issue areas that can be best explained, e.g. security for realism, economy for 
rational institutionalism and environment for both rational and sociological 
institutionalism.   
In reality, states are multiple role players, faced with multiple issues and 
complex situations that cannot be simply categorized in this manner.  While these 
theories may succeed in maintaining the beauty of the theoretical “parsimony”, 
they fail to capture the complex political, economic and environmental situations 
in the South China Sea where low politics and high politics are intertwined and are 
not easily disaggregated into separate fields.  Chapter 3 of this dissertation will 
discuss in detail the complexity and linkages among issues in this region.  States 
do not play a single game in a single-issue area.  States are faced with relative gain 
games in competing for the territories and the limited resources of energy or 
fisheries (realist conceptualization of the situation); they are also seeking to 
overcome obstacles to collective action to manage common resources (rational 
institutionalist conception of the situation); at the same time they are pressured by 
international society to protect the marine environment and address marine 
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environmental degradation (sociological institutionalist conceptualization of the 
situation).  Therefore, none of the approaches adequately explain the development 
and evolution of environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
Second, current theoretical and empirical works on environmental 
cooperation mainly focus on regimes and non-governmental organizations in 
promoting and shaping environmental cooperation.  Although formal IOs can be 
considered as a component of regimes, their unique futures and roles, or even 
problems derived from these characteristics, are under-explored in the study of 
environmental cooperation.  Later in this chapter I will further argue for a 
revitalized study on formal IOs, and the dissertation will explore the power and 
roles of IOs in forging environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
Third, environmental cooperation has been always a foreign policy issue.  It 
is part of states’ foreign policy, and hence is shaped by states’ overall diplomatic 
goals vis-à-vis other states who are also participating in environmental 
cooperation.  In the past, environmental cooperation has been studied on its own, 
without systematic consideration of the diplomatic goals or considerations of 
countries.  For example, although Peter Haas noted early in his book the political 
difficulties in achieving environmental cooperation, including the territorial 
disputes and diplomatic relations among the bordering countries of the 
Mediterranean Sea, all these factors are later treated only as context or background 
variables, which did not influence the activities of the epistemic community in 
educating, persuading or changing the perception of government officials in 
dealing with the marine environment.43   
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I propose an integrative and interactive model to study environmental 
cooperation in the South China Sea.  By “integrative”, I mean my primary 
approach will integrate institutionalist and realist approaches.  I take the 
institutionalist assumption that IOs are independent actors with influence on state 
behavior, but I do not treat states as passive recipients of this influence.  I assume 
that states are rational actors seeking to maximize their power and that they 
actively use IOs to pursue their goals, be they environmental or non-environmental 
goals.  Therefore, I will analyze environmental cooperation beyond states’ 
environmental considerations, including security and economic considerations.  By 
“interactive”, I mean we should study the interactions among major actors, that is 
between IOs and other actors, and the ways in which major actors’ interests, 
motivations and strategies influence their dealings with one another.  Through this 
approach, I seek to strengthen the institutionalist case by importing additional 
properties from realism—in an attempt to show that cooperation is feasible under 
the realist assumptions that are not incorporated into the existing institutionalist 
analysis of international cooperation. 
In the rest of this chapter, I will try to build my theoretical framework to 
study environmental cooperation, by focusing on IOs as a variable and their 
interactions with other major actors in shaping environmental cooperation.  I will 
present a two-fold analysis. I will first summarize various conventional 
understandings of the roles of IOs as proposed by previous studies, and then 
explore additional sources of power and roles played by IOs.  This will be followed 
by a review of literature on states’ active utilization of environmental cooperation 
as an instrument to achieve non-environmental goals.  Lastly, I will analyze 
 
  54
UNEP’s positions and ASEAN’s dynamics in the South China Sea, and present the 
hypotheses for the dissertation. 
 
The Case to Revitalize the Study of IOs 
The academic popularity of studying regimes, non-state actors and other 
forms of institutions, including “epistemic communities”, as well as the decline of 
research on IOs, has been a part of the development trend of international 
organization as a field since the 1970s. 44  The autumn 1986 issue of International 
Organization included two review articles on the study and practice of IO, one by 
Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie and a second by J. Martin 
Rochester.  Both noted that the practice of IOs was in a sorry, even, dismal state of 
affairs, while the studies of international organizations had moved the focus from 
formal organizations to regimes and informally institutionalized institutions.   
J. M. Rochester contends the fall of IO study since 1970s was due to the 
rise of “turbulence” politics and the broadening concept of “international 
organization”. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gernard Ruggie noted that in the 
1980s students of international organizations shifted their focus systematically 
away from international institutions, toward broader forms of international 
institutionalized behavior.45  Scholarship on the study of IOs reached its peak in 
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the 1950s and 1960s,46 mainly focusing on IOs as a functionalist solution to global 
governance.47  Since then, academics observe a decline of interest in IOs and an 
increasing interest in institutions, regimes and NGOs.  By the time “international 
environmental policy” obtained attention from academics, which does not date 
back much further than the late 1960s and early 1970s,48 study of international 
regimes had started to become a “fad” in academics.49  That is the reason why 
international environmental cooperation has been analyzed mainly from the 
perspective of regime analysis.   
The reasons for the rise of regime theory and decline of IO study are due to 
both academic considerations and the practices of IOs.  In academics, Kratochwil 
and Edward Mansfield observe there are two reasons why interest in regimes arose 
while that in IOs fell.50  First, earlier studies of international organizations mainly 
focus on IOs, a formal hierarchical organization, as a solution to informational 
deficiencies and other “market failures.”  Regime theorists argue that it is not the 
formal IOs per se, but the “principles, rules and norms” which foster efficiency.  
For example, reassignment of property rights, provided by the UNCLOS III 
through the creation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is probably more likely 
to prevent overfishing than is the creation of a supranational bureaucracy.  Second, 
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regime theorists modified the definition of “hierarchy” by “order”.  Hierarchy does 
not necessarily imply order because compliance is “far more complicated than is 
implied by the usual ‘enforcement’ argument.”51  Different from an IO approach 
stressing actors, regime analysis touches upon the fundamental rules, norms and 
principles, which are both the functions of IOs and factors shaping the behavior of 
IOs.   
In practice, some IOs’ performances have been, to some extent, 
disappointing.  The uneven performance and predicament of international 
organizations has been puzzling.  Strange aptly summarizes several types of IOs in 
their performance:  “(w)hile some (IOs)52 lie becalmed and inactive, like sailing 
ships in the doldrums, others hum with activity, are given new tasks, and are 
recognized as playing a vital role in the functioning of the system.”53  IOs, 
designed to solve collective action problems, have in practice been demonstrated to 
be inefficient and unable to meet their creators’ expectations.  They often 
generated unforeseen and unintended consequences that actually impeded progress 
toward achieving social goals.54  
Current academic studies of IOs have mainly focused on the problems of 
IOs, researched reform paradigms, and questioned IOs’ legitimacy.55  In reality, 
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NGOs continue to criticize the IOs as inefficient destructive bureaucratic machine 
with a growing depth and scale.  To talk about the functions or roles of IOs in 
academics seems out of fashion, and in reality, is an easy way to stimulate eyebrow 
raising among members of “civil society”, especially those engaged in 
environmental politics, which is largely viewed as having its roots in grassroots 
movements. 
It is therefore not surprising that very limited literature has been written on 
IOs’ roles in facilitating environmental cooperation, and even less on the various 
conditions under which IOs work or do not work.  In the past two decades, 
scholars have tended to apply regime analysis to study IOs or treat IOs as a 
component of regimes.  Currently, the study of IOs’ roles in environmental 
cooperation is mostly researched by examining IOs’ roles in regime formation, 
implementation and evolution.56  Scholars have studied IOs as a solution to 
collective action problems, and IOs’ instrumental roles in environmental 
negotiation57 and networking.58 
The study of international regimes and other forms of institutions should 
not marginalize or replace research on IOs.  For many scholars, international 
institutions and regimes are broader concepts that, in many cases, incorporate IOs.  
However, the attempt to cover broader concepts tends to sacrifice in-depth studies 
of some unique features of IOs.  Rochester emphasized that regime scholars had 
not only neglected IOs but had, in effect, so submerged their relevance as to 
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minimize and even deprecate their role.  He therefore recommended taking a new 
approach by viewing IOs as the set of instruments for making and implementing 
“transnational policy” or “international public policy” rather than merely as “a 
patterned set of international interactions.”59  Echoing Rochester’s comments, 
Kratochwil and Ruggie also recognized that “along the way…international 
institutions of a formal kind have been left behind” and that “it is necessary to link 
up regimes in some fashion with the formal mechanisms through which real-world 
actors operate.”60  They further commented that “the process of global governance 
is not coterminous with the activities of international organizations but these 
organizations do play some role in that broader process,” and challenged scholars 
of international relations with “the objective was to identify their role.”61   
Two decades after the two articles crying for more studies on formal IOs 
and their roles in the process of international politics, little progress has been made 
in the study of the roles of IOs or the identification of conditions under which the 
roles are executed and influenced by interactions among international actors.  
Martha Finnemore noted in 1993 that “little attention has been paid to international 
organizations”62 in the literature of epistemic communities, ideas, and transnational 
relations, and the unexplored roles of IOs in developing and spreading 
international norms.  In the most recent review article on formal IOs in the journal 
International Organization (1999 Autumn issue), Michael N. Barnett and 
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Finnemore again noticed that “(r)esearch has paid little attention to how IOs 
actually behave after they are created.”63 
IOs deserve more attention and further studies from academics in 
explaining environmental cooperation.  The unique features of IOs, in comparison 
with any other institutional forms or regime types, can be exemplified from the 
definitions of these concepts, which are not always obviously clear in the 
international relations literature.  In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss the 
special attributes and sources of the power of IOs, review the roles of IOs that have 
been proposed by scholars, propose their new roles, and identify those conditions 
for IOs’ roles and functions. 
 
IOs as Actors: Sources of Power 
While regime theorists or institutionalists rightly point out the 
insufficiencies in studies that treat IOs as formal structures and bureaucracies, they 
underemphasize the roles that IOs play in environmental cooperation beyond that 
which can be represented by international regimes or environmental NGOs.  The 
regime approach is not sufficient to study IOs, which have formal, symbolic and 
authoritative elements.  Organizations, different from institutions, are “material 
entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and 
budgets.”64  They generally “possess legal personality in the sense that they are 
authorized to enter into contracts, own property, sue and be sued, and so forth.”65  
In the environmental cooperation literature, key roles of IOs in inducing states to 
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cooperate have been largely under-explored.  This includes in relation to their 
abilities to leverage influence across issue areas and supply cooperative 
mechanisms in issues other than environmental protection for use by member 
countries.   
I assume that IOs are autonomous sites of authority, independent from the 
state “principals” which have created them, with power flowing from the following 
sources: 1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody; 2) the 
independence that they represent; 3) control over knowledge, including technical 
expertise and information. 
Legitimization.  Evans and Wilson have rightly pointed out “the literature 
on international regimes overwhelmingly focuses on formally negotiated 
international agreements and tends to ignore the social and political processes that 
underpin them.”66  Beyond their traditional roles as a solution to market failures, 
IOs, especially the UN, different from international regimes, signify a certain 
authority and legitimacy to the nation-states.  It is the authority and legitimacy that 
bestow upon the UN the power to induce countries’ compliance with its rules. 
International politics is not merely a struggle for power maximization but 
also a contest over legitimacy.67  Furthermore, the power of an institution in a 
society is a function of the legitimacy of the institution perceived by citizens, 
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domestically, and states in the international arena.68  The UN is not only an entity 
with legitimacy bestowed by the member states, but it is also an originator of 
individual states’ legitimacy of their statehood and specific rights.  Membership in 
the UN has become one of the most important criteria for being recognized as a 
state in the international society.  New states, therefore, struggle hard to gain their 
seats in the UN General Assembly.  For example, Taiwan’s loss of its seat in 
representing China in the UN does not cause much loss in its material power, but it 
is an important symbol for the international society that Taiwan is not an 
internationally recognized state. 
In international politics or foreign affairs, states seek to obtain consent or 
support from IOs as a form of legitimacy.  As Claude puts it: 
While states have their own ways of justifying their foreign policies 
to themselves and their peoples, independently of external 
judgments, they are well aware that such unilateral determinations 
do not suffice.  They are keenly conscious of the need for approval 
by as large and impressive a body of other states as may be 
possible, for multilateral endorsement of their positions—in short, 
for collective legitimization.69 
 
The prominence of the UN among IOs and the universal value that 
it claims to represent have undoubtedly put the UN in the most 
authoritative position for granting collective legitimization.  Although the 
function of the UN was recognized among scholars early in the IR field, 
little work has been done to explore the conditions under which this power 
of legitimization attracts states to comply with UN rules as opposed to 
merely seeking memberships.   
                                                 
68 Ian Hurd.  2002.  “Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council.”  In 
Global Governance, Volume 8, No. 1: 35-51. 
 
69 Ibid.  p. 195. 
 
  62
Independence.  Independence means the ability to act with a degree of 
autonomy within defined spheres.  It often entails the capacity to act as a neutral in 
managing interstate disputes and conflicts.  IOs’ independence can be highly 
constrained, but an even partially autonomous and neutral actor can influence and 
transform direct inter-state relations, as all other state actors act out of their 
individual national interests. 
The power of IO independence derives from the procedures to establish an 
IO, its structure and the universal value it claims.  An IO created by inter-
governmental treaties, has the character given to it by its sovereign creators and is 
subject to the jurisdiction of no individual members, even though they created it.  
The headquarters of IOs do not enjoy a separate sovereignty, but the authority of 
the host state is withdrawn, affording the organization a limited territorial control 
in its own precincts.  The autonomy of IOs is further augmented through the 
immunities possessed by members of its secretariat.70  More importantly, the 
power of independence derives from the universal independent value claimed by 
IOs, to achieve the common interest of the human kind.71  For individual staff 
members, independence means that they fully accept and practice primary loyalty 
to their organization and its purposes.   
The claimed independence and neutrality grant IOs and its staff additional 
power in mediating and negotiating multilateral cooperation, and enable them to 
act as a perceived “fair” mediator to broker negotiation results among countries in 
contested interactions, without becoming deeply entangled in inter-state political 
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quagmire.  The ideas or proposals presented by IO staff would invite more 
attention and less suspicion from member states than those from government 
delegates, because of the independence and neutrality claimed by IOs.  Activities 
that might be unacceptable in their original state-to-state form may become 
acceptable when run through an independent, or seemingly independent, IO.  For 
example, states are always more cautious in accepting direct aid from individual 
governments, especially a former colonial power or one seeking political influence, 
than from an independent financial institution such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.72  As Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal assert,  
IOs facilitate interstate collaboration by pushing negotiations 
forward…  an independent IO may be more acceptable because it is 
neutral.  For many substantive IO operations, however, it is the 
existence of a truly independent third party, not the absence of bias 
per se, that enables states to achieve their ends.73 
 
The power of this independence is magnified when it comes to the IO 
specializing in some neutral technical issues, such as environment protection, 
education and scientific research.  States tend to perceive that the IO specializing 
in technical areas are more genuinely neutral or independent in comparison with 
those dealing with sensitive value-oriented issues, such as security and human 
rights issues. The more states perceive that an IO and its staff act out of 
independence and neutrality, the more likely that it can succeed in developing and 
negotiating multilateral cooperation among states. 
Knowledge.  Knowledge is power.  It has been well recognized by scholars 
that an important source of power for IOs derives from their possession of 
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specialized technical knowledge, training, and experience that is not immediately 
available to other actors.74  Specialized knowledge enables IO staff to originate 
ideas, and propose solutions to problems for the consideration of member 
countries. 
Less noticed by scholars is the power of IOs to empower knowledge.  
When knowledge meets an IO, the result can be actually mutually reinforcing.  A 
neutral source of information was more credible and could support greater 
cooperation.  Information created or verified by an independent, neutral and 
authoritative IO is perceived to be more reliable than that provided by states 
because it is free of national biases.  Usually an IO collects and compiles data and 
information through its national focal points, and publishes technical or annual 
reports based on the data and information contained in national reports submitted 
by the focal points.  The same sort of information or data, presented in two 
different forms (national reports or IOs’ consolidated reports) will generate 
different degrees of credibility, due to IOs’ supposed independence. 
These three attributes of IOs, i.e. legitimization, independence and 
knowledge, provide a theoretical basis for treating IOs as autonomous actors in 
contemporary world politics, since they enable IOs to act independently from 
states.  Ironically, much IO power derives from the appearance of being 
depoliticized.  As Barnett and Finnemore summarize, “the power of IOs and 
bureaucracies generally, is that they present themselves as impersonal, 
technocratic, and neutral—as not exercising power but instead serving others; the 
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presentation and acceptance of these claims is critical to their legitimacy and 
authority.”75  However, IOs differ in their ability to appear impersonal, 
technocratic, and neutral, and the extent to which they are accepted as neutral 
players also differ.76 
 
Roles of IOs 
I distinguish between two types of roles that IOs execute in promoting 
international cooperation: instrumental and inductive.  First is the conventional 
role of IOs as collective action facilitators.  This role is a passive role since states 
seeking to address collective action problems create IOs as facilitators for 
international cooperation.  The instrumental roles of IOs are similar to those of 
international institutions and regimes which have been well theorized and 
documented by rational institutionalists.  Second is the inductive role of IOs in 
teaching, persuading or luring states to cooperate.  IOs play an independent role, 
which influences state preferences and behaviors.  The inductive roles are derived 
from the unique organizational structures and authority embodied by IOs, which 
are not shared by other types of organizations, institutions and regimes. 
Instrumental Roles 
Collective Action Facilitator.  Common interests may not lead to the 
development of collective action.  Especially where uncertainty is high and actors 
have no access or different levels of access to information, obstacles to collective 
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action and strategic calculations may prevent them from achieving mutual 
interests.77  Axelrod contends that iteration of games, Tit-for-Tat strategy and 
lengthening the shadow of the future can assist game players to overcome a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma situation and achieve cooperation.78   
IOs act as collective action facilitators in various ways.  IOs increase the 
interactions among states and provide an arena to address different issues, 
therefore lengthening the shadow of the future.  They provide information to 
relevant actors and reduce uncertainty among states, hence reducing transaction 
costs for cooperation.  They may serve to mitigate fears of cheating through 
measures designed to increase the transparency of the behavior of relevant actors.  
They may reduce incentives to defect either by sanctioning violators or by 
lengthening the shadow of the future.   
Nodes of Networks.  IOs act as nodes for various transnational networks.  
For example, in the “epistemic community” approach, IOs provide an important 
arena for the activities of a transnational network of experts.  Moreover, staff 
members of IOs may also be part of the epistemic community itself.79 
Inductive Roles 
Issue Framing and Agenda Setting.  IOs frequently act as catalysts in 
environmental negotiations, influencing the way the issues are conceptualized or 
framed and propelling them toward the top of the international policy agenda.  
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More than an arena for agenda setting and negotiation process,80 Breitmeier 
contends that IOs are very influential in improving the cognitive setting of an issue 
area and in bringing to the international level any information gathered at the 
national level about the causes and consequences of a problem.81  The influence or 
power of an IO derives from countries’ perceptions of it as an authoritative 
institution that possesses important knowledge.   
Normative Functions and Teaching Norm.  In investigating the driving 
forces behind the establishment of state bureaucracies for scientific research 
coordination, Finnemore contends that it was the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that “taught” states the value and 
utility of science policy organizations.82  Hence, the creation of state apparatuses to 
coordinate scientific research is the result of the “teaching” mission of UNESCO.  
Accordingly, the teaching mission was a reflection of a new norm elaborated 
within the international community, which held that coordination and direction of 
science are necessary tasks of the modern state and that a science policy 
bureaucracy having certain well-specified characteristics was the appropriate 
means to fulfill those tasks.83  The approach lends support to constructivist or 
reflective theoretical approaches that treat states as social entities, shaped in part by 
international social action.   
Mediator.  Mediation is defined by Cormick as: 
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A voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly 
explore and reconcile their differences.  The mediator has no 
authority to impose a settlement.  His or her strength lies in the 
ability to assist the disputants in resolving their own differences.  
The mediated dispute is settled when the disputants themselves 
reach what they consider a workable solution.84 
 
The study of mediation and the roles of mediators is no stranger to scholars 
of international relations.85  Studies of international mediation have traditionally 
focused on the effectiveness of international efforts to settle or resolve militarized 
conflicts.  Few studies examine the identity of mediators and factors determining 
the choice of mediators.86   
The most important attribute of a successful mediator that has been 
traditionally identified by international relations scholars is even-handedness, or 
neutrality.  Young claims “a high score in such areas as impartiality would seem to 
be at the heart of successful interventions in many situations.”87  His views are well 
accepted and shared among scholars.  Scholars emphasize the importance of 
neutrality in the selection and acceptability of mediators, and believe that parties 
will have confidence in a mediator only if he/she is, and is perceived as, neutral.88  
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An IO that claims to be neutral and independent, and operates with the view of 
achieving the common interests of human kind, is an ideal candidate to be a 
mediator in facilitating international negotiations among disputing parties.   
Scholars have recently noticed that an important factor in selecting a 
mediator is that the selected mediator be seen as capable of promoting an 
agreement through the use of leverage, power potential, and influence.89  To 
exercise influence and structure the interactions between parties, mediators need 
“leverage”, a wide array of means, and resources, which enhance their ability to 
achieve a favorable outcome.90  The sources of power discussed in the previous 
part equip IOs with the necessary means and resources required to act as successful 
mediators. 
 
Mechanisms to Power 
 How, when and under what conditions can IOs’ power be transformed into 
the roles executed by IOs, resulting in real actions to achieve environmental 
cooperation?  I have identified three mechanisms through which an IO can 
leverage its power and influence state behaviors and execute the roles outlined in 
the previous section: 1) identity politics.  When states seek to build or consolidate 
their identities through participation in activities under the framework of an IO, the 
power of the IO tends to be realized or achieved.  2) domestic politics.  When 
states are struggling with various policy priorities at the domestic level, and with 
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fragmented political factions in support of individual policy priorities, IOs can ally 
with some domestic pro-cooperation fractions to leverage influence on government 
decision-making.  3) linkage politics.  IOs tend to have more influences on state 
behaviors and policies when IOs are an arena for multiple issues of concern to 
states.  IOs can augment their power by linking issues and areas in dealing with 
states at both domestic and international levels. 
Identity Politics.  Identities perform the following functions in a society: 
they tell you and others who you are, and they tell you who others are.  The 
identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions.  A state 
understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while 
simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practices.  
Identities ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order.  Durable 
expectations between states require inter-subjective identities that are sufficiently 
stable to ensure predictable patterns of behaviors.91  For example, China’s identity 
as a “regional power” in the South China Sea entails its hard-line policies and 
tendency to dominate regional political struggles.  On the other hand, China as a 
“third-world” country implies certain weak economic relationships with the 
developed countries.  A common identity, i.e. a sense of shared cultural “we-ness” 
among ASEAN countries, may define individual national interests shaping foreign 
policies towards “other-ness”. 
When states seek to reproduce or transform their identities through 
interactions with other, IOs tend to have power in constituting state identities 
through the interactions, hence shaping national interests and influencing state 
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behaviors and policies.  Some aspects of states’ identities must be reproduced 
through social practices within IOs, for example the definition of a “state” or 
execution of “statehood.”  In exploring why states comply with treaties, Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes argue that the fundamental reason for routine 
treaty compliance is the change of the inter-subjective understanding of 
“sovereignty”, which “no longer consists in the freedom of states to act 
independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in reasonably 
good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life.” 92 
They argue that states comply with international regulatory agreements simply 
because they behave as new sovereign states.   They further assert: 
In today’s setting, the only way most states can realize and express 
their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that 
regulate and order the international system.  Isolation from the 
pervasive and rich international context means that the state’s 
potential for economic growth and political influence will not be 
realized.93 
 
Domestic Politics.  International relations are always linked with domestic 
politics.  Robert D. Putnam characterizes international negotiations as a two-level 
game.94  At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favorable policies to specific groups, and politicians seek 
power by constructing coalitions among those groups.  At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.  
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An international environmental cooperation initiative will trigger different 
responses or reactions from various government agencies or institutions, producing 
bureaucratic and interest group splits.  IOs can influence government decisions, 
state behaviors or policies towards cooperation by allying with domestic factions 
supporting international environmental cooperation, which may include line 
government agencies, non-governmental organizations or private sectors.  IOs can 
affect state behaviors by creating new constituencies or shifting the balance among 
factions or subgroups vying for influence.95 
How can IOs help or empower domestic pro-cooperation factions in 
gaining political leverage in domestic politics?  A recent empirical study by 
Xinyuan Dai on why states comply with treaties may provide some food for 
thought in exploring IO influences on domestic politics.  Dai contends that 
domestic politics provides a mechanism of compliance; specifically a 
government’s compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the 
informational status of domestic constituencies.  He argues that compliance 
decisions bias toward large interest groups that have significant electoral influence, 
and those special interest groups that are much better informed about the policy 
process. 96 
Following this line of reasoning, I have identified two channels through 
which IOs can influence and empower domestic pro-cooperation allies: 1) IO 
authority and legitimacy.  In domestic politics, pro-cooperation fractions can use 
an IO to justify their arguments for international cooperation in domestic struggles, 
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and to solicit more interest and partners at the domestic level.  2) Information 
empowering.  An IO can empower its domestic allies by providing information 
and knowledge for domestic negotiation and competition. 
Linkage Politics.  International regimes concern the delineation of a 
domain or activity.  Regimes are usually constructed to solve problems occurring 
in an issue area.  This approach has largely ignored the linkage politics among 
different issues and power or influence that can be leveraged by formal IOs across 
issue areas.  As Hasenclever et al. argue, the sphere of activity of an IO need not 
be restricted to a particular issue-area of international relations, whereas regimes 
are issue-specific institutions.97   
Transboundary environmental problems are not purely environmental 
problems.  They are economic, political and cultural problems as well.  
Economically, environmental degradation can cause tremendous direct or indirect 
economic losses.  For example, it has been estimated that the environmental 
stresses resulting from rapid economic development has caused productivity losses 
and require public health expenditures that together cost the Asia Pacific countries 
between three and eight percent of GDP.98 
Issue linkage provides IOs a mechanism to leverage influence at both 
domestic and international levels.  At the domestic level, an IO can increase the 
number of people or interest groups in supporting environmental cooperation by 
linking environmental problems with economic development, agriculture, public 
health, and tourism, and informing stakeholders of these various sectors regarding 
possible negative impacts caused by environmental degradation.  At the 
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international level, an IO can be an arena for multiple issue areas, in which states 
have to deal with their counterparts.  States’ decisions on one issue area are closely 
linked to, and influence their decisions in other issue areas.  In the South China Sea 
where multiple issues overlap and interact, an IO on the one hand is constrained by 
states’ consideration of other issues, on the other, has more space to leverage 
influence by linking issues or areas.  In short, the study of environmental 
cooperation must be based on a larger geopolitical context rather than focus purely 
on environmental protection activities. 
 
States’ Reactions: Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument of 
Diplomatic Goals  
When discussing the interactions between IOs and states, especially 
developing countries, many scholars treat developing countries as passive 
recipients of financial and technical assistance, knowledge, ideas or norms.99  I 
contend that states, rather than being passive recipients, not only treat 
environmental cooperation as an opportunity to address the “collective action 
problems” for the good of environmental protection, but also actively seek to use 
international environmental cooperation for other purposes beyond environmental 
protection.  The latter case would be more prominent when environmental 
cooperation occurs between countries with other sensitive, salient issues requiring 
intergovernmental actions, such as territorial disputes or economic cooperation. 
Institutionalist theory has been rightly criticized for paying insufficient 
attention to issues of power and distribution in international politics.  I draw upon 
realist considerations to supplement my institutionalist approach in this regard.  I 
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integrate the realist assumption about states’ desire to pursue power; hence, I 
contend that environmental cooperation should not be treated as a purely 
environmental issue, exempt from power struggles.  When considering whether or 
not to develop environmental cooperation with their neighboring countries, states’ 
considerations are not constrained within environmental fields, but encompass 
other foreign affairs aspirations, including security, trade, economy and cultural 
considerations.  Hence, analyzing the motivations for states to participate in 
environmental cooperation should be embedded in a larger political context.  An 
appropriate question to start with is what utilities or benefits, other than 
environmental gains, states will get by participating in environmental cooperation. 
Recent works on environmental cooperation have shed some light on 
instrumental utilities obtained by countries participating in environmental 
cooperation.100  In studying the Soviet Union and its successor states’ motivational 
incentives behind East-West environmental cooperation (mostly in the form of 
environmental aid from the West), Darst finds “the USSR and the newly 
independent states were rarely motivated to participate in international 
environmental cooperation by genuine concern about the domestic impact of 
externally generated pollution.”101  The Soviet Union and its successors 
instrumentally manipulated external environmental concerns in order to advance 
other goals, including the mitigation of East-West hostility, economic 
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development, and the amelioration of their own self-inflicted environmental 
problems.102   
In explaining environmental cooperation in the Aral Sea Basin after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Weinthal integrates both domestic and international 
processes of institution building to explain regional environmental cooperation in 
the Aral Sea Basin.103  Weinthal’s approach identifies IOs, bilateral aid 
organizations, and NGOs as the primary actors in inducing Central Asian States to 
participate in environmental cooperation.  New leaders of these governments also 
seek to participate in international negotiations and to join in IOs as a means to 
consolidate their domestic power base and to gain legitimacy both at home and 
abroad.104  She argues that the motivation for the newly independent Central Asian 
states to participate in Aral Basin cooperation lies beyond the desire for an 
international agreement on water sharing, but also the need to solicit international 
funding to “conduct” state making, by compensating key domestic constituencies 
that could undermine an agreement or threaten the government’s hold on political 
and social stability.105 
Weinthal’s framework is, to some extent, parallel to Darst’s research in that 
both contend that the motives of states participating in environmental cooperation 
lie in non-environmental considerations.  The non-environmental benefits, which I 
will call the “political utility” of environmental cooperation, that motivate 
countries to participate in international cooperation, depend largely on domestic 
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politics and national policy considerations.  The “political utility” is a function of 
domestic politics, linkage politics and inter-state relationships, hence varies across 
countries and regions, and over time. 
Building on the empirical studies of Darst and Weinthal, I will explore the 
“political utility” exploited by states in participating environmental cooperation in 
the South China Sea.  However, different from the approaches of Darst and 
Weinthal, I will further investigate how IOs, intentionally or unintentionally, 
contribute to the generation of such “political utility” in environmental 
cooperation.    
 
UNEP in the South China Sea Regional Setting 
UNEP was established by the General Assembly in 1972 following the 
Stockholm Conference.  It was designed to coordinate the environment-related 
activities of other UN agencies and to spur them to integrate environmental 
considerations into their activities.  Actually the power of UNEP, deriving from 
administrative or financial resources, is relatively small, in comparison other UN 
agencies or programmes, with limited budget and about 200 professional officers 
working around the world.  The power of UNEP derives not only from legitimacy, 
independence and knowledge outlined in the previous discussion of this chapter, 
but also some unique characteristics of UNEP, including its headquarter location, 
small-size, pro-developing countries and scientific focus. 
Head-quartered in Nairobi, UNEP was the first UN program to be located 
in a developing country.106  Its location helped to dispel some of the misgivings 
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about the program expressed by developing countries at the Stockholm 
Conference.107  In the past three decades, UNEP has successfully built a pro-
developing countries scientific and technical image with a goal to promote 
environmental protection.  Unlike the large Breton Woods system, the Asian 
Development Bank, and UNDP which tend to impose non-environmental 
conditions on environmental projects or assistance, UNEP’s small size and non-
conditional environmental assistance helps UNEP to gain confidence and trust 
from developing countries, contributing to UNEP’s ability to draw developing 
countries in disputes into a negotiation table.   
UNEP’s power is augmented when it acts at the regional level.  First, 
Acting at the regional level, UNEP is a globally established organization with 
globally agreed rules and procedures that member countries in the region cannot 
change to fit regional requirements.  When facing conflicts at the operational level, 
UNEP can resort to higher authority in Nairobi (UNEP headquarter), the Global 
Environment Facility in Washington DC, or even UN by simply stating that “the 
UNEP or GEF rules say…” or “according to the UN rules.”  Second, the UN is 
generally more respected in East Asia, in comparison with Europe and North 
America.108  Third, none of the countries bordering the South China Sea use 
English as a native language, hence they are all equally at a disadvantage.109  
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Government officials sent to regional meetings and negotiations have less 
proficiency in English than UNEP staff, but they have to express their ideas in 
English.  UNEP staff posses the power that comes from having a language 
advantage, because they are generally better equipped with English language skills 
than government delegates.  This has put UNEP in a powerful position in regional 
negotiation tables, and enabled UNEP to broker negotiations more easily than 
might have been the case amongst a group of English-speaking countries.110 
 
ASEAN as a Unit of Analysis 
ASEAN countries are treated as a unit in dealing with China in this 
dissertation.  Although countries in ASEAN are very different and also have 
conflicts and differences between themselves, major ASEAN countries share a 
common attitude of preferring a multilateral approach towards China in the South 
China Sea.111  Furthermore, ASEAN countries had more than 15 years’ experience 
of cooperation with each other before China joined the East Asian Seas Action 
Plan.  I realize the weaknesses of treating ASEAN as a unit due to the difficulties 
and conflicts among the members within ASEAN, so I complement this approach 
by unpacking ASEAN in its early stage of development, during the early initiation 
and development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan. 
ASEAN was established by the five founding members, with a vision to 
safeguarding their newly gained independence and sovereignty, and preventing any 
                                                 
110 Language sometimes becomes an obstacle to cooperation due to different understanding of the 
same English words.  For example, some practitioners believe the reason why it is difficult to 
negotiate a legally binding agreement, is that in Chinese, “agreement” usually entails legally 
binding obligations in any form. 
 
111 Scholars have used ASEAN as unit of analysis when studying China-Southeast Asia relations.  




external powers’ intervening in domestic politics.  The Bangkok Declaration that 
established ASEAN proclaimed the founding members’ determination “to ensure 
their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation 
in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and 
aspirations of their peoples.”112  “Non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another” is one of the principles explicitly underlying ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, as it was in the 1971 declaration 
on Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, another of 
ASEAN’s milestone documents.  Article 2 of the TAC enshrined a number of 
principles governing ASEAN states, among which are: mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identify of all 
nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
another. 
Over the past few decades since its establishment, the ASEAN countries 
have developed a unique set of diplomatic norms and a culture, emphasizing an 
informal and incremental approach to cooperation through consultation and 
dialogue, while limiting to a minimum, the institutionalization of the Association.  
This is generally referred to as the “ASEAN Way.” Many scholars have discussed 
the elements of the “ASEAN way” and its’ importance to the success of ASEAN 
as a regional organization.113  Despite minor differences in interpretation, the 
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“ASEAN Way” is taken to refer to a series of behavioral and procedural norms 
shared by ASEAN member countries in practicing diplomacy.  The former centers 
on the principle of “non-interference of internal affairs” and contains standard 
norms of international law: respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal 
affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts and non-use of force.  The procedural 
norms characterizing the decision-making process are the observance of the 
Indonesian-Malay practice of musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat 
(consensus).114 
The respect for non-interference in each other’s affairs has been a cardinal 
principle and characteristic of ASEAN concord since its creation.  Non-
interference stems from the traditional notions in international relations of equality 
of the sovereignty of states (from diminutive Singapore to mammoth Indonesia) 
and the consequent right to exclusive sovereignty. 115  Some politicians or scholars 
attributed the “ASEAN Way” to the Asian cultural preference for informality and 
non-confrontational practices.  Singapore’s Ambassador-at-large Tommy T. B. 
Koh explained, “the Asian preference, unlike the Western preference, is to take a 
very non-legalistic approach to things.  We take actions step by step and allow 
things to evolve, rather than sit down and say, a priori, we want to create an 
institution.”116 
                                                                                                                                       
60 – 87.  Tobias Ingo Nischalke.  2000.  “Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-operation: the 
‘ASEAN Way’, a Real Spirit or a Phantom?”  Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No.1, April 
2001: 89-112. 
 
114 Hussin Mutalib.  1997.  “At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millennium.”  
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1: 74-85. 
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116 Steven Holmes.  1993.  “US Seeking New Asian Trade and Security Links.”  New York Times, 




Considering the long history of colonization and external powers’ 
involvement, it is not difficult to understand why ASEAN, as a regional 
organization formed of developing countries, would so jealously defend their own 
sovereignty and absolute right to deal with internal politics.  ASEAN respects 
individual countries’ decisions, and hence takes collective decisions based on 
consensus; consequently it takes an extraordinarily long time to develop any 
legally binding agreement. The organization itself was established by the non-
legally binding Bangkok Declaration in 1967 and it was almost ten years before the 
member countries managed to sign the first legally binding treaty, i.e. the 1976 
TAC. 
 
An Interactive Triangular Model 
An interactive triangular model between UNEP, a regional organization 
(ASEAN) and a regional power (China) will be used to explain the development 
and evolution of environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.   I propose it 
is the interactions between the major actors motivated by different interests and 
goals and shaped by different strategies of actors (organizational or national) that 
that have led up to the regional environmental cooperation in this current forms. 
My dependent variable is the development and evolution of multilateral 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  The dependent variable has 
been examined and measured by the changing characteristics of environmental 
cooperation over time.  These characteristics include: geographical coverage, 
format, area of cooperation, priority issue setting, approach, legal status and nature 
of the cooperation.  My independent variables are the UNEP powers and its 
 
  83
interactions with China and ASEAN and the political dynamics between China and 
ASEAN. 
During my research, I ask myself questions regarding the interests and 
power sources of major actors to explore what motivates countries to participate in 
regional environmental cooperation.  What are the major sources of power for 
UNEP to play as an independent actor?  What are the political, economic and 
environmental forces operating in the region? Whose interests would be served or 
threatened by the environmental cooperation?  What are the environmental and 




My hypotheses can be categorized into two groups.  The first group is 
about the multiple roles played by UNEP in fostering and forging environmental 
cooperation.  The second group is about ASEAN and China’s reactions to UNEP’s 
initiatives, and their influences on the form and nature of environmental 
cooperation. 
Group 1 Hypotheses: UNEP’s Multiple Roles 
I hypothesize UNEP plays an independent role in facilitating and forging 
environmental cooperation, and that UNEP’s roles are multiple and evolving, 
including its conventional (instrumental) roles and proactive (inductive) roles.  The 
conventional roles make UNEP an instrument to address collective action 
problems, by providing technical, scientific and financial assistances to overcome 
the barriers to collective action.  The proactive roles of UNEP make it a political 
player, by acting as a persuader, mediator and teacher. 
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Hypothesis 1.1.  IOs can catalyze environmental cooperation in an 
instrumental manner in regions that lack regional institutions and domestic 
capacities, by providing financial resources and technical assistance. 
In a region which does not have adequate scientific and technical capacity 
and lacks cooperation experience, UNEP can play a catalytic role in facilitating 
environmental cooperation by providing various resources.  In such a case, 
environmental cooperation tends to take the form of scientific research that is 
focused on a specific area the determination of which is influenced by global 
considerations due to UNEP’s influence and priorities. 
Hypothesis 1.2.  IOs also can catalyze/deepen cooperation by wielding 
their power of legitimacy, independence and knowledge in an inductive manner.  
This is done through identity, domestic, and linkage politics.  
In a region where territorial disputes are numerous, and countries are 
jealously guarding their rights of sovereignty, the more legitimate, knowledgeable 
and independent an IO can present itself as to the countries concerned, the more 
power it can leverage to broker a cooperative multilateral environmental outcome. 
When states seek to build or consolidate their identities through their 
participation in an IO’s activities, the IO’s power is enhanced strengthening its 
potential to forge multilateral cooperation among the countries concerned.  This is 
closely related to hypothesis 2.1. 
IOs’ influence on governments’ decisions to participate in multilateral 
cooperation can be channeled through their domestic pro-cooperation alliances.  
The more equally domestic politics are split on environmental cooperation, the 
more critical IOs’ roles will be.   
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The complexity of political, economic and environmental situation 
sometimes is an obstacle to successful cooperation, but also provides various 
mechanisms for UNEP to leverage its negotiation power.  The fact that the UN is a 
forum where multiple issues meet provides UNEP with a source of power beyond 
the individual UN specialized agency. 
Group 2 Hypotheses on Reactions of ASEAN and China 
Environmental cooperation in the region was originally initiated by UNEP, 
but ASEAN and China do not act as passive recipients to the initiative.  I 
hypothesize that they actively seek opportunities to maximize the political utilities 
of environmental cooperation, and that their preferences and behaviors have direct 
impacts on the nature and form of environmental cooperation in the South China 
Sea. 
Hypothesis 2.1.  ASEAN used UNEP sponsored environmental cooperation 
as an instrument to achieve its own political utilities: 1) to promote environmental 
cooperation in ASEAN, and consolidate ASEAN identity through its participation 
in UNEP initiatives; 2) to engage China and lock it in a multilateral framework. 
Before 1990, ASEAN environmental cooperation was largely financed by 
UNEP.  The earliest ASEAN environmental meetings, the ASEAN Environmental 
Declarations issued after the meetings, are based on the meeting results of 
COBSEA.  Participants of the COBSEA convened their ASEAN environmental 
expert meetings the day following the COBSEA meeting in the same city.  The 
results of COBSEA meetings provide direct inputs to ASEAN environmental 
cooperation.  UNEP environmental aid finances ASEAN environmental consensus 
and ASEAN consolidation. 
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ASEAN also used environmental cooperation as a forum to engage and 
build confidence with China, It was believed that engaging China in a multilateral 
arrangement would “lock China into a network of constraining multilateral 
arrangements”117, which would serve as a soft constraining power against any 
possible aggressive actions of China.   
Hypothesis 2.2.  China’s domestic politics is split between anti or pro-
cooperation, and China’s desire to build confidence with ASEAN countries for 
economic and security considerations contributes to the strengthening of the 
domestic support for its participation and strong support for environmental 
cooperation under the framework of UNEP.  
Although China has taken an assertive position towards its sovereignty over 
the South China Sea, its overriding diplomatic goal is to build mutually beneficial 
relationships with Southeast Asia and create a peaceful and stable environment for 
its continuing economic development.  Once having joined in the environmental 
cooperative initiative in the South China Sea, China has worked hard to present 
itself as a willing cooperator, and has taken an active leadership role in 
implementing the activities. 
                                                 
117 Michael Leifer.  1996.  “Truth about the Balance of Power” in the Evolving Pacific Power 




TURBULENCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
 
The South China Sea is one of the most dynamic, volatile and controversial 
regions in the world with multiple issues interacting, i.e. fast economic 
development, overlapping territorial disputes and serious environmental 
degradation.   It is a sea in a flux of hope, prosperity, uncertainties as well as 
dangers.  For quite a while, East Asia was regarded as a model for economic 
development in developing countries.  It is surrounded by the fastest developing 
economies, having directly contributed to the creation of “the miracle of East 
Asia.”1  Three out of the “four dragons” are bordering the South China Sea: 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.2  The rest of the countries bordering the South 
China Sea have also achieved impressive economic development.  Despite the 
1997-1998 financial crisis, the region continues to show prosperity and serves as a 
model to other developing countries.   
The prosperity of the region is however not completely secured: it is 
considered the most troubled water in the world due to the frequent skirmishes 
involving fisheries and oil exploration activities.  Countries bordering the South 
China Sea have competitive claims to the Sea, and its resources, including oil and 
marine living resources.  The marine environment has experienced serious 
degradation.  Moreover, numerous conflicts and skirmishes have taken place 
among the littoral countries in the past two decades and these pose a threat to 
                                                 
1 The World Bank.  1993.  The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy.  New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
2 The other dragon South Korea is also closely related to the bordering countries of the South China 
Sea, and largely depends on oil and gas passing through the South China Sea.  
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regional stability and the security essential to the long-term prosperity of the 
region. 
Fast economic development has led to increasing demands for resources, 
including oil and fisheries, by countries bordering the sea.  The increasing demand 
for resources in the South China Sea makes countries jealously guard their rights 
over the disputed sea areas.  Technological advancement has made it possible for 
fishermen to fish further and further away from their national coastlines, resulting 
in closer contacts between fishermen from different claimant countries.  As 
Thomas Home-Dixon argues, if environmental problems are not taken care of, they 
can lead to conflicts in a not so controversial region.3  What will be the impacts of 
fierce competition for resources on the spiraling of conflicts?  Will marine 
environmental degradation, especially the overexploitation of fisheries resources, 
aggravate existing conflicts or even induce new conflicts between or among 
countries? 
Economic development and technological advancement has led to marine 
environmental degradation and overexploitation of resources in the South China 
Sea. This will increase the possibilities of disputes and conflicts among the 
countries bordering the Sea.  Unclear ownership of the resources poses an 
intimidating challenge to the management of common resources.4  Over-fishing in 
                                                 
3 See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon.  1991.  “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of 
Acute Conflict.”  International Security 16: 76-116.  Thomas F. Homer-Dixon.  1994.  
“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.  International Security 19: 
5-40.  Thomas Homer-Dixon.  1999.  Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.   
 
4 Neoclassical economists believe that environmental degradation can be attributed to a lack of clear 
property rights.  See Ronald H. Coase.  1960.  “The Problem of Social Cost.”  Journal of Law and 
Economics 3: 1-44.  In fact, Demsetz argues that if property rights over all environmental resources 
were clearly defined and enforced, and if the transaction costs involved in buying them were low, 
then a free market for environmental resource would lead to internalization of environmental harms, 
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the area cannot be solved without cooperation among the littoral countries, and the 
trend will continue when a country’s fishermen compete with others’ for the 
undefined ownership of the limited fishery resources.  Without coordinated actions 
or interventions from the littoral countries of the sea, territorial disputes and 
environmental degradation could form a vicious circle, in which they mutually 
reinforce one another and economic development and technological advancement 
further aggravate this relationship. 
This chapter sketches the geopolitical setting and difficulties for 
multilateral cooperation in the region.  It will survey the significance of the South 
China Sea in terms of its strategic location, oil resources, and marine biological 
diversity.  It will review different countries’ competing claims to the same sea area, 
territorial disputes among the countries, and marine environmental degradation in 
the region; and analyze the relationships among these various issues.  It will 
contend that environmental degradation may worsen the already contentious and 
volatile situation in the South China Sea due to countries’ increased competition 
for oil resources and fishery resources driven by the undefined ownership of these 
resources and the need to sustain economic growth.  Environmental cooperation is 
highly important not only in protecting and maintaining marine biological 
diversity, but also in achieving regional security in the highly volatile area. 
 
Strategic Importance of the South China Sea 
The South China Sea was named after its location, which means the sea to 
the south of China. More specifically, it refers to the sea area south of Hainan 
                                                                                                                                       
welfare-maximizing and fair outcomes.  See Harold Demsetz.  1967.  “Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights.”  American Economic Review 57: 347-59. 
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Island.  It is bordered by China to the North, Philippines to the East, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore to the West, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei to 
the South.   
It is still not known how many islets, rocks or features exist in the South 
China Sea.  The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated there are 
more than 200 small islands, rocks and features existing in the area with most of 
them in the Spratly and Paracel island chains.5  Mark J. Valencia et al. compiled 
the data from past literature and estimated there are 80-90 distinctive features in 
the Spratly area, among which only 25-35 are above water at high tide.6  The 
largest islet, Itu Aba, is 0.43 km2 in area, currently being occupied by Republic of 
China (Taiwan).  Spratly Island, with a total area of 0.15 km2, is currently occupied 
by Vietnam.  Only five other islets are larger than 0.1 km2, i.e. Thi Tu Island, West 
York Island, Northeast Cay, Southwest Cay and Sand Cay.7  Most of the other 
islands are “partially submerged islets, rocks, and reefs that are little more than 
shipping hazards not suitable for habitation.”8 
Currently, China (including Taiwan), Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Brunei claim all or part of the South China Sea.  It remains one of 
the most dangerous waters in the globe.  Why are these countries so keenly 
interested in an area which could be seen as being “little more than shipping 
hazard” and jealously defensive of their rights over the waters?   
                                                 
5 US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html.  
Accessed on 27 March 2004). 
 
6 Mark J. Valencia.  1997.  Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea.  Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press.  p. 41. 
 
7 Ibid.  p. 43. 
 
8 US EIA ( http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html.  Accessed on 27 March 2004). 
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Oil and Gas Potential.  Beyond other strategic considerations, what makes 
the South China Sea important today is the potential for significant deposits of oil, 
gas and minerals located on and under the surrounding seabeds.  The offshore 
geology of the South China Sea indicates that a number of areas are likely to be 
endowed with hydrocarbon resources.  Oil deposits have been found in most of the 
littoral (adjacent) countries of the South China Sea. The South China Sea region 
has proven oil reserves estimated at about 7.0 billion barrels, and oil production in 
the region is currently around 2.5 million barrels per day.9  Table 3.1 summarises 
the potential oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea, in comparison with other 
regions. 
Table 3.1.  Oil and Gas in the South China Sea - Comparison with other 
Regions, September 2003 
 

















17.2-32.8 232 1.6 4.5 
North Sea 
Region 
16.8 178.7 6.4 9.4 
Persian Gulf 674.0 1,923.0 19.3 8.0 
South China 
Sea 
Est. 7.0 Est. 150.3 2.2 3.2 
Source: US Energy Information Administration. 
 
Different sources have different estimates of the oil and gas potential in the 
disputed area.  China has been optimistic about the oil and gas potential in the 
region.  Chinese media even consider the South China Sea as the second “Middle 
East” for its oil and natural gas reserves.  A report from the China National 
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) shows that the South China Sea has three of 
                                                 
9 EIA.  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html.  Accessed on 8 April 2004. 
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China’s five most productive natural gas pools.10  One of the more moderate 
Chinese estimates suggested that potential oil resources (not proved reserves) of 
the Spratly and Paracel Islands could be as high as 105 billion barrels of oil, and 
another suggested that the total for the South China Sea could be as high as 213 
billion barrels. A common rule-of-thumb for such frontier areas as the Spratly 
Islands is that perhaps 10 percent of the potential resources can be economically 
recovered. Using this rule, these Chinese estimates imply potential production 
levels for the Spratly Islands of 1.4-1.9 million barrels per day (at 
reserve/production ratios of 15 and 20).11  The highest Chinese reserves estimate 
implies production levels that are twice as high as this. 
Because of a lack of exploratory drilling, there are no proven oil reserve 
estimates for the Spratly or Paracel islands, and no commercial oil or gas has been 
discovered there.  However, the fact that there exists abundant oil reserve in the 
surrounding areas of the South China Sea have led to the littoral countries to 
speculate that the Spratly islands and Paracels islands could be an untapped oil 
area.    All the countries bordering the South China Sea except China have 
formally and unilaterally claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extending up 
to 200 nautical miles from their national baselines. 
Important Shipping Sea Area.  Shipping and trading in the South China 
Sea can be traced back to ancient times.  In the Han dynasty of ancient China, silk 
was shipped to the west through the South China Sea. It was the starting point of 
the "Silk Road on the ocean".  The sea route started from the South China Sea, 
passed India and Sri Lanka, crossed the northern end of the Red Sea, and then 
                                                 
10 People’s Daily.  September 28, 2000. 
 
11 EIA.   http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html.  Accessed on 8 April 2004. 
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finally reached Europe and East and North Africa. The famous story about "Cheng 
Ho going to the West Ocean" recounted how Cheng Ho led a fleet to the South 
China Sea, and visited the countries there. 
From a comparative geographic view, the South China Sea can be likened 
to a “Mediterranean” region between the Asian and Australian continents.12  This 
term has also been applied to the Gulf of Mexico—Caribbean area which has been 
described as the “American Mediterranean.”13  Strategically lying between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans, the South China Sea is an important throughway for 
ship traffic between the Persian Gulf oil ports and the rapid growing East Asian 
economies.  Located in the Southeast of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca 
is the shortest route between the Persian Gulf and Japan, South Korea, China and 
other newly industrializing countries in East Asia.  More than 50,000 vessels 
transit the Strait of Malacca, and more than 10.3 million barrels out of the world’s 
total (34.8 million barrels) oil pass through the Strait daily.14  In addition to the oil 
transiting through the Strait of Malacca, oil being shipped from the two oil 
exporting countries in this region (Indonesia and Malaysia) to other countries in 
East Asia also passes through the South China Sea; so almost one-third of the 
world total daily oil flow passes through the South China Sea.  Figure 3.1 shows 
the importance of the South China Sea as passage area for oil transit. 
                                                 
12 Joseph R. Morgan and Donald W. Fryer.  1985.  “The Marine Geography of Southeast Asia”.  In 
George Kent and Mark J. Valencia, eds.  Marine Policy in Southeast Asia.  Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and London: University of California Press.   
 
13 R.W. Fairbridge, ed.  1966.  Encyclopedia of Oceanography.  New York: Reinhold.  p. 324. 
 
14 EIA.  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.html.  Accessed on 27 March 2004. 
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Figure 3.1.  World Crude Oil Flows 1997 
Source: EIA 
Currently, the South China Sea is the second busiest shipping area in the 
world.  More than half the world’s shipping tonnage sails through the South China 
Sea each year.  More than 80 percent of the oil for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
flows through the area; two-thirds of South Korean energy needs, and more than 
60 percent of that of Japan and Taiwan, transit the region annually.15   The 
importance of the sea is likely to increase due to East Asia’s growing economies.  
As the countries bordering the South China Sea develop their export-oriented 
economies, the South China Sea will become a more and more important trading 
route between the region and the rest of the world, and within the region.   
Abundant Living Marine Resources.  The South China Sea is among the 
world’s richest fishing grounds.  Over five million tons of fish are pulled from the 
South China Sea each year, 10 percent of the global fisheries catch, and five of the 
                                                 
15 Brad Glosserman.  2001.  “Cooling South China Sea Competition.”  Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies.  Pac Net Newsletter: #22A. 
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world’s eight top shrimp producers border the sea.16  According to FAO-defined 
areas, South China Sea lies within Zone 71, ranking fourth among the world’s 
nineteen fishing zones in terms of total annual marine production.  The main 
species fished include scad, mackerel, tuna and shrimp.  In terms of catch by 
species, Zone 71 ranks first in tuna and second in shrimp among all FAO zones.17   
According to UNEP Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the South 
China Sea, four South China Sea littoral countries are among the top ten tuna 
fishing nations of the world.  The combined catch of Taiwan, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand made up 23 percent of the global landed catch over a six-
year period from 1988 to 1993.18  The South China Sea coastal areas also provide a 
suitable environment for coastal aquaculture.  For example, in 1995, the culture 
production of fisheries in the South China Sea coastal areas (6.7 million tons) 
accounted for 54 percent of the total world production.19 
Military Importance.  The military importance of the Sea is obvious.  It is 
the gateway to bordering countries.  The disputed islands are strategic as bases for 
sea-lane defence, interdiction, and surveillance and possibly for launching of land 
attacks.  They could serve as naval bases for supporting submarines and surface 
combatants, which would provide the occupying countries with a capability to 
monitor and potentially to interdict ships transiting the South China Sea.  Jose 
Almonte, former national security adviser to the Philippines government, aptly 
captured the importance of the South China Sea: “the great power that controls the 
                                                 
16 UNEP.  2001.  TDA. 
 
17 Daniel Y. Coulter.  1996.  “South China Sea Fisheries: Countdown to Calamity.”  Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No. 4, March 1996. 
 





South China Sea will dominate both archipelagic and peninsular Southeast Asia 
and play a decisive role in the future of the western Pacific and Indian Ocean—
together with their strategic sea lanes to and form the oil fields of the Middle 
East.”20  During the Second World War, Japan used Itu Aba, the largest island in 
the Spratly Chains, as a submarine base and jumping-off point for its invasion of 
the Philippines.21 
 
Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea 
Three areas are in dispute in the South China Sea: the Paracel, which is 
contested by China (Taiwan)22 and Viet Nam; the Gulf of Tonkin, disputed by 
China and Viet Nam, and the Spratlys, contested in whole or part by five littoral 
parties: Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines and Viet Nam.  The disputed claims 
over the South China Sea can be historically traced back to the fall of China’s 
power starting in the mid-nineteenth century, and the colonization of the countries 
bordering the South China Sea.  Traditionally, the South China Sea is within the 
“influence area” of China, and the name “South China Sea” is not without a 
reason: it refers to its location in relation to China, corresponding to the “East 
China Sea.”  Before the Second World War, Japan and France occupied the area.  
After the world war, in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced its 
                                                 
20 Glosserman.  2001.   
 
21 Esmond D. Smith, Jr.  1994.  “China’s Aspirations in the Spratly Islands.”  Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 13: 274-294. 
 
22 Mainland China and Taiwan claim about 80 percent of the entire South China Sea bounded by a 
U-shaped line that China made public in 1947 and which appears on official Chinese maps.  The 
Mainland China and Taiwan claims are in fact a single claim and are based on the same historical 
justifications.   
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claim to the Spratlys, but did not specify a successor to that sovereignty.23  The 
power vacuum created by the fall of the Chinese empire in the region and the 
withdrawal of colonizing powers (Japan and France) resulted in competition for the 
control of the area by the countries bordering the South China Sea.   
Overlapping Claims.  Countries involved in the dispute apply numerous 
incompatible arguments to justify overlapping claims.  China, Viet Nam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim all or part of the islands in the South China 
Sea.  Indonesia does not claim any islands, but other countries’ claims extend into 
Indonesia’s EEZs or continental shelf.  Table 3.2 summarizes the littoral countries’ 
claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea.  The main dividing line is between 
claims to historical title as opposed to claims relying on technical-geographical 
arguments.  Originally, China (including Taiwan) and Vietnam were the principal 
advocates of historical title, whereas the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei made 
more use of technical-geographical arguments.  However, from 1992 Vietnam 
appeared to change sides, de-emphasizing historical arguments to the advantage of 
technical-geographical arguments.24   
                                                 
23 Craig A. Snyder.  1997. 
24 Liselotte Odgaard.  2001.  “Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea.”  Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 23(2): 292-306. 
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Table 3.2.  Territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
Country Claim 
Brunei Does not occupy any of the islands, but claims part of the South China Seas nearest to it as 
part of its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The boundary lines are 
drawn perpendicularly from 2 outermost points on the Brunei coastline. In 1984, Brunei 
declared an EEZ that includes Louisa Reef. 
China Refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha islands, and claims all of the islands and most of 
the South China Sea for historical reasons. These claims are not marked by coordinates or 
otherwise clearly defined. China also claims the Paracel Islands (referred to as the Xisha 
Islands), and includes them as part of its Hainan Island province.  
 
Chinese claims are based on a number of historical events, including the naval expeditions to 
the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming Dynasty from 1403-1433 
AD. Chinese fishermen and merchants have worked the region over time, and China is using 
archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of sovereignty.   
 
In the 19th and early 20th century, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands. 
During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, China produced a 
map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 
Chinese law restated its claims in the region.  
China has occupied 8 of those islands to enforce its claims. In 1974, China seized the Paracel 
Islands from Vietnam.  
Indonesia Not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands. However, Chinese and Taiwanese claims in the 
South China Sea may extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, including 
Indonesia's Natuna gas field. 
Malaysia Its Spratly claims are based upon the continental shelf principle, and have clearly defined 
coordinates. Malaysia has occupied 3 islands that it considers to be within its continental 
shelf. Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil from the mainland and has 
built a hotel. 
Philippines Its Spratly claims have clearly defined coordinates, based both upon the proximity principle 
as well as on the explorations of a Philippine explorer in 1956. In 1971, the Philippines 
officially claimed 8 islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan, partly on the basis of this 
exploration, arguing that the islands: 1) were not part of the Spratly Islands; and 2) had not 
belonged to anyone and were open to being claimed. In 1972, they were designated as part of 
Palawan Province, and have been occupied.  
Vietnam Vietnamese claims are based on history and the continental shelf principle. Vietnam claims 
the entire Spratly Islands (Truong Sa in Vietnamese) as an offshore district of the province of 
Khanh Hoa. Vietnamese claims also cover an extensive area of the South China Sea, although 
they are not clearly defined. In addition, Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands (the Hoang Sa in 
Vietnamese), although they were seized by the Chinese in 1974. The Vietnamese have 
followed the Chinese example of using archaeological evidence to bolster sovereignty claims. 
In the 1930's, France claimed the Spratly and Paracel Islands on behalf of its then-colony 
Vietnam. Vietnam has since occupied 20 of the Spratly Islands to enforce its claims.  
Source:  EIA. 
China refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha Islands and Paracel 
Islands as the Zhongsha Islands, and claims sovereignty over all of the islands and 
most of the South China Sea for historical reasons.25  Chinese ships sailed across 
                                                 
25 See Jianming Shen.  2002.  “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: a Historical 
Perspective.”  Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1: 94-157.  Keyuan Zou.  2001.  
“Historical Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice.”  Ocean Development and 
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the South China Sea 2000 years ago, and used the Sea as a regular navigational 
route during the Han dynasty.26  China used archaeological evidence to support its 
claim that fishermen and merchants have worked in the region already in ancient 
times.  In 1946, China (then the Republic of China) sent a marine garrison to the 
largest island in the Spratlys, Itu Aba, to accept the surrender of the Japanese 
forces stationed there.27  In 1947, China produced a map with a U-shape line, 
which encompasses the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands and most of the South 
China Sea as Chinese territory.28  This map has now become an important legal 
basis for Chinese claims. 
Like Chinese claims, the Vietnamese claims are also based on historical 
evidence of occupation or ownership.  Vietnamese show court documents during 
the reign of King Le Thanh Tong (1460-1497), indicating that both the Spratly 
Islands and Paracel Islands are Vietnamese territory.29  After the Second World 
War, the Vietnamese claim to the Spratlys rests on rights of state succession 
following the French withdrawal from Indochina.  The post World War II history 
of the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratlys has been shaped, in part, by its 
struggle for independence and subsequent civil war between the socialist 
government in the North and the US-backed government in the South.  Since the 
1990s, Vietnam also used the argument of proximity to support its claims over the 
                                                                                                                                       
International Law 32: 149-168.  Keyuan Zou.  1999.  “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary 
Line in the South China Sea and its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the 
Spratly Islands.”  International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 14: 27-55. 
 
26 Shee Poon Kim.  1998.  “The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking.”  Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 19(4): 369-387. 
 
27 Snyder.  1997. 
 
28 Zou.  2001. 
 
29 Valencia et. al.  1997.  p. 33. 
 
 100
islands.  In protesting Chinese oil exploration activities in the disputed areas in 
1994, a spokesman of Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry emphasized that the area fully 
lies within Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf and that there was no disputed 
area there.30 
The Philippines claims fifty islands that are located 230 nautical miles west 
of Palawan island, and are known to Filipinos as the Kalayaans.31  While Chinese 
and Vietnamese claims can date back to certain historical periods, the Philippines 
claim is much more recent.  The first claim to Filipino control over the Spratlys 
was made with a claim of discovery issued in 1956 by Thomas Cloma, a private 
Filipino citizen.  His claim was based on the fact that in the 1951 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, Japan renounced its claim to the Spratlys but did not specify a 
successor to that sovereignty.32  At that time, the Philippines considered the islands 
abandoned, and rediscovered by the Philippines.  In 1968, the Philippines military 
occupied eight of the islands, and the Marcos government formally annexed them 
into Philippine territory by a Presidential Decree in 1978.  According to the 
Presidential Decree, the Kalayaans belong to the Philippines “by reason of their 
proximity”.33  Part of the basis for the Philippines claims is that “the islets were res 
nullius or ‘abandoned’ after World War II, and that the recent Philippine 
                                                 
30 Ramses Amer.  1997.  “The Territorial Disputes between China and Vietnam and Regional 
Stability.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.19, No. 1: 86-113. 
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occupation of some of the islets gives it title either through ‘discovery’ or 
‘prescriptive acquisition.’34   
Other countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, claim 
sovereignty over part of the Spratlys based on their proximity to the “abandoned” 
islands.  Malaysia claims twelve islands or features of the South China Sea, and six 
of them are occupied by Malaysia in certain forms.35  Malaysia’s claim to the 
South China Sea was based on continental shelf extension and discovery of “new 
territory.” Brunei currently claims two reefs, i.e. Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, 
and a maritime zone based on the prolongation of its continental shelf.36 
Besides the claiming countries within the region, the US, and to some 
extent Japan, are the most significant players in the disputes of the South China 
Sea.  These external powers have great political and security interests, and to a 
lesser extent, economic interests in the South China Sea.  The political and security 
interests stem from the strategic position of the South China Sea, and the need to 
balance the rise of China’s power.  The economic value of the islands and features 
in the sea are still not that important, at least until economically recoverable oil and 
gas deposits are discovered.  Economic interests of the South China Sea are 
derived from the strategic trade routes located nearby and the oil and gas 
exploration activities being conducted close to the area. 
The US interest in the South China Sea is linked to the diverse and far-
flung interests it has in East Asia as a regional and global power.  The end of the 
Cold War and resource constraints have forced the United States to reduce its 
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military presence in the region, but the security of the sea-lanes in the vicinity of 
the Spratlys is still of considerable concern to the United States.  The US security 
obligations to Japan and its defense commitments to the Philippines underpin its 
interests in the area, with a view to balancing the rise of China in the region.  The 
United States also has considerable economic interests with nearly all states in the 
region, and some American oil companies are involved in oil exploration activities 
in the area. 
Japan’s stake in the maritime routes near the Spratly islands is greater even 
than that of the United States.  Seventy percent of Japan’s oil imports, as well as 
other trade pass through the Spratlys.37  Japan is also a major trading partner and 
investor in all the claimant countries, and is involved in financing or operating 
some of the oil exploration efforts in the South China Sea.  Geo-politically 
speaking, like the United States, Japan is also apprehensive about China’s rising 
power, and seeks greater regional and global influence in the region. 
Military Clashes.  There have been numerous minor incidents in the South 
China Sea, some of which could have led to an escalation of hostilities if 
circumstances had permitted.  These incidents include arrests of fishermen in 
disputed waters, shows of force by naval vessels, the firing of warning shots 
against approaching craft, prevention of passage or access to exploration and 
drilling fields, and diplomatic oral protests by the claiming countries’ Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Despite the numerous incidents, military clashes have been 
controlled within limited areas and between just a few countries.  Table 3.3 
summarizes the military clashes that have occurred in the South China Sea. 
                                                 
37 Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan.  2000.  “Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict 
Management.”  In Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security.  Derek da Cunha, eds.  Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
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Table 3.3.  Military Clashes in the South China Sea over the Past Two 
Decades 
Date Countries  Military Action 
1974 China, Vietnam Chinese seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, with 18 of its troops 
killed in clashes on one of the islands. 
1988 China, Vietnam Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed at Johnson Reef in the 
Spratly Islands. Several Vietnamese boats were sunk and over 70 
sailors killed. 
1992 China, Vietnam Vietnam accused China of landing troops on Da Luc Reef. China 
seized almost 20 Vietnamese cargo ships transporting goods from 
Hong Kong from June - September. 
1994 China, Vietnam China and Vietnam had naval confrontations within Vietnam's 
internationally recognized territorial waters over Vietnam's Tu Chinh 
oil exploration blocks 133, 134, and 135. Chinese claim the area as 
part of their Wan' Bei-21 (WAB-21) block.  
1995 China, Philippines China occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. Philippine military 
evicted the Chinese in March and destroyed Chinese markers. 
1995 Taiwan, Vietnam Taiwanese artillery fired on a Vietnamese supply ship. 
1996 China, Philippines In January, Chinese vessels engaged in a 90-minute gun battle with a 
Philippine navy gunboat near Capones Island. 
1997 China, Philippines  The Philippine navy ordered a Chinese speedboat and two fishing 
boats to leave Scarborough Shoal in April; the Philippine navy later 
removed Chinese markers and raised its flag. China sent three 
warships to survey Philippine-occupied Panata and Kota Islands 
1998 Philippines, Vietnam In January, Vietnamese soldiers fired on a Philippine fishing boat 
near Tennent (Pigeon) Reef. 
1999 China, Philippines In May, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with Philippine 
warship. In July, another Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision 
with a Philippine warship. 
1999 China, Philippines In May, Chinese warships were accused of harassing a Philippine 
navy vessel after it ran aground near the Spratly Islands. 
1999 Philippines, Vietnam In October, Vietnamese troops fired upon a Philippine air force plane 
on reconnaissance in the Spratly Islands. 
1999 Malaysia, Philippines  In October, Philippine defense sources reported that 2 Malaysian 
fighter planes and 2 Philippine air force surveillance planes nearly 
engaged over a Malaysian-occupied reef in the Spratly Islands. The 
Malaysian Defense Ministry stated that it was not a stand-off. 
Source: EIA and BBC News 
To date military clashes have occurred only between China (Taiwan), Viet 
Nam and the Philippines.  Before 1995, direct military clashes happened only 
between China (Taiwan) and Viet Nam.  China and Viet Nam have had a relatively 
long history of military clashes in the South China Sea.  The two major military 
conflicts occurred between China and Viet Nam in 1974 and 1988.  The 1974 
battle for the Paracel was triggered by the South Vietnamese38 government’s 
                                                 
38 Viet Nam was colonized by France since 1840s, and later by Japan during the Second World 
War, after which an independent movement led to the outbreak of the war between Viet Nam and 
France until 1954.  After French loss, Viet Nam was divided into the North and South Viet Nam, 
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administrative decision to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province 
in September 1973.  The decision was made upon the recommendation of the 
National Petroleum Board, which was established after the granting of oil 
concessions to a number of international oil companies and consortia for 
exploration off the shores of South Viet Nam in July 1973.39 
Four months later, on 11 January 1974, China issued a statement to 
condemn Viet Nam’s action as an infringement of China’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.  South Viet Nam rejected China’s claim and issued a counter 
statement.  At the same time, Chinese fishermen were sent to three islands of the 
Paracel to carry out activities like setting up huts and displaying Chinese flags.  
Subsequently, both countries sent vessels and troops to the Paracel.  Skirmishes 
took place during 16-18 January 1974, which finally led to serious fighting in the 
early hours of 19 January 1974.  Within two days, South Vietnamese forces were 
defeated and withdrew from the Paracel islands, and China has taken control of the 
Paracel islands since then.   
Competition for the occupation of the Spratlys started during the Viet Nam 
war.  With the reunification of Viet Nam, Hanoi took over the six islands of the 
Spratly group in April 1975, and has since then expanded its control.  In 1979, it 
published a map showing an extensive continental shelf claim north of Boreneo, 
and in 1983 and 1986, it sent troops to occupy islands on the shelf.  By the mid-
1980s, the Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam, and Taiwan (which occupies Itu Aba) 
had occupied virtually all the features in the Spratlys that were above the sea at 
                                                                                                                                       
which were reunited in 1975 when Americans lost the Vietnamese war to the North Viet Nam.  For 
a detailed history, see Wikipedia—the Free Encyclopedi ( 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War), accessed 6th July 2005). 
 
39 See Chi-Kin Lo.  1989.  China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes.  London and New York: 
Routledge. 
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high tide.  In the late 1980s, China became the last claimant to enter the scramble 
for features in the Spartlys.  Beijing felt it had an imperative to have a presence in 
the Spartlys, with Viet Nam issuing oil concessions to areas that China claimed.  
The late 1980s provided a good opportunity for China to make a move because of 
the decreased power of the Soviet Union.  In 1988, the Chinese began to occupy 
several reefs, including Fiery Cross Reef.  In March 1988, China and Viet Nam 
clashed on the Johnson Reef, resulting in the sinking of three Vietnamese vessels 
and the deaths of 78 Viet Namese navy personnel.40  As of today, Viet Nam 
occupies the biggest number of islands of the Spratlys, followed by the Philippines 
and China, respectively.  Table 3.4 presents the status of occupation, military 
facilities and number of troops in the Spratly Islands. 
Table 3.4.  National Occupation of the Spratly Islands, 1998 
 
Claimant State No. of Islands Facilities No. of Troops 
Mainland China 8 Helicopter pads 260 
Philippines 9 1,300m runway 595 
Vietnam 25 600m runway 600 
Malaysia 3 600m runaway 70 
Taiwan 1 Helicopter pads 112 
Brunei 0 None 0 
Source: Christopher J. Joyner.  1998.41  “The Spratly Islands Disputes”.   
Prior to 1994, ASEAN countries had a belief that China would resort to 
military actions only with Viet Nam.  At that time, China and ASEAN shared an 
interest in containing Viet Nam.  The year 1995 marked a change of attitude 
towards China from ASEAN countries due to the Sino-Philippines dispute over the 
ownership of the Kalayaans, which had not been a major irritant in Sino-
                                                 
40 See Alan Collins.  2003.  Security and Southeast Asia.  Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner  
Publishers. 
 
41 Christopher J. Joyner.  1998.  “The Spratly Islands Disputes”.  The International Journal of 
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Philippines relations prior to 1994.  In April 1988 after the Sino-Viet Nam clash on 
the Johnson Reef, the Philippine President Corazon Aquino made a high-profile 
trip to China, during which she raised the issue of the Kalayaans with China’s then 
paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping.  Deng promised to shelve the sovereignty issue, 
engage in joint exploration and exploitation of maritime resources and work 
towards a peaceful resolution of the issue.42 
The year 1995 marked a turning point in Sino-Philippines relations and the 
perception of ASEAN countries regarding China’s aspirations in the South China 
Sea.  In that year, China was found to have built structures on Mischief Reef—a 
small, rocky outcrop lying 135 miles west of Palawan and well within the 
Philippine-claimed 200-milesEEZ.43  The finding was later confirmed by the US 
reconnaissance aircrafts.  Accordingly, Chinese built four platforms on stilts, with 
three to four octagonal bunkers on each platform, equipped with satellite 
communication equipment.  Eight Chinese naval vessels were also seen near the 
Reef.  The Philippines government condemned Chinese actions, and arrested 
Chinese fishermen around the area.  China claimed that these structures were 
“wind shelters” for fishermen, set up by “China’s local fishing authorities” on 
Meijijiao (Chinese name of the Mischief Reef).44  China also offered to allow 
fishermen from other countries to use the “shelters,” but Manila declined, wary of 
any actions that could be interpreted as acknowledging Chinese sovereignty.45  In 
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October 1998, the issue of Mischief Reef came to prominence again when the 
Philippine Government produced photographs of Chinese vessels unloading 
construction materials at the reef. Subsequent photographs revealed Chinese 
workers constructing a large building adjacent to the original structures. 
On May 15, 1996, China issued the Declaration of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the People’s 
Republic of China.  In the declaration, China demarcated its 200 nautical mile 
EEZs, and provided coordinates for a portion of its coastal baselines.  The 
baselines were mainly stipulated for the mainland coastal areas.  A separate set of 
archipelagic baselines was also declared for the Paracel island group, but no 
baselines were declared for the Spratlys.46  Since 1995, ASEAN countries have 
expressed increasing concern regarding China’s actions and policies towards the 
South China Sea. 
Conflict Resolution.  The claiming countries have yet to find a way to 
resolve the disputes.  Each claiming country has strongly adhered to its claims, and 
it seems that negotiations will not produce any substantive results in the short term.  
An important reason that has aggravated the situation of the South China Sea is 
that according to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, islands can generate their 
own EEZs of 200 nautical miles from the coastlines of the islands.   
While the World Court is a useful conflict resolution tool, its use is 
predicated on the desire of disputants to allow outsiders to arbitrate their claims. 
Analysts have generally concluded that in the Spratlys, no nation's claim appears to 
have been sufficiently strong or unchallengeable to persuade others to keep out of 
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the region.  The claimants are not able to demonstrate continuous and effective 
occupation, administration, and control or acquiescence by other claimants.47  
Because all the claims are weak, each claimant undoubtedly realizes that if the 
dispute were presented to a tribunal or arbitrator, it may not ultimately or 
completely prevail. An independent decision-maker is likely to allocate these tiny 
islets according to the common legal principles of equity and fairness.48  The 
ASEAN claiming countries strongly believe that the UN or the World Court should 
only be called upon after all other local attempts to find a solution have failed.49  
During the 1995 Mischief incident between China and the Philippines, the 
Philippines leadership indicated its willingness to resort to the World Court and 
other international channels for third-party arbitration, but China strongly opposed 
any third-party involvement.  China’s leadership has been reluctant to 
"internationalize" its claim to the South China Sea, as it claims the sea area over 
1,000 nautical miles (nm) south of Hong Kong as its traditional territory.  China 
considers any attempts to resort to international forums or mechanisms for the 
resolution of the South China Sea disputes an action of transgressing its 
sovereignty.   
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Economic Development in the South China Sea 
The economic development of East Asia has deservedly gained the 
attention of academics and policy-makers from all over the world during the past 
several decades.  The South China Sea region contains the world’s fastest growing 
and most dynamic economies.  Until the outbreak of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, 
it was common to see references to the “Asian Economic Miracle.”  The World 
Bank, in 1993, published a report that characterizes eight East Asian economies as 
“miracle economies,” because their achievements are unprecedented.50  Six of the 
eight “miracle economies” border the South China Sea.   
During the period of 1965 and 1996, GDP per capita in Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand quadrupled.51  Unlike the development that took place in South 
America, development in East Asia benefited the whole population, including the 
lowest-income groups.  In Indonesia, the population living under the poverty line 
dropped from 60 percent in 1965 to 15 percent in 1996.  The proportion of people 
living in absolute poverty, lacking such basic necessities as clean water, food and 
shelter, dropped from 58 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1990 in Indonesia, and 
from 13 percent to less than 5 percent in Malaysia during the same period.52  The 
Economist, in September 1991, wrote,  
The four economic ‘tigers’ of East Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong—have forged the fastest industrial 
revolutions the world has ever seen.  Behind them are another four 
countries which are getting close to the point of industrial take-
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off—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and most interestingly, 
China.53 
 
The coastal areas of the South China Sea are the fastest growing areas, and 
are the locomotive for economic development of the bordering countries.  For 
example, Guangdong province is the fastest developing area in China, especially 
the Pearl River Delta bordering the South China Sea.  In the period of 1978 to 
1990, Guangdong’s real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 12.3 percent 
while the country’s rate is about 7 percent. 
The region enjoyed high economic growth rates until the financial crisis in 
1997-1998.  Despite the 1997-1998 financial crisis, the region continues to grow 
faster than other regions.  Figure 3.2 illustrates that all the countries achieved a 
growth rate higher than 4 percent in 1999, which continues to 2000.  In 2001, the 
economic growth was lowered because of the slackened US demand.  The US 
economy evolved into a mild recession by April 2001 and culminated in a GDP 
contraction later that year due to the 9/11 event.54  Despite some disagreements 
over the reasons for the stellar economic performances in the region and the 
sudden financial crisis in late 1990s, commentators broadly agree that the region 
will continue to grow rapidly and move up in the development ladder for some 
time to come.55  In the following, I will discuss three main characteristics of the 
economic development in the region, and their implications for marine 
environment protection in the South China Sea. 
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 Source: Asian Development Bank.  Key Indicators 2003. 
 
State-led Development.  It is agreed by political economists that the roles 
played by governments directly contributed to the economic development.  Asian 
economies did not come along by themselves or completely by laissez-faire 
policies.  Asian economies do not take a completely “free market” approach, 
neither a “centralized” way.  The governments strategically protect and promote 
specific industries with policies such as subsidizing exports and preventing 
imports.  These governments have followed the prototypes of the so-called 
“developmental states” in the field of political economy.56 
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In summarizing the lessons learnt from Asian economic development, the 
Economist points out, governments shared a common view that the priority of state 
action should be economic development, which is “not defined by the 
government’s ability to hand out welfare payments to the less privileged, but rather 
by growth in output, productivity and above all, international competitiveness.”57   
As one of the biggest growing economies, the Chinese government’s strong 
emphasis on “economic development” partly explains its fast economic growth in 
the past two decades.  Deng Xiaoping, the post-Mao leader, emphasized, 
“economic construction is the center of the party work (Chinese Communist 
Party)”.58  The essential state policy is that “everything has to center around 
economic development.”  The most important criteria of bureaucratic promotion in 
China are economic performances, including both economic growth and the 
foreign investment attracted during the tenure of a government official. 
This state-led economic development takes an approach of “grow now, and 
save clean up later,” which causes the acceleration of environmental degradation.  
In order to gain foreign currencies, for example, shrimp production and export 
were encouraged.  Mangrove forest areas were converted into shrimp ponds.  
Short-term economic incentives overtook ecological considerations. 
Export-oriented Economy.  An important strategy of developmental states 
in promoting economic development is to encourage exports by fostering a 
supportive macroeconomic climate and by providing suitable macroeconomic 
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incentives.  Exports supply the needed foreign currencies to import necessary 
machines, equipments and technologies for industrializing.  Mechanisms used by 
governments range from broad, export-friendly measures such as avoiding an 
appreciated exchange rate to government-run export contests.  Universal export 
incentives, such as tax breaks and credit guarantees, are provided for all 
exporters.59   
In their early development stage, the countries of the South China Sea did 
not have much experience with producing technological products.  Instead, they 
had to take advantage of their abundant natural resources and cheap labor; and 
therefore/ a significant part of their exports is from the export of raw materials or 
agricultural and resource-based products with intensive labor inputs.  Textiles, 
petroleum, aquatic products, rubber, and wood have been among the most 
important export commodities.  Table 3.5 indicates the top five export 
commodities of the countries bordering the South China Sea. 
Driven by the demand of the world market for raw materials and natural 
resources, these countries have increased their exploitation of their natural 
environment.  The processing of some products further deteriorates the local 
environment.  For example, forest products have traditionally been a mainstay of 
the Southeast Asian economies with timber consistently ranking among the top 
foreign exchange earners, but the last two decades have seen a precipitous decline 
in timber stocks in the area.  In crude terms, annual forest loss amounts to 100,000 
hectares in the Philippines, 230,000 in Malaysia, 325,000 in Thailand and 550,000 
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in Indonesia.60  The processing of some of the export products results in negative 
environmental impacts.  It is well known that the textile industry is one of the 
“dirty” industries.  Rubber and palm oil are also not clean.  They can cause intense 
water pollution.  The processing of rubber results in the discharge of acidic 
effluents, being dumped into the water supply.  The palm oil industry needs huge 
amounts of fresh water, which is then turned into a hot, thick, oily waste. 
The export-oriented characteristics of the economies of this region indicate 
that the environment not only has to bear the impacts of economic activities to 
sustain human livelihood in the region, but also of the consumption demands 
outside of the region.  The type of export commodities in the region places 
tremendous pressure on the environment. 
Table 3.5.  Exports of the South China Sea Countries, by Principal 
Commodity 
 
Countries Top Five Export Commodity 
Cambodia 1. Rubber; 2. Timber; 3. Soya beans; 4. Maize; 5. Sesame. 
China 1. Cotton yarn and cloth; 2. Crude petroleum; 3. Aquatic 
products; 4. Coal; 5. Cereals. 
Indonesia 1. Petroleum and products; 2. Plywood; 3. Rubber; 4. Shrimp; 
5. Coffee 
Malaysia 1. Petroleum; 2. Logs and timer; 3. Palm oil; 4. Rubber; 5. 
Thermionic valves, tubes, photocells, etc. 
Philippines 1. Electronically equipments; 2. Garments; 3. Coconut oil; 4. 
Copper concentrates; 5. Centrifugal and refined sugar. 
Singapore 1. Petroleum and products; 2. Telecommunication equipment; 
3. Clothing; 4. Crude rubber; 5. Fixed vegetable oils 
Thailand 1. Computer and parts; 2. Textile products; 3. Electrical 
appliances; 4. Integrated circuits and parts; 5. Canned food. 
Vietnam 1. Food and live animals; 2. Beverage and tobacco; 3. Crude 
materials; 4. Mineral fuels; 5. Animal/vegetable oil and fats. 
Source: Asian Development Bank.  Key Indicators 2003. 
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Economic Integration.  Along with dramatic economic growth, the region 
has experienced rapid economic integration.  During the 1990s, global trade in 
merchandise grew by 5 percent per year, reaching $5,473 billion in 1999.  During 
the same period, ASEAN’s exports grew at more than double the world rate, at 11 
percent annually, to $359 billion in 1999 despite considerable volatility during the 
economic crisis.  ASEAN’s share of total world exports increased from 4.3 percent 
in 1990 to 6.6 percent in 1999; for imports from 4.7 percent to 5.2 percent.61 
In 1992, the ASEAN heads of State/Government decided to establish the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).  Its objective is to increase ASEAN’s 
competitive advantage as a production base geared for the world market by 
increasing regional economic integration.  A vital step is to liberalize trade through 
elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers among ASEAN member countries.  
According to the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
Scheme for AFTA, tariffs levied on a wide range of products traded within the 
region are reduced to 0-5 percent.  Quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff 
barriers are to be eliminated.  The average CEPT tariff rate in ASEAN countries, 
was 12.76 percent in 1993, but has been reduced to below 5 percent.    
Economic integration between China and ASEAN has sped up in the past 
decade.  According to statistics released by Chinese customs, China-ASEAN trade 
reached 21.48 billion dollars between January-October 1999, registering an 
increase of 15.7 percent over the same period the year before.  The bilateral trade 
has grown steadily, from 6 billion dollars in 199162 to 13 billion dollars in 1994 to 
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23.5 billion dollars in 1998.  In 2002, China's exports to ASEAN grew 27.6 percent 
to 18.82 billion US dollars, while its imports from ASEAN climbed 28.9 percent to 
24.64 billion US dollars.63  ASEAN is now an important market for labor services 
and project contracting by China. China has respectively signed governmental 
agreements on cooperation in science and technology with Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Viet Nam, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Several implications for the marine environment in the South China Sea of 
the rapid economic development in the region need to be carefully explored.  First, 
economic growth is accompanied by an increasing demand for energy.  The region 
has turned from a net exporter in 1990 to a net importer of oil in 1995.  Table 3.6 
shows that the region has become a huge importer of energy, in comparison to its 
energy status in 1971.  In 2001, the region imported 173.12 Mtoe of oil, with China 
alone accounting for almost half of the net import (81.79 Mtoe).64  The increased 
demand for oil will further motivate the littoral countries of the South China Sea to 
explore and drill for the oil resources believed to be in the region.  This in turn will 
increase the competition and tension among the bordering countries.  Between 
1992 and 2003, ten disputes related to exploration and drilling occurred among the 
countries, among which nine were between China and Vietnam, and one between 
Brunei and Malaysia.  As the development of exploration and drilling technology 
and equipment continues, more and more exploration activities are likely to be 
undertaken in the South China Sea, with high potential for conflicts and disputes. 
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Table 3.6.  Net Imports of Oil (Mtoe65) in  South China Sea 
  1971 1973 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 
Brunei -5.95 -11.77 -11.79 -8.31 -7.56 -8.48 -8.83 -9.62 -9.61 
China 3.77 2.99 -10.99 -31.20 -17.57 20.59 60.88 87.08 81.79 
Chinese Taiwan 7.26 10.35 21.41 17.00 18.79 37.29 43.76 45.85 44.71 
Malaysia 1.31 0.18 -5.57 -13.80 -19.25 -16.15 -14.86 -12.28 -11.69 
Indonesia -33.88 -50.82 -58.05 -43.41 -41.47 -35.45 -22.36 -17.30 -11.98 
Philippines 8.73 9.25 11.26 7.23 11.74 17.83 17.62 17.22 17.33 
Singapore 6.61 12.23 8.02 10.52 24.50 30.98 38.40 39.70 43.47 
Thailand 6.35 8.28 12.17 8.83 17.63 30.53 29.86 27.39 27.86 
Vietnam 5.82 5.80 1.85 1.90 0.11 -2.69 -7.78 -7.43 -8.76 
Total 0.02 -13.51 -31.69 -51.24 -13.08 74.45 136.69 170.61 173.12 
Source: OECD.  Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, 2000-2001 
Second, the increased economic activity and rising consumption due to 
improvement of living standards across the region has placed, and will continue to 
place, increasing pressure on the environment and marine ecosystems.66  The 
dramatic economic growth has generated a rapid rise in incomes for large 
populations in the region, increasing the demand for products and services, 
including those provided by the South China Sea.  In the past, shrimp and seafood 
were exported to mainly Europe and the United States.  As the living standards 
increases in the region, domestic demand for seafood is likely to increase.  
Therefore, pressure on marine fishery resources in the region is expected to 
continue, rising in parallel with high domestic and international demand. 
Third, with economic development and the deepening of economic 
integration, factors of production, particularly capital, freely move beyond national 
boundaries, seeking the most favorable investment environment.  All too often this 
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means countries with lowest environmental and social standards.67  Debates have 
continued on the relationship between free trade and the environment.  
Environmentalists contend that under the free trade system, heavily polluting 
industries will move to poor countries where environmental and social regulations 
are lax.  Some economists also contend that free trade contributes to economic 
growth, which will make people wealthy enough to have the funds to clean up the 
environmental damages caused by growth.   
Whether free trade is good or bad for the environment, to achieve 
effectiveness in environmental policy in integrated economies requires 
coordination among governments, as the factors of production, including capital 
and labor, are free to move beyond national boundaries.  Regional economic 
integration poses questions for the countries bordering the South China Sea related 
to how best to cooperate for environmental protection. 
 
Marine Environmental Degradation in the South China Sea 
The high economic growth in the South China Sea region has inevitably 
placed tremendous pressure on the natural ecosystems.  Until recently, 
environmental problems were largely considered to be those resulting from 
urbanization and industrialization with limited geographical impact.  Today, in 
addition to air and water pollution, they include soil erosion, desertification, 
tropical deforestation, loss of biodiversity, global warming, acid rain, and toxic and 
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hazardous wastes, many of which have not only national but also regional and 
global impacts.68 
Each country bordering the South China Sea has incurred a series of severe 
environmental problems, resulting from fast industrialization, population increase 
and urbanization.  Some of the problems tend to be “local”, with consequences 
limited to within a national jurisdiction, while others have impacts that spill over 
national boundaries.  Due to the lack of systematic and consistent environmental 
cooperation before the mid-1990s among all the major countries, little information 
is available for countries to assess the causes and severity of transboundary 
environmental problems.  From 1996 to 1998, under the sponsorship of the GEF 
and UNEP, a transboundary analysis was conducted to evaluate the environmental 
status of the South China Sea.  Each participating country undertook a national 
study on environmental problems in the South China Sea.  Building on these 
national analyses, a regional analysis of transboundary marine environmental 
problems was conducted, and problems were ranked in terms of their importance.  
The end result was a UNEP technical report entitled “Transboundary Diagnostic 
Analysis for the South China Sea”, often referred to as the TDA69  
The TDA report identified major marine environmental concerns and 
principal issues in the South China Sea.  Major environmental concerns are in 
priority order: habitat loss and degradation, over exploitation of living resources, 
marine pollution, and freshwater concerns.  During the first stage of the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project, more substantive study has been conducted 
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to identify the problems, causes, and optimal points of intervention to reverse the 
environmental degradation trends in the region. 
Habitat degradation and loss.  Located within the global center of marine 
biological diversity, the South China Sea is endowed with an immense diversity of 
species, which find their home in various ecological habitats, formed by 
mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands.  In the past several decades, the 
South China Sea witnessed an accelerating speed of degradation and loss of these 
globally significant habitats.  Undoubtedly, the most effective way to protect 
biological diversity is to protect their habitats.   
Mangroves.  The uniqueness of mangrove trees lies in their ability to 
survive in unstable, saline and low-oxygen environments, earning them fame as the 
“guards” of the coastlines.  Mangroves can live in soft substrates, such as muddy 
inter-tidal zones, where ocean waves threaten to dislodge them.  Some mangroves 
have stilt roots or cable roots to cling onto the soil.  They also possess ecological 
functions that enable them to live in saline and low-oxygen environments.   
Mangroves grow in tropical and subtropical coastlines where seawater 
temperature occasionally drops below 20 degrees.  The South China Sea coastal 
region forms a major concentration area for mangrove trees.  FAO estimated that 
Asia supports around 39 percent of the world’s total of the remaining mangrove 
forest (14.6 million hectares), mostly found in the seven major countries bordering 
the South China Sea.70  The diversity of the mangrove trees in the region can be 
shown in comparison with other regions in the world.  According to a recent UNEP 
report, some 41 genera of true mangrove species exist in the Indo-West Pacific, 
                                                 




while only 5 are in the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard of the Americas.  The 
diversity of the plant species provides a home to a diversity of both aquatic and 
terrestrial animals that are residents in the forests. 
At the same time, the region’s mangroves suffered a much higher rate of 
loss than the world average.  In 1998, it was estimated that a total area of 4.2 
million ha has been lost in the region, resulting in the loss of more than half of its 
original mangrove forests.  The annual rate of loss during 1990-2000 is 1.1 
percent, down from 1.9 percent in the 1980s.71  The loss of mangroves in the 
region is not only a direct loss of mangrove trees and species, but also threatens the 
animals residing in the habitats.  Due to the global significance of the region’s 
mangrove forests, the loss is not merely a national or regional one, but has an 
impact on global biological diversity. 
Mangroves are important not only from a marine biological perspective; 
they also provide direct and indirect economic value to human beings.  Mangrove 
forest systems yield large amounts of fish, crabs, prawns and oysters. They are also 
valuable sources of fuel wood, timber, tannin and other natural products. Their 
non-marketable value is of equal importance: stabilization of the coastline, an 
indispensable nursery ground for numerous marine species with commercial value, 
a natural filter maintaining the clarity of nearshore water, a home for resident and 
migratory birds and other wildlife. 
Coral Reefs.  The South China Sea is acknowledged as the richest in the 
World in terms of its biological diversity related to coral reefs, with the center of 
diversity lying in the Philippines and Indonesia.  More species occur here than in 




any other part of the tropical reef world, which is partly due to favorable climatic 
conditions and the huge range of habitats associated with the long and varied 
shorelines.72  The location of the South China Sea at the junction between the 
Pacific and Indian Ocean basins endowed it with species from both oceans.   
The South China Sea’s coral reefs and their related biological diversity are 
globally significant.  It was estimated that 34 percent of the earth’s coral reefs are 
located in the seas of Southeast Asia.73  The Philippines recorded over 450 coral 
species, while only some 35 coral species are found in the Atlantic, 200 from the 
Red Sea, 117 from the Southeast India and 57 from the Persian Gulf.74 
Ecologically, coral reefs are important habitats for many commercially 
important reef fish and invertebrate species, and they provide breeding and nursery 
grounds for many pelagic and demersal fish species found in the open sea.  For 
example, the most diverse reef systems in the region may support over 1,000 
species of fish and 400 species of stony corals.75   
Coral reefs in the South China Sea have degraded due to coastal 
development, destructive fishing, including use of poison and bomb fishing, and 
global climate change.76  Coral reefs in Malaysia and the northwest of the 
Philippines show 10 to 30 percent degradation.  In Thailand and Indonesia, 40 to 
60 percent of reefs are degraded.  Ninety-five percent of coastal areas of Hainan, 
                                                 
72 Elizabeth Wood and Michael AW.  2002.  Reef Fishes, Corals and Invertebrates of the South 
China Sea.  London: New Holland Publishers. 
 
73 L. Burke, E. Selig and M. Spalding.  2002.  Reefs at Risk in Southeast Asia.  Washington DC: 
World Resources Institute. 
 
74 UNEP.  2004.  Coral Reefs in the South China Sea.  UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 
2. 
 
75 Wood and Michael AW.  2002.   
 
76 UNEP.  2004.  UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 2. 
 
 123
China are severely degraded.  Burke et al considers that over 80 percent of 
Southeast Asia’s coral reefs are under threat.77 
Seagrass.  Like mangroves and coral reefs, seagrass beds are an important 
ecological system that provides a highly productive habitat that supports a large 
quantity of marine life including commercial fish.  They provide important feeding 
and breeding areas for fish.  For instance, the endangered green turtle and Dugong 
from the Philippines feed on the seagrass beds in the South China Sea.78  Seagrass 
beds are highly diverse in the region.  The region was found to have 20 species of 
seagrass out of about 50 species worldwide, making the region the second most 
seagrass species-rich area next to Malesia, a region bounded by Indonesia, northern 
Australia and Papua New Guinea.79  Seagrass beds have also incurred a rapidly 
increasing rate of loss and decline.  Of seagrass beds, about 30-40 percent in 
Indonesia, 30-50 percent in the Philippines, 20-30 percent in Thailand and 40-50 
percent in Vietnam have been lost due to various causes.80   
Wetlands.  Southeast Asian countries have at least 334 wetland sites, with a 
total area of 192,363,601 ha.  These wetlands support livelihoods of local 
communities and provide habitats to a variety of rare endemic, endangered and 
threatened species with global significance.  However, wetlands, for a while 
considered as wastelands, have suffered from land reclamation, logging, and waste 
dumping.  Logging and woodcutting affect about 30 percent of all wetlands sites in 
the Southeast Asian countries.  In China’s Pearl River Delta, an average annual 
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rate of 11 km2/year of reclamation has occurred during the period of 1966-1996.  
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand recorded an overall wetland rate of loss of 
31 percent, 78 percent and 22 percent respectively.81 
Over-exploitation of fisheries resources.  Due to its abundant marine 
biological diversity, there are abundant fishery resources in the South China Sea.  
The littoral countries are important exporters of aquatic products, including 
fisheries and shrimps.  Marine fishery production in the countries bordering the sea 
accounts for more than 12 percent of the world total.  The region’s coastal 
aquaculture in the region has a dominant share of 54 percent of the global total.  
Four littoral countries are among the top ten leading tuna fishing nations in the 
World.   
Will this production of fishery be sustainable?  Fish nursery areas and 
breeding grounds are being degraded, and two-thirds of the waters’ major fish 
species are being over exploited.  According to the UNEP/GEF TDA, as of the late 
1990s, there is a region-wide over-exploitation of fisheries resources in the South 
China Sea.  Destructive fishing practices, bycatch, post-harvest losses, siltation and 
habitat destruction are a tremendous pressure on sustainable fishing.82  If the trend 
continues, the fishery resources will be depleted. 
Marine pollution.  The major sources of pollution to the South China Sea 
include land-based pollution, ship-based pollution and air pollution.  Land-based 
pollution is the most important source of pollution in the sea.  Wastes from 
domestic, agricultural, and industrial sources, along with sediments and solid 
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wastes are major pollutants running down through rivers and draining into the sea, 
polluting freshwater systems, coastal areas and the sea.  Ship-based pollution is 
also likely to increase as a result of the growing trade and transport of raw 
materials, fossil fuels and commodities across the shipping lanes, with increasing 
oil spills and waste dumping. 
Transboundary air pollution, both in the form of smoke haze from forest 
fires and air pollutants resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels and biomass in 
transport, industries, agriculture and households, has spread widely across the 
region, severely affecting human health and economic activity.  The annual 
average level of “total suspended particulates” in the air of Bangkok, Manila and 
Jakarta are more than double the standard set by the World Health Organizations 
(WHO) Guidelines.83   The most serious air pollution problem in the region is the 
transboundary haze pollution from land and forest fires.  Satellite photo-images of 
the South China Sea during the last half of 1997 showed dense clouds of smoke 
haze.  Most of this air pollution came from forest fires in Sumatra, Kalimantan and 
East Malaysia.   
Holistic and Transboundary Nature of Marine Environmental 
Degradation.  Marine environmental degradation in the South China Sea has two 
inherent characteristics.  First is the holistic nature of the problems.  Marine 
habitats are interrelated with each other, and losses in one can cause losses in 
others.  Land-based pollution can cause the degradation and losses of coastal 
habitats and pose a threat to fisheries.  The coastal habitats, having served as 
nursery or feeding grounds for fisheries at some stage of, or throughout their whole 
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life cycles, will directly impact the sustainable reproduction of fisheries.  For 
example, coral reef-based fisheries account for about 20-25 percent of the marine 
fish catch in the Philippines and Indonesia.84  Second, marine environmental 
degradation has a transboundary nature inherently in that impacts can transfer 
beyond national boundaries through movement of fisheries and ocean currents.  
Fisheries may find their residence at some stage of their life in different countries’ 
coastal areas.  The losses of mangroves, coral reefs and seagrasses themselves are 
global losses, as they are important as nursing and feeding grounds for fisheries 
and other migratory species. 
 
Complex Linkages: Territorial Disputes, Development and Environment in 
the South China Sea 
Territorial disputes, economic development and environmental degradation 
in the South China Sea form complex relationships among them in which a change 
in one of the variables may lead to changes in the other two.  The relationships can 
be as follows:  1) Fast economic development places great pressure on the marine 
environment of the South China Sea, causing the degradation of marine 
environment in the South China Sea.  Furthermore, economic development 
increases national demands for increased resources, including oil and marine living 
resources, causing governments more aggressive actions towards the occupation 
and consolidation of their positions in the South China Sea, increasing inter-
governmental conflicts; 2) The status of competing claims for the South China Sea 
forms a situation in which countries do not feel the security of their ownerships of 
the part of the South China Sea occupied by them.  This insecurity may lead to 
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countries actions to exploit and explore the resources in the South China Sea, in a 
speed faster than when ownership of a resource is clearly defined, leading to 
further environmental degradation in the South China Sea.  Territorial disputes also 
make the countries increase their government expenditures on military 
modernization, reducing government investment in further economic development.  
3) Environmental degradation in the South China Sea can pose a serious threat to 
sustainable economic growth in the region, as it relies heavily on its marine 
resources for economic benefits and foreign exchanges.  Environmental 
degradation can also worsen inter-state conflicts already existing in the region. 
Development and Territorial Disputes as Causes of Environmental 
Degradation.  Like many other environmental problems, the degradation of the 
marine environment in the South China Sea can find its causes in economic 
development, population growth, and urbanization that are rapidly occurring in the 
region.  Southeast Asia has been not only one of the fastest growing economic 
regions in the world in the past several decades; it is also one of the most heavily 
populated regions.  Some 70 percent of the Southeast Asian population are coastal 
dwellers, representing approximately 270 million, or roughly five percent of the 
world’s population.  The littoral countries of the South China Sea heavily rely on 
the marine resources from the South China Sea for basic animal proteins and 
economic incomes.  The governments have to provide sufficient food and protein 
to their large and still increasing populations.  In Southeast Asia, seafood is the 
main animal protein source for most people, and two-thirds of animal protein 
consumption comes from seafood and crustaceans.85  The increasing population is 
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probably the root cause for fisheries exploitation and other marine environmental 
problems in the South China Sea. 
Unlike any other domestic problems, the degradation is further worsened 
by the unclear ownership of the contested area, which encourages various claimant 
countries’ competition for resources, and ultimately leads to increasing 
government-encouraged exploitation activities without taking consideration of any 
obligations to protect the environment.  The unclear definition of sovereignty 
rights, along with competing unilateral claims of ownership, drive individual 
governments to fiercely compete with one another and accelerate their exploitation 
of fisheries resources and oil exploration activities.  They fear that any unilateral 
restraints will only benefit other countries.  For example, media reports commonly 
show government-supported oil exploration activities and fishing activities being 
conducted with soldiers serving as escorts. 
Environmental Degradation: a Possible Trigger to Inter-state Conflicts.  
There is awareness at the highest political levels in the states bordering the South 
China Sea that development cannot continue to be pursued at the expense of the 
environment; if it is, it will not be sustainable.  The only uncertainty of the policy-
makers is how much more the environment/ecosystem can take.  Less noticed by 
policy-makers is that a degrading marine environment can increase the tensions 
and the quarrelling among nations, and actually play a disintegrating role in the 
peace and final solution of the disputes and conflicts in the region.  The importance 
of marine environmental degradation in the South China Sea goes far beyond the 
significance of its impact on the marine ecosystem, or sustainable development of 
the region, although this is still extremely important.  The environmental status of 
the South China Sea directly relates to the security of the region.  When resources 
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are abundant, human beings are less aggressive, but tension tends to increase when 
resources are being depleted.  Competition for the resources will increase as the 
depletion continues, especially when ownership of the resources has not been 
clearly defined.   
To some littoral countries, marine environmental problems in the South 
China Sea seem less threatening or impending than some of their domestic 
environmental problems, which are more closely related to the welfare of their 
citizens, for example, the fresh water, air pollution, and sewage systems and 
hygienic conditions of urban cities.  In the main environmental reports by ASEAN 
and UNEP, the marine environment is mostly discussed in less length than other 
environmental problems such as air pollution and deforestation, and in general is 
relegated to the latter part of the reports. 
Marine environmental degradation in the South China Sea, interacting with 
development and territorial disputes could have impacts beyond the environmental 
field.  Scholars have long recognized that environmental scarcities can contribute 
to inter-state conflicts.  Thomas Homer-Dixon observed that Japan sought to 
secure oil, minerals and other resources in China and Southeast Asia during the 
Pacific War, and the 1991 Gulf War was at least partly motivated by the desire for 
oil.86 
Two kinds of resource exploration and exploitation competition in the 
South China Sea may essentially intensify regional tensions, and aggravate the 
conflicts over the South China Sea.  The first is the growing need for developing 
indigenous hydrocarbon resources.  The rising demand encourages states to allow 
foreign oil companies to explore areas not recognized as being within their 
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jurisdiction.  The second is the over-capacity in fishing industries of individual 
countries, responding to the increasing demands for fish as a source of animal 
protein and export income.   
Two factors may contribute the “environmental scarcity” in the South 
China Sea: technological development and an increasing population with access to 
the marine resources.  As technology develops, both offshore hydrocarbon 
exploration activities and fishing activities are likely to increase in a competitive 
way.  People from different countries will find themselves, physically closer and 
closer, more and more often, trying to fish the same stocks.  In other words, the 
common resource pie is decreasing, while the population wanting to divide the 
resource pie is increasing.  Tension among resource users, therefore, is likely to 
greatly increase.  Environmental degradation and resource depletion in such a 
volatile and disputed area as the South China Sea could easily lead to further 
conflicts in the already much “troubled” waters.  The advanced fishing 
technologies enable fishermen to fish in distant areas, increasing the chances of 
contacts and competition with fishermen from other countries. 
Oil Exploration and Conflicts.  Expectations of large offshore oil deposits 
in the region are spurring aggressive oil exploration efforts by littoral countries, 
especially China and Vietnam.  This has resulted in a volatile sitation, which could 
easily and quickly lead to open conflict.  Table 3.7 includes the major disputes 
over drilling and exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea in 
the 1990s.  Ten major disputes have occurred since 1992, nine out of which were 
between China and Vietnam. 
 131
Table 3.7.  Disputes over Drilling and Exploration in the South China 
Sea 
Date Countries  Disputes 
1992 China, 
Vietnam 
In May, China signed a contract with U.S. firm Crestone to explore for oil near 
the Spratly Islands in an area that Vietnam says is located on its continental shelf, 
over 600 miles south of China's Hainan Island. In September, Vietnam accused 
China of drilling for oil in Vietnamese waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
1993 China, 
Vietnam 
In May, Vietnam accused a Chinese seismic survey ship of interfering with 
British Petroleum's exploration work in Vietnamese waters. The Chinese ship left 
Vietnamese block 06 following the appearance of 2 Vietnamese naval ships. 
1993 China, 
Vietnam 
In December, Vietnam demanded that Crestone cancel offshore oil development 
in nearby waters. 
1994 China, 
Vietnam 
Crestone joined with a Chinese partner to explore China's Wan' Bei-21 (WAB-21 
block. Vietnam protested that the exploration was in Vietnamese waters in their 
blocks 133, 134, and 135. China offered to split Wan' Bei production with 
Vietnam, as long as China retained all sovereignty. 
1994 China, 
Vietnam 
In August, Vietnamese gunboats forced a Chinese exploration ship to leave an 
oilfield in a region claimed by the Vietnamese. 
1996 China, 
Vietnam 
In April, Vietnam leased exploration blocks to U.S. firm Conoco, and ruled out 
cooperation with U.S. oil firms that signed Chinese exploration contracts in 
disputed waters. Vietnamese blocks 133 and 134 cover half the zone leased to 
Crestone by China. China protested, and reaffirmed a national law claiming the 
South China Sea as its own in May. 
1997 China, 
Vietnam 
In March, Vietnamese issued a protest after the Chinese Kantan-3 oil rig drills 
near Spratly Islands in March. The drilling occurred offshore Da Nang, in an area 
Vietnam calls Block 113. The block is located 64 nautical miles off Chan May 
cape in Vietnam, and 71 nautical miles off China's Hainan Island. The diplomatic 
protests were followed by the departure of the Chinese rig. 
1997 China, 
Vietnam 
In December, Vietnamese protested after the Exploration Ship No. 8 and two 
supply ships entered the Wan' Bei exploration block. All 3 vessels were escorted 
away by the Vietnamese navy. 
1998 China, 
Vietnam 
In September, Vietnamese protested after a Chinese report stated that Crestone 
and China were continuing their survey of the Spratly Islands and the Tu Chinh 
region (Wan' Bei in Chinese).  (The dispute over this area was resolved by an 
agreement between China and Vietnam concluded in December 2000.) 
2003 Malaysia, 
Brunei 
In May 2003, a patrol boat from Brunei acted to prevent from undertaking 




Assertion of exploration rights intensified in 1992 with China’s granting of 
an oil exploration contract to a US oil company adjacent to a Vietnamese oil field.  
This action led to verbal and minor physical confrontation between China and 
Vietnam.  The Philippines and Malaysia have also proceeded with hydrocarbon 
exploration activities in the Spratly area.87 
Depletion of Fisheries Resources and Conflicts.  Conflicts resulting from 
fishing competition due to depletion of fishery resources are a new phenomenon.  
The Cod Wars between Iceland and Great Britain were the results of the depletion 
of fisheries resources.  Since the very beginnings of distant water fishing, Icelandic 
seas were a magnet to the trawler fleets of other nations—in particular the UK.  
But during the 1950s catches began to fall.  In 1958, Iceland declared a territorial 
limit of twelve nautical miles and pushed out the foreign trawlers.  Throughout the 
1960s the catches kept on dropping.  In 1972, Iceland extended its exclusive 
fishing limit to 50 nautical miles.  UK authorities refused to recognize the new 
limit and continued to send their trawler fleet into Icelandic waters.  Iceland 
responded with force sending in gunboats to cut the British trawlers’ nets.  In 
response, the UK sent in the Royal Navy to protect its fishing fleet.  This was 
followed with a tense diplomatic situation.  The conflict was concluded with an 
agreement between the two countries that limited British fishing to certain areas 
inside the 50 nautical miles’ limit.  Great Britain agreed the British vessels could 
not catch more than 130,000 tons of fish annually.  The agreement was valid for 
two years, and expired in November 1975.  After the expiration of the agreement, 
Iceland further declared an exclusive fishing area with 200 nautical miles from its 
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coastline.  Great Britain refused to recognize the declaration, and kept sending 
fishing vessels to areas within 200 nautical miles of Iceland coastlines.  Iceland 
employed six Coast Guard ships and two Polish-built stern trawlers, converted for 
Coast Guard work, to enforce her control over fishing rights.  In response, Great 
Britain deployed 22 frigates, seven supply ships, nine tug boats, and three support 
ships to protect its fishing trawlers.  The consequence of the conflict is that there 
were numerous ramming between Icelandic ships and British trawlers and frigates.  
This conflict brought the two NATO allies to the brink of war.  This time NATO 
was brought in to broker a peace deal. 
In recent years, fishing disputes in the South China Sea region have been 
on the rise due to the increase of fishing fleets and decrease of fish stocks.  The 
rapid introduction of sophisticated fishing technology by private or state-controlled 
companies has seriously disrupted the traditional organization of small-scale 
fishermen.  The construction of small trawlers has intensified the pressure on 
coastal stocks, and small-scale fishing has been neglected in development plans, 
which focus on full-time fishermen.  In order to assure fishermen’s interests, 
governments have even sent naval forces to protect them.  By 1988, the South 
China Sea countries had become increasingly active in securing for themselves a 
share of fishery resources.   
In 1999 alone, two serious incidents between Philippine naval ships and 
Chinese fishing boats were reported by the BBC News.88  On May 23, 1999, a 
Chinese fishing boat sank near the Scarborough Shoal (claimed by both China and 
the Philippines), after a collision with a Philippine naval vessel which had been 
                                                 
88 See BBC News World: Asia-Pacific.  “Chinese boat sunk off disputed reef.”  May 24 1999.  
“China condemns sinking of trawler.”  May 25 1999.  “Philippines ‘regret’ over Spratly sinking.”  
20 July 1999. 
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chasing it.  Again on 19 July 1999, the Philippines naval ship chased and fired on 
two Chinese fishing boats in the disputed area, and one of the boats was then 
rammed and sank with eleven crew members on board.  After two incidents, each 
country restated their sovereignty over the disputed areas.  China expressed strong 
protest against the Philippines action and demanded the Philippines punish those 
responsible and compensate the Chinese fishermen for their losses.  It also urged 
the Philippines government to take “necessary measures” to prevent similar 
incidents again.  The Philippines government, on the other hand, refused to 
apologize because it considers the Chinese fishing boats as trespassing in its 
sovereign territory.  President Joseph Estrada said, “they were fishing inside the 
Philippine territory so we have to study whether to apologize or not for that 
unfortunate incident.”89 
For the five-year period between 1987 and 1991, the Thai authorities 
recorded more than a 60 percent increase in the seizure of Thai boats and crew in 
the national waters of other states.90  Numerous other incidents involving the 
detention of fishermen and equipment occurred in the region.  There has been an 
increasing trend of such detentions.  Recurrent incidents of the arrest and detention 
of fishermen and their boats became a repeated source of friction between the 
littoral states of the South China Sea.  It is important to recognize that such 
disputes could trigger bigger conflicts in the future.  “The presence of so many 
vessels in the area can lead to accidents that can lead to so many repercussions,” 
said Mr. Domingo Siazon, the Philippines Foreign Secretary.91  Such disputes 
                                                 
89 BBC News World: Asia-Pacific.  May 25, 1999. 
 
90 Bangkok Post.  31 December 1992.  p. 61. 
 
91 BBC News World: Asia-Pacific.  20 July 1999. 
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between China and the Philippines, in particular, have been part of the cause of 
diplomatic frictions between the two countries, rendering their bilateral Code of 
Conduct (signed in 1995) virtually non-existent.   
 
The Necessity for Regional Marine Environmental Cooperation 
The complexity and inter-connectedness of these various issues challenge 
the littoral countries to take collective actions to reverse the environmental 
degradation trends, and thereby prevent adverse impacts on economic and security 
issues.  Marine environmental cooperation is needed not only for environmental 
cooperation, but also for the achievement of the region’s economic prosperity and 
peace.  Of particular relevance to developing states is that the regional level of 
cooperation offers the possibility of improved collective capacity and capacity 
building.  Regional cooperation has at least the three following functions: pooling 
and more efficient use of scare resources; attracting assistance from regional 
agencies, bilateral aid agencies and other donors; and the presentation of a unified 
“regional front” allowing states to increase their “leverage”, whether in direct 
confrontations with external powers or in the context of highly fractionalized 
global negotiations. 
The transboundary nature of environmental problems itself requires states 
and people across boundaries to cooperate and deal with the problems together.  
The fact that environmental spillovers—physical, economic, and psychological—
occur at a variety of geographic scales argues strongly for effective actions at 
various levels.  Thus, problems that arise at the local level that have local effects 
should be handled by national governments and their sub-jurisdictions, and issues 
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with a global dimension should be addressed by international institutions.92  The 
most appropriate approach to regional seas problems is probably to foster regional 
cooperation on the relatively non-political and non-sensitive problems such as the 
marine environment, and shelving for the time being the “sovereignty” issues.   
Impacts of environmental degradation do not recognize national boundaries 
due to ecological interdependence.  Environmental problems especially can be 
transferred easily in enclosed and semi-enclosed sea areas; therefore, regional 
cooperation is particularly important in these types of areas.  The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) provides a sound legal 
justification for the further development of regional cooperation on marine 
environmental issues.  All the countries bordering the South China Sea have 
ratified the Convention.  Article 123 of the UNCLOS stipulates, 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-
operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the 
performance of their duties under the UNCLOS. To this end they 
shall endeavor, directly or through an appropriate regional 
organization:  
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and 
exploitation of the living resources of the sea;  
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with 
respect to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment;  
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake 
where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the 
area;  
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international 
organizations to co-operate with them in furtherance of the 
provisions of this article.93  
 
                                                 
92 See Dua and Esty.  1997.  Although some scholars argue that all environmental issues have 
global significance due to the inter-linkages in the holistic ecosystem, actions at various levels are 
required to effectively address problems with various scopes of impacts. 
 
93 The text of UNCLOS can be found at the website of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm). 
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Although the physical and ecological degradation of the coastal and near-
shore areas, and the depletion of their resources are seemingly local in their nature, 
the impacts of these problems are widespread and are today so evident at sites far 
away from their origin that only globally applied strategies have a chance to 
achieve long-term solutions.94  However, due to their large scale and the wide 
coverage of global actions, global initiatives cannot address specific environmental 
problems, as Mark J. Valencia puts it: 
The global approach serves an indispensable function in creating 
frameworks or blueprints for action, and in defining general 
principles.  But the breath of the global approach is sometimes 
achieved at the expense of depth.  Indeed, the nature of obligations 
to global agreements tends towards the lowest common 
denominator in order to ensure that the largest possible number of 
parties might be included.95 
 
Neither can individual countries’ actions address transboundary 
environmental problems, carried through ocean currents and winds.  The region 
provides an important medium level between the generalities of global regimes and 
the specifics of national implementation, since national level actions without 
regional coordination tend to lead to the “tragedy of commons,” and global level 
actions have been general, and not specific enough to deal with regional seas 
problems such as those of the South China Sea.   
The definition of a region is flexible, and loose.  It mainly refers to a group 
of countries sharing some common interests or characteristics.  A region might be 
defined around existing patterns of cooperation (regardless of whether the 
                                                 
94 Peter Bautista Payoyo.  1994.  Ocean Governance.  Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations 
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95 Mark J. Valencia.  2001.  Ocean Governance and Sustainable Development in the Pacific Region.  
p. 67.  Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law, Policy and Management.  Bangkok, Thailand: 
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cooperation is marine-related, a management problem shared by all members of 
the region; geographic proximity and the presence of a transboundary issue (as 
with some enclosed and semi-enclosed seas); cultural homogeneity; military 
alliances; and even ad hoc groupings intended to reflect a common position on a 
specific issue of special concern.96  Thus states might be members of a number of 
overlapping “regions” defined for different purposes and according to different 
criteria.  The countries in a region must share political concepts.  For example, a 
sense of “community” must be developed among the participating countries.  
There must be a gradual progression in the region from the concept of national 
resilience and absolute sovereignty to the concept of regional resilience, regional 
cohesion and regional identity.  Hence, to facilitate regional cooperation, it is 
necessary to identify an issue area that the countries are willing to cooperate on, 
and form a sense of “community” among the countries to collectively address this 
identified issue.  Linkages and networking among academics, experts and think 
tanks are important particularly in the preliminarily and initial stages, as are 
linkages between and among various regional and sub-regional initiatives. 
What is the appropriate size of “a region” for successful regional marine 
environmental cooperation?  If a region covers a broad geographic area, it tends to 
be difficult to identify a common “issue area” that all countries are willing to 
cooperate on.  Sometimes the environmental issues can be so diverse that any 
actions to identify regional priority issues may prove to be impossible.  
Furthermore, vast geographical coverage may also bring about controversial 
political considerations, which are not conducive to the formation of a sense of 
                                                 
96 Ibid.  p. 68. 
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community.  As Valencia has pointed out, “if a region contains a smaller number 
of states with more congruent interests or similar management concerns, there is a 
better chance of achieving more specific and more robust agreements than within a 
larger grouping”.97 
In the quest for a cleaner environment and regional marine environmental 
cooperation in the highly complex situation of the South China, the UNEP has 
taken a lead in the cause.  The following two chapters will review the development 
of marine environmental cooperation under the framework of UNEP, and how 
UNEP identifies issues for cooperation and fosters a sense of community, by 
interacting with the countries bordering the South China Sea in their efforts to 
forge multilateral environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
 
                                                 




THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EAST ASIAN 
SEAS ACTION PLAN 
 
 
The earliest moves towards environmental cooperation around the South 
China Sea were driven and shaped by two concurrent dynamics operating at the 
global and regional levels: namely the internationalization of the global 
environmental agenda and the particular dynamics of cooperation in the region.  At 
the global level, public awareness of environmental problems arose quickly during 
the 1960s in Europe, and resulted in the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE), convened in Stockholm in 1972, which led to the 
establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the same 
year.1  In 1974, UNEP initiated one of its first marine initiatives to develop and 
implement the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) followed by similar actions in 
other regions leading, three decades later, to 13 regional seas action plans with the 
participation of more than 140 countries.  At the regional level in Southeast Asia, a 
cooperative mechanism, ASEAN, had been established in August 1967 involving 
five Southeast Asian countries, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand 
and Singapore.  During its early days, ASEAN was very inactive, and was 
criticized as nothing more than a “talk shop”.  Sometimes even the talk shops could 
not be held on time due to intra-regional disputes and conflicts.2  Despite the 
institutional weakness of the newly established organization, ASEAN at least 
                                                 
1 For global environmental movement, see e.g. J McCormick.  1989.  The Global Environmental 
Movement.  London: Belhaven.  Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds.  1992.  The 
International Politics of the Environment.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Norichika Kanie and 
Peter M. Haas.  2004.  Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance.  Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press.   
 
2 See Michael Leifer.  1973.  “The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook.”  International Affairs 
49: 600-607.  
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provided a regional institutional setting, probably the only regional institution 
available in the late 1970s, which could be conveniently used to promote the global 
environmental agenda at the regional level in Southeast Asia. 
Starting in the late 1970s, UNEP, in collaboration with ASEAN, developed 
and implemented the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  The Action Plan was 
considered part of ASEAN's marine environmental program in its early stage, and 
remained embedded in ASEAN for more than a decade before its separation from 
the ASEAN framework in 1990.  The Action Plan, one of the most heavily UNEP-
supported action plans, is amongst the few UNEP regional seas action plans that 
lack the backing of a legally binding regional convention.  The Action Plan is 
facing lots of difficulties currently, seeking a niche in a region with a variety of 
environmental cooperative activities, which the Action Plan has catalyzed.  Three 
decades’ ago, when the Action Plan was first adopted, environmental cooperation, 
or any sort of cooperation, was still extremely rare.  Hence, despite the fact that no 
legally binding regional convention was formed among the countries of the Action 
Plan, observers cannot deny the progress and achievements of environmental 
cooperation made by the countries over the last three decades, including catalyzing 
environmental protection activities, building scientific and management capacity, 
promoting networking among marine scientists, all fostering ASEAN 
environmental cooperation and confidence building among the participating 
countries, culminating in the development of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project in the 1990s. 
This chapter will review the origin, development and evolution of UNEP’s 
Regional Seas activities in the East Asian Seas; explore its interactions with 
ASEAN in forging and shaping the East Asian Seas Action Plan, its institutional 
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setting and expansion, and attempt to explain why no regional convention has been 
developed to date.  It explores how UNEP utilized the existing ASEAN as an 
institutional setting for the early development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan; 
how ASEAN environmental cooperation evolved as the East Asian Seas Action 
Plan grew, and how expansion of ASEAN membership and growth of the East 
Asian Seas Action Plan led to an inevitable separation of the two initiatives.   
I contend that, UNEP had successfully catalyzed marine environmental 
cooperation through the Action Plan by facilitating and fostering the networking of 
marine scientists, enhancing governmental capacity to deal with marine affairs, and 
transforming global environmental policies into regional implementation.  
However, the Action Plan had relied on institutional arrangements and political 
support from ASEAN for the development and implementation of the Action Plan 
since the beginning.  As a result, embedded in ASEAN for more than a decade, the 
decision-making body of the East Asian Seas Action Plan, COBSEA failed to build 
its own regional identity at an early stage.  Inevitably, ASEAN left an 
organizational mark on, and institutional legacy to COBSEA.  Specifically, 
COBSEA inherited the “ASEAN Way” as a norm for decision-making—principles 
of non-interference, consultation and unanimous consensus, which although they 
initially fostered non-legally binding cooperation in a region without much history 
of cooperation, now has probably become the factor preventing the further 
development of formal, legally-binding environmental agreements in the region.  
The separation of ASEAN marine environmental cooperation from COBSEA 
activities and growing regional activities have put COBSEA in a situation of a 
continuous flux, seeking its own niche and identity, which to date has not been 
very successful.   
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UNEP Regional Seas Programme 
 
Coastal areas are among the earliest places for human settlement and 
economic development, due to their proximity to abundant marine living resources 
and the services of maritime transport.  According to Agenda 21, more than half of 
the world’s population lives within 60 km of the shoreline, and, this figure is 
projected to rise to three quarters by the year 2020.3  A UNEP report states that 
seven out of ten people live within 80 kilometers of coastal areas.4  Due to rapid 
population growth and fast-paced industrialization, coastal resources and the 
coastal environment are being rapidly degraded in many parts of the world. 
The 1972 UNCHE and its Stockholm Declaration were a catalyst for the 
development of a range of global initiatives to protect and preserve the 
environment. One important result of the conference was the creation of UNEP.  
Although sovereignty and development were still considered priorities by national 
governments compared with environmental protection, the conference contributed 
to raising environmental awareness among top national leaders, worldwide.   
The Regional Seas Program was initiated by UNEP in 1974 as a global 
program to address marine environmental problems through a regional approach.  
The Regional Seas Programme aimed to address the accelerating degradation of 
the world’s oceans and coastal areas by working regionally to engage governments 
in comprehensive and specific actions to protect their shared marine 
environments.5  The Regional Seas Programme involved the development of 
                                                 
3 UNCED.  Agenda 21: Chapter 17. 
 
4 UNEP.  2000.  Regional Seas: A Survival Strategy for Our Oceans and Coasts.  
www.unep.org/dec/information/public_information.html. 
 
5 UNEP.  2003.  A World of Neighbours: UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme.  www.unep.org. 
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intergovernmentally agreed action plans.  In most cases, this was underpinned by a 
strong legal framework in the form of a regional convention and associated 
protocols on specific problems.  Normally a small secretariat was established to 
coordinate the implementation of the action plan, according to a work plan and 
budget approved by periodic inter-governmental meetings. 
UNEP's earliest initiative was in the Mediterranean, which served as the 
first testing ground for the newly adopted regional approach to marine 
environmental issues.  In the beginning, obstacles to regional cooperation seemed 
insurmountable due to the considerable differences in the political and socio-
economic systems; the differing levels of development of the participating 
countries; and even open hostilities between some of the 20 coastal countries 
bordering this semi-enclosed sea.6  Despite these presumed difficulties, it proved 
relatively easy to reach rapid agreement on an action plan in Barcelona in February 
1975.  Within a year of the adoption of the action plan, negotiations were 
completed for a legally binding agreement, which would serve as the legal 
framework of the action plan.  In early 1976, 11 countries and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) signed the convention supplemented with two 
protocols, on the control of dumping and cooperation in cases of pollution 
emergencies.  Less than two years after the signing, the convention and two 
protocols entered into force.  Four other protocols have been developed in two 
decades, the MAP community has grown to 21 participating countries. 
The MAP has been financially self-sufficient since 1984.  Today all 
expenses are covered by the contributions from the contracting parties to the 
                                                 
6 Stjepan Keckes.  1994.  “The Regional Seas Programme—Integrating Environment and 
Development: The Next Phase.”  In Peter Bautista Payoyo eds. Ocean Governance: Sustainable 
Development of the Seas.  Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press. 
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Mediterranean Trust Fund established in 1979.  It was one of the most useful 
lessons demonstrating that UNEP’s funds could be used to catalyze a large-scale 
program with continuing financial support from the member countries that 
continues to operate and produce results long after UNEP’s financial support has 
been withdrawn.7 
The success of the Mediterranean Action Plan led UNEP to transfer 
experiences through the regional seas programme to almost all regional seas in the 
world commencing with the development of individual action plans in each region.  
At present, the Program includes 13 regional action plans covering more than 140 
countries in the: Black Sea, Caribbean, East Africa, East Asia, the Kuwait 
Convention region, Mediterranean, North-East Pacific, North-West Pacific, Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden, South Asia, South-East Pacific, South Pacific, and West and 
Central Africa.8  
The impact of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme on the reduction of 
marine pollution and the protection of the marine environment continues to be 
questioned by some NGOs and scholars.  However, there is probably no argument 
that “regional” level actions are the most appropriate level of action in addressing 
marine environmental problems, since neither a global nor a national approach are 
adequate or effective in addressing transboundary marine environmental problems.  
It is clear that UNEP created a particular niche within the international system 
through which to address marine environmental problems, namely, the regional 
approach.   
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Ellik Adler.  2003.  “A World of Neighbours: UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme.” Tropical 
Coasts, July: 4-18. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the significance of the UNEP Regional Seas 
Programme goes beyond the impacts on the marine environment.  A regional 
approach demands cooperation among countries bordering a common sea area.  
When UNEP launched its program as part of a global initiative, using the argument 
of the "shared" nature of the marine environment, countries found it difficult to 
resist such multilateral cooperation.  As a result, environmental cooperation 
became an ice-breaking area for contentious countries, and it helped to build 
confidence and reduce suspicion and ambiguity among neighboring countries.   
In addition, the Regional Seas Programme provided a forum to develop 
other forms of marine environmental cooperation including, in collaboration with 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), activities on emergency oil spill 
response and preparedness, and in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) on regional fisheries issues.  In addition to its mandate to 
develop and implement the regional action plans and regional conventions, the 
Regional Seas Programme also formed an effective network and platform for 
UNEP to launch global programs addressing marine environmental issues and 
problems, such as: the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA/LBA); the International 
Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN); the Global International Water Assessment 
(GIWA); and the Global Plan of Action for Marine Mammals.   
A point should be noted at the outset of the discussion, the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan is one of the initiatives under UNEP’s Regional Sea Programme.  The 
observations or conclusions drawn for the East Asian Seas Action Plan may not be 
applied to other regional seas action plans.  Since great diversity exists among the 
thirteen action plans, it is often difficult to draw valid generalizations about either 
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the regional arrangements themselves or the management problems they are 
intended to handle.  Observations made, experiences drawn or lessons learnt in the 
East Asian Seas Action Plan may not be applicable to other action plans, but it is a 
case demonstrating how geopolitical considerations shape the development and 
evolution of a global program initiated by an international organization, and that 
the various geopolitical settings and political support can at least partially explain 
why the same global program results in different levels of successes and 
performances in different regions. 
 
Early Development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan: 1978-1990 
Following the success of the MAP, UNEP undertook a proactive approach 
to develop a similar regional seas approach as a measure to tackle the growing 
coastal and marine environmental problem of the globe.  In the fifth session of the 
Governing Council of UNEP in 1977, five ASEAN member countries requested 
the development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  The Governing Council 
decided that “steps are urgently needed to formulate and establish a scientific 
program involving research, prevention and control of marine pollution and 
monitoring” for a regional seas program in Asia.9  At that time, the difficulties of 
establishing an Action Plan encompassing the entire East Asian Seas seemed 
insurmountable, so UNEP took a subregional approach to promote regional 
environmental cooperation; that is, UNEP started the Action Plan among ASEAN 
countries, which, in its first decade, were still struggling to develop to form a solid 
and regional organization with a distinct identity.  
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In addition to the territorial disputes discussed in Chapter 3, the 1970s 
witnessed complete turmoil in Southeast Asia.  Bilateral conflicts, disputes and 
strife are found between almost all countries of the region.  In the 1970s, Southeast 
Asia was entirely divided by ideological struggles along the Cold War lines, with 
strong involvement of the US and former Soviet Union.  The Indochinese10 
countries (Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam) followed a socialist model, supported 
by the Soviet Union.  With the support of the Soviet Union, Vietnam occupied 
Cambodia; China, in détente with the Soviet Union, was in opposition to Viet Nam 
and their deteriorating relationship culminated in a border war in 1979 between 
China and Viet Nam.  At that time it was a region full of antagonism, poverty, and 
under-development.   
China and Southeast Asia.  During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
relationship between China and the major Southeast Asian countries was 
characterized by ideological struggles and hostility.  Three interrelated factors 
contributed to the hostility between China and the Southeast Asian countries: 
namely China’s support of communist insurgent movements in neighboring 
Southeast Asian countries; problems relating to large Chinese ethnic communities 
in Southeast Asia (the “overseas Chinese problem”); and regional conflicts, 
especially Viet Nam’s invasion of Cambodia, and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 
1979. 
China was believed by Southeast Asian Governments to have supported the 
communist insurgency in Southeast Asia with a view to creating communist 
satellite states for China.  During the Cultural Revolution, China had cultivated ties 
                                                 
10 Under French rule the countries of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam were administered as a single 
entity “IndoChina.” 
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with insurgent communist parties in Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.  Besides endorsing the call for armed struggle against the central 
governments in these countries, Beijing frequently provided material support to 
some parties and set up clandestine radio stations on Chinese territory to serve the 
communist movements in Southeast Asia.  The most well known of these include 
the Voice of People’s Thailand; the Voice of the Malayan Revolution; and the 
Voice of the People of Burma; broadcasting from China in support of the 
communist insurgency in Southeast Asia.11 
Amongst all the Southeast Asian countries, China’s relations with 
Indonesia, the most populous Southeast Asian country, were the worst largely due 
to the failed Indonesian communist coup of 1965, known as Gestapu Affairs.12  On 
31 October 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) failed in an attempted 
coup to seize power in Indonesia.  The Indonesia Armed Forces (ABRI) took this 
opportunity to put an end to communist influence in Indonesia by striking 
decisively at the coup leaders.  Major General Suharto took the presidency, the 
leaders of the PKI were arrested, tried and executed, and the PKI was banned.  
Thousands of PKI members and supporters were massacred in a bloodbath 
following the coup. It was the belief of the Indonesian leadership that the Chinese 
government was behind the entire event.  Consequently, the ethnic Chinese 
community, believed to be a “tool” of the Chinese government to disseminate 
                                                 
11 For a detailed analysis of China’s relationships with the communist movements in the Southeast 
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communism, was harshly persecuted.  Chinese schools were closed down, the use 
of Chinese characters and language were banned, and the observance of Chinese 
festivals was forbidden.  In September 1965, against the background of rising 
tensions between the two countries, Indonesia suspended diplomatic relations with 
China. 
Although China successfully normalized its diplomatic relationships with 
Malaysia in 1974 and with the Philippines and Thailand in 1975, it did not 
renounce support for the communist parties in these countries.13  Consequently, 
these countries remained conservative in their relations with China, and were 
concerned about the influence of communism being disseminated by the Chinese 
government through the overseas Chinese communities.   
ASEAN: Seeking to Consolidate Its Identity.  In a region where conflicts 
were persistent, and even normal diplomatic relationships did not exist between 
some countries, broad based regional cooperation was obviously out of the 
question.  Southeast Asia had a history of internal divisions and the influence of 
external powers.  On 16 September 1963, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sawarak 
were amalgamated into the Federation of Malaysia.  Neither Indonesia nor the 
Philippines recognized Malaysia: the Philippines because of the Sabah dispute; 
while Indonesia viewed Great Britain’s creation of Malaysia as a case of an 
imperial power imposing its will on Southeast Asia.  Indonesia embarked on a 
policy of Konfrontasi (confrontation) with Malaysia.  In August 1965, Singapore 
was expelled from Malaysia due to the constitutional, party, ethnic and personal 
differences between the Singaporean government and the Malaysian federal 
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government.14  The Singaporean and Malaysian governments were still mutually 
suspicious and continued open disputes, reminiscent of those, which occurred 
before separation.  The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia since December 1978 
not only created a crisis situation in the Indochinese peninsula but also threatened 
the stability of Southeast Asia. 
The five founding members of ASEAN had different goals for the initial 
establishment of a regional organization.  Indonesia desired to repair its relations in 
the region that had been damaged largely by the policy of Konfrontasi, which 
underlay the disruptive potential of Indonesia as the largest and most militarily 
powerful state in the region.  Suharto’s government tried to reassure its neighbors 
that a new Indonesia would not be the destabilizing influence it had been in the 
past; hence Indonesia went from a state largely indifferent to efforts at regional 
collaboration to a major proponent of regionalism.15  Furthermore, Indonesia also 
saw ASEAN as an opportunity both to exercise regional leadership and to reduce 
the ability of external powers to influence events in Southeast Asia.  Shee Poon-
Kim observed,  
The downfall of Sukarno after the PKI coup in 1965 and Suharto’s 
“New Order” in both domestic and foreign policy were the crucial 
factors that gave impetus to the formation of ASEAN.  Suharto, not 
wishing to ally himself with either the capitalists or the communist 
bloc, now saw the necessity of becoming an active proponent of a 
new regional organization in Southeast Asia in which Indonesia 
could perform a leading role.16 
 
                                                 
14 For a detailed recount of Singapore’s breakup with Malaysia, see R. S. Milne.  1966.  
“Singapore’s Exit from Malaysia; the Consequences of Ambiguity.”  Asian Survey 6: 175-184. 
15 See Shaun Narine.  2002.  Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia.  Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
16 Shee Poon-Kim.  1977.  “A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977.”  Asian Survey 17: 753-770. 
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Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines supported ASEAN as a way to 
constrain Indonesia, while providing Jakarta with a channel for its aspirations to 
regional preeminence.  Thailand hoped that ASEAN would become the basis for 
the “collective political defense” of the region, which would help to contain Viet 
Nam.17 
The common concern among the Southeast Asian countries of the 
perceived threat of communism in the 1960's constituted a most important reason 
for the formation of a regional organization.  In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore signed the Bangkok Declaration, marking the 
establishment of the ASEAN.  Not much attention was drawn to this organization 
in its early development.  The organization was built upon a declaration, rather 
than a legally-binding instrument.  The failure of similar previous attempts in the 
region, i.e. the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASA) in 1961 and 
Maphilindo (Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia) in 1963, as well as subsequent 
security threats and other destabilizing events in the region throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, led to pessimism and indifference about the viability of ASEAN from 
major powers.18   
ASEAN ran into problems almost immediately after its formation.  The 
Corregidor Affair erupted in March 1968.  It involved allegations that the 
Philippines was using the island of Corregidor as a base to train Muslim insurgents 
for infiltration into Sabah.  Diplomatic attempts to resolve the territorial dispute 
between Malaysia and the Philippines proved fruitless.  In September 1968, the 
                                                 
17 Tim Huxley.  1990.  “ASEAN Security Cooperation—Past, Present and Future.”  In Alison 
Broinowski, ed.  ASEAN into 1990s.  London: Macmillan. 
 
18 Hussin Mutalib.  1997.  “At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millennium.”  
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 19, Number 1, June 1997. 
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Philippines Congress passed a resolution emphasizing the Philippine claims to 
Sabah.  ASEAN meetings were canceled and were resumed only in May 1969.19  
Although ASEAN was built out of the concern against communism, the 
leaders of ASEAN emphasized that it was not a “security organization”, which 
would certainly antagonize other countries or supposed enemies.  The Bangkok 
Declaration broadly states seven purposes of ASEAN: six of them deal with non-
political issues such as economic, social, technical, scientific matters, and only one 
regarding the promotion of peace and stability of the region.20  Despite the latter 
objective, ASEAN politicians made it clear from the outset that the organization 
would not deal directly with security matters or political controversies, because it 
wished to avoid the polarizing effects such a position would have on the other 
states of the region.  Forming a military alliance clearly implied antagonism toward 
some identifiable threat.  In addition, there was inadequate consensus between the 
ASEAN states on security matters, and the distrust among the ASEAN states 
remained a problem.   
ASEAN had a very slow start in terms of its activities and meetings during 
the early years of its existence.  It was almost a decade following the official 
establishment of the organization that, the first meeting of heads of all member 
states was convened in 1976, which adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia (TAC).  The primary purpose of the Treaty was to promote 
regional security and peace and to provide the opportunity for dialogue and 
consultation among the member countries.   In the first decade of ASEAN, the 
greatest achievements were made in the military area, for example the signing of 
                                                 
19 See Narine.  2002.   
 
20 See ASEAN.  1967.  Bangkok Declaration (8 August 1967).  www.aseansec.org . 
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the TAC.21  Although ASEAN leaders emphasized that the organization was 
established for non-military reasons, their greatest achievements as of the late 
1970s lay in security and military aspects.  ASEAN was in much need of 
functional, technical and non-political cooperation to build its “non-military” 
identity.22  UNEP’s initiatives to promote regional environmental cooperation were 
much in line with ASEAN’s political considerations.  Therefore, environmental 
cooperation sponsored by UNEP reflected ASEAN’s power and incentive 
structure, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
For quite some time, scholars pondered and questioned the strength and 
durability, and the extent to which ASEAN represents anything beyond “business-
as-usual” inter-state politics.  ASEAN was struggling for the consolidation of the 
organization to form a regional identity; hence it was actively seeking for 
opportunities of socialization among member countries to build that identity.   
The Early Development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan: Embedded in 
ASEAN.  Considering the stark antagonism among the countries in the region, 
UNEP did not attempt to achieve a regional action plan that covered the whole 
region of East Asia.  Rather, UNEP took advantage of an existing institution and 
decided to develop an East Asian Seas Action Plan under the umbrella of, and 
involving, the five founding members of ASEAN.  The view was that this 
participation could be expanded at a later stage when geopolitical factors became 
more benign allowing broader, multilateral cooperation.  Fully recognizing the 
                                                 
21 Another example is the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines (Oct. 1968-May 
1969), which nearly caused a paralysis of ASEAN activities.  Thailand and Indonesia helped to 
place the Sabah issue on the back burner and restore the solidarity of ASEAN.  See Russell H. 
Fifield.  1979.  “ASEAN: Image and Reality.”  Asian Survey 19: 1199-1208. 
 
22 See e.g. Alejandro Melchor, Jr.  1978.  “Assessing ASEAN’s Viability in a Changing World.”  
Asian Survey Vol. 18: 422-434. 
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future involvement of other countries, the Action Plan stated early on in its text 
(paragraph 2 of the Action Plan) that: 
The area of application of the action plan will cover initially the 
marine environment and coastal areas of the following states: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand without 
prejudice to its future extension so as to cover the marine 
environment and coastal areas of all the States bordering the East 
Asian Seas as may be determined at a later stage.23 
 
In the early preparation and development of the Action Plan, UNEP used 
ASEAN as a mechanism to convene expert meetings, and collaborated with 
various international organizations in developing program priorities and projects.  
UNEP played an important role catalyzing environmental cooperation among 
ASEAN countries, not only marine environmental cooperation.  As early as 1977, 
UNEP commissioned its Asia-Pacific regional advisory team to draft an ASEAN 
subregional Environmental Program (ASEP). During the process, UNEP launched 
a series of meetings and discussions on environmental issues, which were 
associated with progress not only in identifying issues and enunciating principles, 
but also with the actual formation of environmental ministries and the 
establishment of nature preserves in the ASEAN countries.24   In December 1978, 
an ASEAN Expert Group on Environment (AEGE) convened a meeting in Jakarta, 
Indonesia to discuss the desirability of an action plan for the ASEAN region.  In 
March 1979, a UNEP mission visited Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand to explore their interest in the development of the action plan.  The 
                                                 
23 UNEP.  1983.  Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Areas 
of the East Asian Region.  UNEP regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 24.  This document 
reproduces the parts of the reports of the intergovernmental meetings convened by UNEP in 
Manila, 27-29 April 1981 and in Bangkok, 9-11 December 1981 as the final stage of the 
preparatory work leading to the adoption of the Action Plan. 
24 See Manuel F. Montes and Francisco A. Magno.  1997.  “Trade and Environmental Diplomacy: 
Strategic Options for ASEAN.”  Pacific Affairs Vol. 70: 351-372. 
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first draft of the action plan was prepared by the secretariat of UNEP in 
cooperation with specialized organizations of the United Nations System.  It was 
reviewed by the second meeting of AEGE (Penang, 17-20 September 1979).  
Eleven projects relevant to the development of the action plan were initiated by the 
secretariat of UNEP in September 1979, in cooperation with the UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), IMO, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and FAO.  The draft of the action plan was reviewed and 
revised by two meetings of experts designated by the countries of the region, 
respectively in Baguio, 17-21 June 1980 and in Bangkok, 8-12 December 1980.   
The draft action plan was then submitted to the first intergovernmental 
meeting of member countries, convened to adopt the Action Plan on 27-29 April 
1981, in Manila, Philippines.  Representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand attended an intergovernmental meeting on the 
protection and development of the marine environment and coastal areas of the 
East Asian Region, and adopted the “Action Plan for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Areas of the East Asian Region.”25  Due to 
extensive consultations among government nominated expert members of the 
region during the drafting of the action plan, the adoption of the text of the action 
plan was relatively easy.  Another factor that had contributed to the adoption of the 
text was that it was comprised of general statements regarding marine 
environmental protection, and the proposed activities were all about scientific and 
                                                 
25 This Action Plan will be referred to as the “1981 East Asian Seas Action Plan”, which was not 
revised until 1994. 
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technical research related to environmental assessment and management.  There 
were no sensitive issues or obsessive obligations for countries. 
However, when it came to legal, institutional, and financial arrangements to 
achieve the goals and objectives set forth by the action plan and support the 
implementation of the action plan, the meeting failed to reach agreements.  The 
meeting decided that the legal component did not need to be developed for the time 
being, due to ASEAN’s aversion to legally binding agreements.  With respect to 
financial and institutional arrangements, the meeting participants had to go back to 
their governments and seek their governmental perspectives on financial and 
institutional arrangements, before they could make a commitment on financial 
contributions and nominate focal points and institutions for the regional 
networking of the Action Plan.  UNEP hence pushed the governments to consider 
suitable coordinating measures, i.e. the institutional and financial arrangement, for 
the Action Plan.26  As a result, the meeting agreed that a second inter-governmental 
meeting should be convened later in 1981 to reconsider and adopt necessary 
institutional and financial arrangements for the implementation of the Action Plan.   
Although the governments failed to adopt institutional, legal and financial 
arrangements to implement the Action Plan, the meeting contributed to Senior 
Government officials’ awareness of the marine environmental problems and 
challenges faced by the region.  Building on the outcomes from the inter-
governmental meeting for the adoption of the Action Plan, the five ASEAN 
countries issued the “Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment” on 30 April 
1981; this was the first ASEAN environmental declaration.  It announced that the 
                                                 
26 See Para. 25.1 of UNEP.  1983.  Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine 
and Coastal Areas of the East Asian Region.   
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ASEAN countries had decided to endorse and implement the adopted ASEP, a 
report that had been drafted by UNEP.   
Following the first inter-governmental meeting, UNEP followed up with 
individual governments for financial and institutional arrangements for the Action 
Plan.  A letter was sent by the UNEP Executive Director to the five governments, 
and favorable responses were received from the five countries to reconsider the 
financial and institutional matters.  Hence, before the convening of the second 
intergovernmental meeting, each government had already decided its financial 
contribution, and nominated its focal point and institutions for regional 
networking.  It was based on the “ASEAN Way”, relying entirely on voluntary 
commitment, and individual governments’ judgments of the benefits from the 
Action Plan.  On 9-11 December 1981, the five countries convened a second 
Intergovernmental Meeting on the East Asian Seas Action Plan, in Bangkok, 9-11 
December 1981.  During the meeting, countries agreed on the institutional and 
financial arrangements for the implementation of the Action Plan, which formed 
the basic structure for the Action Plan. 
To ensure synergy between ASEAN and the COBSEA, it was decided that 
the participants attending the ASEAN Expert Group meeting should participate in 
the COBSEA meeting, and the interim coordinator of the ASEAN Experts Group 
on the Environment was designated to provide a channel of communication 
between UNEP and COBSEA between the periodic meetings of COBSEA.  This 
meeting also decided that, at the national level, each country would designate a 
national focal point and national institutions to coordinate implementation of the 
Action Plan at the national level.  The same meeting considered the establishment 
of a Regional Coordinating Unit, which would technically coordinate the various 
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program activities and act as the secretariat of the action plan.  Due to the financial 
implications, the meeting postponed any decision regarding the establishment of 
such a unit and designated UNEP as the responsible entity for the overall technical 
co-ordination and continuous supervision of the implementation of the action plan; 
as the secretariat for the action plan; and, as the manager of the resources of the 
Trust Fund.   
 
The 1981 East Asian Seas Action Plan 
The 1981 Action Plan had four major components: environmental 
assessment; environmental management; financial arrangements; and, institutional 
arrangements; all of which were meant to be mutually reinforcing.  The two 
intergovernmental meetings in 1981 concluded the adoption of the Action Plan in 
two separate parts: the environmental text (including environmental assessment 
and environmental management), and the institutional and financial text.  In 
comparison with the MAP, the East Asian Sea’s Action Plan lacked two major 
components; namely a legal component, comprised of the framework convention 
and related protocols; and details of the institutional and financial arrangements for 
the implementation of the action plan.27  ASEAN countries preferred to work in a 
flexible way, and had aversions to make long-term financial commitments and 
fixed institutional arrangements.  Financial commitments were made initially for a 
period of two years, and were renewed in every other year in the COBSEA annual 
meeting.  No regional coordinating unit was set up to coordinate the activities due 
to the financial implications of such a unit. 
                                                 
27 For the MAP, see Peter Haas.  1990.  p. 97. 
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Environmental Assessment.  In the 1981 action plan, priority was given to 
the identification of the quality of the marine environment and coastal areas, the 
factors affecting its quality, and the projection of future trends.  There were three 
integrated clusters of activities under environmental assessment: baseline 
information and data collection; a coordinated environmental assessment program; 
and a program of training and technical support for local scientists and technicians.   
Baseline Information and Data Collection.  The Action Plan aimed to build 
networks among marine scientists and institutions, and collect data and information 
regarding the status of marine scientific research in the region.  Baseline 
information to be collected included: 1) a survey of national capabilities and 
activities in the region as they relate to the marine environment and coastal area 
development, including a directory of scientific institutions, research centers, 
information centers and data sources; a compendium of past and ongoing research 
work and scientific studies; and a bibliography of publications and reports 
published on relevant problems of the region, and  2) a compilation and up-to-date 
synthesis of existing data on the physical oceanography of East Asian waters 
utilizing physical and chemical oceanographic information collected in the past by 
various national data centers or international organizations. 
Regional Assessment Program.  Due to the inadequacy, or incomparability 
of available data on the marine environment, the Action Plan aimed to establish a 
regional assessment program, listed with priority elements and elements for the 
expansion of the program.  The priority elements for the environment assessment 
program were overwhelmingly focusing on marine pollution.28  Although there 
                                                 
28 The priorities elements included: 1) Assessment of the oceanographic phenomena with particular 
reference to hydrography, water masses, water circulation and their effects on pollution dispersion 
patterns including detailed oceanographic surveys with special emphasis on maritime 
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was an aspect of assessing habitat degradation, it was only part of the assessment 
of the impact of pollution.  The Action Plan further listed some other elements for 
the assessment program, for future expansion of the program, including 
environmental impact of offshore seabed exploration and exploitation, thermal 
pollution, and atmospheric pollution.  Again, the activities are mainly pollution-
related. 
 Program of Training and Technical Support.  This was mainly a capacity 
building program to support activities of the environmental assessment program.  
This program mainly focused on analytical techniques, procedures and 
methodology so that data and information were collected with the same 
methodology at the national level, and hence could be synthesized or compiled at 
the regional level.29 
Environmental Management.  This component mainly focused on the 
training and capacity building of managers and policy makers in environmentally 
sound management practices in related fields such as coastal area development and 
oil pollution.  Environmental management activities mainly include training, joint 
implementation, establishment of regional advisory services on oil pollution 
                                                                                                                                       
meteorological phenomena, oceanographic features, and establishment of oceanographic reference 
station.  2) Assessment of oil pollution and its impact on living aquatic resources including survey 
of oil pollution sources and monitoring of oil pollution in the marine and coastal environment, and 
cooperative research on oil and oil dispersant toxicity. 3) Assessment of non-oil pollutants, 
especially metals, organics, nutrients and sediments, and their environment impact.  Assessment of 
the impact of pollution on, and habitat degradation of, mangrove and coral ecosystems.  See See 
UNEP.  1983.  Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Areas of 
the East Asian Region.  p. 6. 
 
29 Training activities included: standardization of analytical techniques for measuring pollutant 
concentration and the effects of pollutants on human health, fisheries resources and marine and 
coastal ecosystems; introduction of quality control of analytical procedures within and among the 
laboratories participating in the action plan, including the conduct or regional intercalibration 
exercises; the establishment of a joint regional equipment service; training of scientists and 
technicians through existing national, regional and international institutions ready to offer their 
facilities; compatible methodology for the handling, validation and regional evaluation of data 
collected.  See UNEP.  1983.  Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Areas of the East Asian Region.  p. 6. 
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control; development and application of principles and guidelines for the discharge 
of waste into coastal waters and cooperative research on marine sites for dumping 
of hazardous wastes, and development and/or strengthening of national 
coordinating mechanisms for the management of relevant information and data, 
leading to the establishment of a regional data exchange system.  
Activities under both environmental assessment and environmental 
management heavily focused on marine pollution, with little coverage of other 
marine environmental problems such as marine biological diversity and fisheries.  
There were three reasons why oil pollution was treated as a priority issue in the 
Action Plan.  First, at the global level, there was a fashionable tendency to focus on 
oil pollution.  Vessel-source pollution, mainly oil pollution, has been said to be 
“the most obvious and widely publicized source of marine pollution.”30  Marine 
environmental problems reached the international agenda largely due to the 
striking effects of oil pollution on the marine environment.  Oil pollution attracted 
the most considerable attention from the international community, following the oil 
spill disaster of the “Torrey Canyon” in 1967.  A variety of international 
conventions were developed and ratified, mostly on marine pollution.31   Second, 
no overall comprehensive regional surveys and studies were undertaken to 
examine the priority marine problems in the region, prior to the development of the 
Action Plan.  The region lacked data and information in the late 1970s regarding 
the marine environment, and there were extremely limited financial resources for 
                                                 
30 E. D. Brown.  1994.  International Law of the Sea.  Dartmouth: Aldershot.  Vol. 1. p. 377. 
 
31 For example the International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 (INTERVENTION 1969), the Convention of the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (London Convention 1972), and 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, and its Protocol of 
1978 (MARPOL 1973/1978). 
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an overall comprehensive study at the regional level.  Collecting all first hand data 
and information from scratch seemed impossible.  Third, for many people in 
Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, including government officials and marine 
scientists, environmental problems were considered simply in terms of pollution 
problems.  Other aspects of environmental degradation were considered 
insignificant. 
Institutional Arrangements.  Following the adoption of the Action Plan, an 
institutional structure was developed to support the operations and implementation 
of the Action Plan, including COBSEA, national focal points, and national/regional 
institutions to support the Action Plan.  COBSEA is the overall authority to 
determine the content of the action plan, to review its progress and to approve its 
program of implementation, including the financial implications.  The roles of 
COBSEA in the early years of the Action Plan were purely process related.  It 
made policy decisions only concerning all substantive and financial matters related 
to the action plan, including: reviewing progress achieved; evaluating results; 
adopting a work plan, and approving budget allocations.32  UNEP’s goal was 
modest in the early days: COBSEA was not a policy forum aimed to develop or 
change marine policies at the national level, but a decision-making body for an 
action-oriented program to promote scientific research and study and build 
capacity and networking of government officials and scientists in the region. 
In view of the ASEAN Expert Group on the Environment (AEGE), it was 
decided that the AEGE would be also convened as COBSEA.  UNEP was 
designated by the governments to be responsible for the overall technical 
coordination and continuous supervision of the implementation of the action plan.  
                                                 
32 See UNEP/IG.31/6.  1981. 
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The Interim coordinator of AEGE was designated to provide a channel of 
communication between UNEP and the member countries, due to the fact that 
UNEP’s secretariat was being physically located outside of the region.  
Considering the expenses and cost incurred, the governments decided not to 
establish a separate regional coordinating unit. 
At the national level, each participating country designated an official 
national focal point for the action plan to act as the official channel for 
communication between the Interim coordinator and their respective governments 
and to coordinate the participation of national institutions and agencies in the 
agreed program.  The national focal points were responsible for coordinating 
activities at the national level, and communicating with other countries and 
attending COBSEA meetings at the regional level. 
National institutions, such as research centers, laboratories, government 
services, and universities, were designated by each participating government to 
provide the institutional basis for carrying out the projects under the action plan.  
These institutions were designated by national governments, taking into account 
the specific characteristics of national administration and the organizational 
structure of each country.  Subregional and regional institutions were also used to 
maximize the possible extent of the implementation and coordination of the Action 
Plan.  While governments were mainly responsible for designating national 
institutions, it is usually UNEP that selects subregional or regional institutions to 
assist UNEP in implementing regional activities through subcontracts.  Sometimes 
national institutions were proposed by a government to assume a regional or sub-
regional role to provide services in support of the implementation of the Action 
Plan. 
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Early Implementation.  Following the adoption of the Action Plan up until 
1990, nine projects were funded to implement the Action Plan, see Table 4.1.  Six 
of the projects were addressing pollution problems; three on oil pollution and the 
other three on other types of pollution.33  Early projects tended to be small in size, 
due to the limited funding sources.  Nearly all of the project activities were related 
to studying, surveying, researching or assessing the status of problems.   
 
Table 4.1.  Initial Projects under East Asian Seas Action Plan  
(1981-1990) 







Cooperative Research on Oil and Oil Dispersant 
Toxicity in the East Asian Seas Region 
Malaysia $96,807 $33,769 $9,841 
Study on Coral Resources and the Effects of 
Pollutants and Other Destructive Factors on Coral 
Communities and Related Fisheries in the East 
Asian Seas Region 
Philippines $87,229 $54,422 $40,000 
Study of the Maritime Meteorological Phenomena 
and Oceanographic Features of the East Asian Seas 
Region 
Thailand $54,964 $83,890 $28,800 
Survey and Monitoring of Oil Pollution and 
Development of National Coordinating 
Mechanisms for the Management and 
Establishment of a Regional Data Exchange 
System 
Indonesia $37,571 $80,809 $40,000 
Assessment of Concentration Levels and Trends of 
Non-Oil Pollutants and Their Effects of Non-Oil 
Pollutants and Their Effects on the Marine 
Environment in the East Asian Seas Region 
Philippines $34,744 $57,607 $40,000 
Implementation of a Technical and Scientific 
Support Programme for Oil Spill Contingency 
Planning 
Indonesia $14,272 $17,000 $20,000 
Cooperative Study into the Cleaning-up of Urban 
Rivers 
Singapore $5,217 $5,217 $10,000 
Development of Management Plans for Endangered 
Coastal and Marine Living Resources in East Asia: 
Training Phase 
Malaysia $59,000 34,000 $220,000 
Assessment of Land-based Urban, Industrial, 
Agricultural Sources of Pollution, Their 
Environmental Impact and Development of 
Recommendation for Possible Control Measures 
Singapore $52,000 $22,000 $27,332 
Source: EAS/RCU, Bangkok, Thailand 
 
                                                 
33 The reason that oil pollution was treated as a priority issue was mainly due to the lack of a 
comprehensive regional survey conducted on overall marine environmental problems in the region, 
prior to the Action Plan, and a result of global influences and perspectives of the threat to marine 
pollution. 
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In terms of implementation, a member country would be designated as a 
lead country for coordinating and collaborating with other member countries to 
implement the project activities.  The selection of the lead country was mainly 
decided during the formulation and development of project proposals, which were 
developed by UNEP in collaboration with the member countries.  There were no 
systematic criteria for the selection of a lead country, but general consideration was 
given to the capacity of the country and environmental status regarding a specific 
environmental issue.  There was a tendency that each country should lead at least 
one project. 
A project’s funding was mainly from the UNEP Environment Fund and the 
EAS Trust Fund.  During the implementation of project activities, considerable 
delays often occurred due to the lack of experience of member countries in 
implementing projects according to UN rules and procedures.  Most of the projects 
expected to be completed within a year lasted for more than five years. 
A series of regional workshops or meetings were organized to support the 
project activities, the participants of which were mainly from the five ASEAN 
countries.  Normally, for a workshop or meeting organized under a particular 
project, the lead country would invite one to three participants from other member 
countries of the Action Plan to participate in the meeting.  Most participants would 
be from the lead country of the project.  These meetings and workshops helped to 
build connections and personal relationships among scientists, with the impact 
flowing over to other regional activities.  As Dr. Manuwadi Hungspreugs has 
summarized, “in a region where marine scientists were few and marine problems 
were not well noticed, the initial activities of the Action Plan did play a significant 
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role in starting up the activities and building a networking of marine scientists in 
Southeast Asia.”34 
By 1990, about fifty national institutions and agencies actively participated 
in the implementation of agreed activities.  Technical assistance, including 
equipment, material and expertise, was provided to national institutions for the 
implementation of the agreed activities.  More than five hundred technical 
personnel, mostly from the five countries, were trained in various aspects of 
environmental protection, pollution control and environmental management 
techniques.35  The training contributed considerably to the capability of these 
personnel and their institutions to respond to the environmental problems of their 
countries.  Furthermore, the personnel and institutions provided inputs directly to 
ASEAN environmental cooperation.  Consequently, to a great extent, the Action 
Plan financed the development of ASEAN environmental cooperation.  For 
example, many marine scientists or researchers receiving funding or training from 
the Action Plan also participated in the ASEAN marine program. 
The policy impacts of the Action Plan are more difficult to evaluate.  Since 
the adoption of the Action Plan, there have been changes in the environmental 
policies of the participating states that are in conformity with the objectives of the 
Action Plan.  There was increased environmental awareness in the states 
participating in the Action Plan.  However, it is hard to disaggregate the impact of 
the Action Plan from those of other global, regional and national factors.  No 
comprehensive efforts were made to change national policies, except through 
                                                 
34 Interview with Dr. Manuwadi Hungspreugs, April 2005. 
 
35 M. S. Kismadi and A. Maheswaran.  1991.  Reappraisal and Revision of the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan.  UNEP (OCA)/EAS IG.3/8. 
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various workshops and training activities provided to government officials or 
scientists. 
During the first decade of the implementation of the Action Plan, regional 
coordination and cooperation on project activities were limited, mainly due to 
limited financial resources.  The available financial resources were too thinly 
distributed over too many activities.  As a result, projects conceived as being 
regional were implemented at the national level with only the lead country carrying 
out the project activities with marginal participation of institutions and experts 
from other countries in the region.  In other words, countries were drawn in only 
for meetings and workshops during the implementation of these projects, but 
scientific or operational activities were not undertaken collectively.   
The situation was aggravated by the non-existence of a regional 
coordinating unit located in the region.  The UNEP provided the secretariat service 
functions through its Regional Seas Programme office located first in Geneva and 
later in Nairobi.  Consequently, activities tended to be individual, national and not 
well coordinated at the regional level.  Due to financial constraints and lack of a 
regional coordinating unit, no efforts were made to identify common regional 
marine environmental problems or joint strategies and actions to address them, 
although almost all of the projects were designed to be implemented at the regional 
level.   
In 1991, UNEP hired two high-level consultants, Mr. M. S. Kismadi and 
Mr. A. Maheswaran, to evaluate the Action Plan and its implementation in the first 
decade.  Their evaluation missions to the participating countries recommended the 
strengthening of regional cooperation by exploring joint activities and 
concentrating on the most important regional issues: 
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The Action Plan should help to solve the environmental problems 
faced jointly by the participating states and to strengthen extra 
regional cooperation…  the projects being implemented within the 
framework of the Action shall concentrate on the most important 
issues identified by the Governments of the region as requiring 
through regional cooperation.36 
 
The institutional arrangement of linking the COBSEA with AEGE had a 
dual impact on marine environmental cooperation in the region.  On the one hand, 
during the early days of ASEAN environmental cooperation, i.e. the convening of 
the AEGE, ASEAN had limited technical inputs to provide for the AEGE since 
there was no funding for project activities under AEGE.  ASEAN also lacked 
experience in convening regional expert meetings in comparison with UNEP.  The 
activities under the Action Plan and meeting results from COBSEA provided direct 
inputs to AEGE meetings.  On the one hand, COBSEA and AEGE were in effect 
managed by the same set of officials and this situation gave rise to the state of 
affairs that there were two sets of parallel activities operating in the same field of 
marine environmental protection and management.  The institutions and personnel 
used for the implementation of the activities of both COBSEA and the AEGE 
marine program were virtually the same, thereby imposing considerable strain on 
the limited human resources available in each country for carrying out such 
activities in the region.  Literally, the same groups of people attended the two 
meetings to consider and agree upon similar matters, under two different 
organizational titles.   
In summary, during the first decade of the implementation of the Action 
Plan, individuals were being drawn by UNEP to marine environmental cooperation 
through AEGE.  As a result, countries capacity to address marine environmental 
                                                 
36 M. S. Kismadi and A. Maheswaran.  1991.  Annex III.  p. 4.  Italics added by author.   
 170
issues has been increased, and marine scientists have formed networks and 
connections in the region.  However, few substantive activities were truly 
cooperative, except meetings and workshops. 
 
The Separation from ASEAN and Expansion of the Action Plan (1990-1994)  
The incorporation of the Action Plan under the umbrella of ASEAN helped 
ASEAN to build its own networks and increase the technical and scientific 
capacity among its government officials and environmental managers.  After a 
decade of the implementation of the Action Plan, ASEAN was ready to create its 
own marine program with increased scientific and technical expertise and 
networking among the member countries.   
In 1990, ASEAN undertook an overall institutional reform to strengthen the 
regional organization.  As a result, ASEAN established its own environmental 
program, including a marine environment program.  The AEGE, established in 
1978 and convened as COBSEA since 1981, was upgraded to the ASEAN Senior 
Officials on Environment (ASOEN) and held its first meeting in June 1990 in 
Kuala Lumpur.  ASOEN established its Working Group on ASEAN Seas and 
Marine Environment in order to oversee activities within the ASEAN seas.  During 
the second meeting of the ASOEN, 17-19 June 1991, in Singapore, it was decided 
that there was no need to discuss the issue of COBSEA activities under the 
mandate of ASOEN.37  This signified the official separation of the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan from the ASEAN environment program in terms of formal 
institutional connections. 
                                                 
37 UNEP (OCA)/EAS IG.3/11.  1991.  Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Co-ordinating Body on 
the Seas of East Asia.  Ninth Meeting of the Co-ordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia 
(COBSEA) on the East Asian Seas Action Plan, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 13-15 November 1991. 
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In view of the decision of the ASEAN Standing Committee to upgrade the 
AEGE to ASOEN, and anticipating that ASOEN would be responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of all environment programs of the ASEAN 
region, ASEAN countries attempted to integrate the Action Plan into ASOEN 
activities.  ASEAN countries expressed their views to M. S. Kismadi and A. 
Maheswaran, the two consultants hired by UNEP, that “the East Asian Seas Action 
Plan should therefore logically be an activity under ASOEN in contrast to the 
present arrangement where COBSEA is considered a UNEP activity distinct from 
the activities of AEGE (sic).”38  Based on their visits to the five ASEAN countries, 
Mr. Kismadi and Mr. Maheswaran recommended, “the Action Plan shall be called 
the ASEAN Seas Action Plan.”39   
The ninth meeting of the COBSEA was convened in Kuala Lumpur in 
September 1991.  The consultant report by Mr. Kismadi and Mr. Maheswaran was 
reviewed, and the meeting considered the recommendations of the report to 
integrate the Action Plan into the activities of ASOEN.  UNEP stressed that the 
COBSEA had a major part to play within the wider East Asian Seas region, not 
only confined to ASEAN.  In view of the expanded role of COBSEA and the 
possible participation of other countries of the region in the East Asian Seas Action 
Plan, the meeting requested the Executive Director of UNEP to arrange the 
preparation of a detailed report on UNEP’s perception of the future role of 
COBSEA and its future mode of operation.  Taking into consideration the fact that 
the ASEAN marine environment was separated from COBSEA activities, and that 
consequently the local support to the Action Plan was reduced, the ninth COBSEA 
                                                 
38 M. S. Kismadi and A. Maheswaran.  1991.  p. 14. 
 
39  Ibid.  Annex III, p. 4. 
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meeting made a number of major decisions, including: 1) requesting the Executive 
Director of UNEP to establish a Regional Coordinating Unit for the East Asian 
Seas Action Plan (EAS/RCU) in the region; 2) extending invitations to other 
countries of the region to join the action plan; 3) preparing a draft revised action 
plan in order to, inter alia, include the new countries that join the action plan and 
reflect the relevant elements of Agenda 21, specifically Chapter 17. 
These decisions actually followed the intentions of UNEP.  ASEAN 
intended to integrate the Action Plan into its ASEAN environmental program, and 
turned it into an “ASEAN Seas Action Plan.”  However, UNEP argued that the 
East Asian Seas Action Plan covered broader geographical areas, which were 
stipulated in the 1981 Action Plan.  Therefore, the meeting decided to expand the 
membership to other East Asian Seas countries.  Furthermore, the revised action 
plan was influenced by UNEP’s global environmental responsibility to promote the 
implementation of the Agenda 21 adopted in the Rio conference in 1992. 
Following the decision of the ninth COBSEA meeting, UNEP established 
the EAS/RCU on 1 May 1993.  In other words, it was more than a decade 
following the adoption and implementation of the Action Plan that UNEP 
established a regional coordinating unit to oversee and coordinate the activities on 
behalf of COBSEA.  The office of the EAS/RCU was at that time administratively 
located within UNEP’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific physically located 
in the UN Building in Bangkok, Thailand.  At the beginning, the unit was staffed 
by two professional staff, a coordinator and a junior program officer.   
Following the decisions of the ninth meeting of COBSEA to extend the 
memberships to other countries of the East Asian Seas, invitation letters were sent, 
by UNEP over the period of 1992-1993 to the Governments of Australia, Brunei 
 173
Darussalam, Kingdom of Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Union of Myanmar and Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
to the join the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  Australia, Cambodia, China, the 
Republic of Korea, and Viet Nam accepted the invitations.   
The successful expansion of membership of the Action Plan was closely 
related to the changing geopolitical context in the region of the East Asian Seas, 
namely a détente in the relationships between major powers; and the end of the 
Cold War, which created an environment more conducive to promoting 
environmental cooperation among countries beyond the ASEAN member 
countries.  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the confrontation between 
alliances disappeared in the region, and this was accompanied by the settlement of 
the Cambodian issue.  The geopolitical environment lessened the antagonism 
among Southeast Asian countries, and with China, and overall conditions for 
multi-lateral cooperation in the region improved.  
The early 1990s witnessed an improvement in diplomatic relations between 
China and other Southeast Asian countries, and among the Southeast Asian 
countries themselves.  In August 1990, China restored its diplomatic ties with 
Indonesia, which was followed by the establishment of diplomatic ties with 
Singapore in October of the same year, and with Brunei in September 1991.  Two 
months later, China normalized party-to-party relations as well as state-to-state 
relations with Viet Nam.40  In July 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, 
                                                 
40 Joseph Y. S. Cheng.  2001.  “Sino-ASEAN Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century.”  
Contemporary Southeast Asia 23 (3): 420-51. 
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attended the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.  In 1992, Minister Qian proposed closer 
economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation.41   
The political changes formed the necessary political environment for the 
improvement in marine environmental cooperation in the East Asian Seas region. 
However, barriers still remained regarding environmental cooperation in the South 
China Sea, as the 1990s was a decade of increasing conflicts in the South China 
Sea.  
 
The East Asian Seas Action Plan (1994) and Its Implementation (1994-
Present) 
Considering the expansion of membership of the Action Plan, UNEP took 
the initiative to revise the Action Plan in view of the participation from five other 
countries in the region.  The Action Plan was revised and submitted to the Fifth 
Meeting of Experts (Singapore, 25-26 July 1994).  On 27 October 1994, the 
Meeting of Plenipotentiaries on the East Asian Seas Action Plan was convened in 
Bangkok on 27 October 1994, and five additional countries were officially 
welcomed to the Action Plan.  The revised action plan was adopted by the 
participating countries, along with a long-term strategy to implement the Plan. 
The Action Plan: What Has Changed since 1981?  The 1994 Action Plan 
had a paradigmatic shift from oil pollution to ecosystems.  This shift was mainly 
driven by the changing perception of marine environmental problems at the global 
level, from a pollution-focused approach to a comprehensive approach addressing 
various environmental problems, including biodiversity, climate change, 
                                                 
41 Lee Lai To.  1993.  “ASEAN-PRC Political and Security Cooperation: Problems, Proposals, and 
Prospects.”  Asian Survey 33 (11): 1095-1104. 
 175
desertification, and biotechnology.  The UNCED in 1992 adopted a detailed 
Agenda 21 of desired actions.  Chapter 17 of the Agenda 21 outlined a 
comprehensive program of action to be taken by governments, the UN agencies 
and all other partners to address the impacts of human activities on the marine 
environment.  The paradigmatic shift was made possible also because scientific 
research and baseline data and information collected in the implementation of the 
Action Plan provided the necessary data and information to re-prioritize regional 
marine environmental problems.42  The increasing data and information collected 
in the region showed that the most serious marine problems were actually 
ecosystem and habitat degradation, rather than oil pollution.43   
In comparison with the Action Plan of 1981, which mainly focused on 
baseline data and information and environmental assessment, the revised action 
plan emphasized the importance of the management of marine ecosystems, and 
promoted scientific research for the purpose of management.  This was mainly due 
to the fact that during the implementation of the Action Plan in the 1980s, most 
activities were on research, study and environmental assessment.  The management 
aspects of the Action Plan were largely ignored during the 1980s. 
The revised Action Plan is composed of five components: scientific 
activities; environmental management; implementation; institutional arrangements 
and financial arrangements.  Among the five components, sound environmental 
management is the centerpiece of the Action Plan, and is based on the principles of 
                                                 
42 UNEP (OCA)/EAS IG.5/6.  1994.  Report of the Meeting of Plenipotentiaries on the East Asian 
Seas Action Plan.  Bangkok, 27-28 October 1994. 
 
43 Interviews with marine scientists in the region. 
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Chapter 17, Agenda 21.44  It was expected that data produced by scientific 
activities would provide direct inputs to environmental management programs 
designed to protect and properly manage the marine and coastal environment.45 
Long Term Strategy (1994-2009).  In view of the restructured ASEAN 
framework, UNEP prepared a long-term strategy (1994-2009) and a policy 
document regarding the future roles and operation mode of the COBSEA to 
support the implementation of the revised action plan.  The two documents reflect 
UNEP’s endeavor to enhance and transform the roles of COBSEA in the changing 
regional setting, by adding policy functions to COBSEA, re-focusing the Action 
Plan on regional activities, and strengthening the management component of the 
Action Plan.  The two policy documents, along with the revised Action Plan, are 
the guiding documents for the development and implementation of the expanded 
Action Plan. 
The COBSEA’s long-term strategy is to promote and support the following 
tasks: 1) preparation of national strategic plans covering marine and coastal 
environment; 2) integration of these strategic plans to achieve a regionally 
balanced approach to the conservation of marine habitats of the East Asian Seas; 3) 
identification of regional priorities for action, including protection of biodiversity, 
management of pollution and ecosystem rehabilitation; 4) evaluation of progress in 
program achievement through regular monitoring and assessment of the state of the 
                                                 
44 See para. 19 of UNEP (OCA)/EAS IG 5/6: Integrated management efforts shall draw on the spirit 
of Chapter 17, Agenda 21 of UNCED…  The action plan should eventually see the 
“implementation of integrated coastal and marine management and sustainable development plans 
and programmes at appropriate levels.” 
 
45 Scientific and management activities cover the following aspects: 1) the development and 
maintenance of a regional database; 2) monitoring and environmental assessment program; 3) 
rehabilitation of ecosystems, species and communities; 4) marine protected areas; 5) utilization and 
protection of marine resources; 6) pollution; 7) capacity building.  See UNEP (OCA)/EAS IG.5/6.  
1994.  Annex 4: p.1-6. 
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marine environment of the region; 5) strengthening the governments’ capability to 
manage coastal environments, including training, developing a database and 
capabilities to assess environmental risk and socio-economic impact evaluation; 6) 
increasing awareness in decision-makers and the community on the socio-
economic, cultural and ecological importance of marine ecosystems.46 
In terms of the mode of operation, the EAS/RCU of UNEP communicates 
directly with national focal points to coordinate the implementation of the Action 
Plan, rather than through the interim coordinator of AEGE as was done in the past.  
The roles of COBSEA cover the following: 1) examine, amend and extend its 
Long Term Strategy; 2) advise on potential areas of cooperative venture with other 
regional seas action plans; advise on policy issues and guide on technical aspects 
of the development of program activities; 3) advise on avenues to be pursued for 
securing possible additional funding for its major priority programs; 4) concentrate 
on the implementation of major coastal and marine environmental projects, the 
development of which should be based on the elements of the Long-Term Strategy, 
avoiding small scale studies and projects. 
Two points are worthy of note.  First, UNEP aimed to enhance COBSEA’s 
role as a policy forum, trying to changing national policy by developing strategic 
national plans on the marine and coastal environment, building management 
capacity through training, and increasing environmental awareness among 
decision-makers.  During the first ten years, COBSEA had been only a decision-
making body for budget allocation and the approval of projects funded by the Trust 
                                                 
46 UNEP. 1994.  “Long-Term Strategy of the Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia: 
COBSEA (1994-2009).”  In UNEP (OCA)/IG.5/6.  Report of the Meeting of Plenipotentiaries on 
the East Asian Seas Action Plan, Bangkok, Thailand, 27-28 October 1994. 
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Fund.47  Second, having realized that in the first decade of the implementation of 
the Action Plan, the past activities had been implemented at the national level 
involving very little regional collaboration, UNEP took a strategy to promote 
operational regional cooperation by focusing the limited financial resources on 
fewer numbers of larger regional projects, and aimed to turn the Action Plan into a 
real “regional” action plan, by concentrating on the most important issues 
identified by the Government of the region as requiring solution through regional 
cooperation.   
Implementation.  Since the establishment of the EAS/RCU in 1993, there 
has been growing activities seeking funding from external donors on a project 
related basis.  Between 1993 and 1998, eighteen projects were developed and 
implemented to support the implementation of the Action Plan (see Table 4.2 for a 
list of projects developed).   
                                                 
47 The statement is made based on a comprehensive review of all the meeting agenda and reports of 
all the COBSEA meetings from 1981 to 1994. 
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Thailand Component 1-the Oceanographic Features of the 
East Asian Seas Region—Development of Oil 
Spill Trajectory Models 
 $60,000  
 Component 2-Survey and Monitoring Oil 
Pollution in the East Asian Seas Region 
   
Philippines Quality Assurance for Non-Oil Pollution 
Monitoring 
   
Malaysia Conservation and Sustainable Development for 
the East Asian Seas 
   
 Programme of Action to Control Land-based 
Sources of Pollution in the East Asian Seas 
Region 
$25,000  $31,566 
Malaysia Coastal Resource Management Plan Project for 
the East Asian Seas Region 
   
 Enhancement of the Public Awareness and 
Participation on Environmental Issues Related to 
Coastal Marine Areas in the East Asian Seas 
Region 
$98,000   
Thailand Workshop on the Biological Effects of 
Pollutants 
$40,000 $20,000  
EAS/RCU Study of the Evaluation of the Percentage 
Contribution of Coastal Activities to the GNP 
Cancelled   
IMO Feasibility Study on a Comprehensive 
Preparedness and Response Plan to Oil and 
Chemical Spills, Integrating National, Sub-
regional and Regional Plans 
$30,000   
UNEP/ROAP Training Workshops on Biological Effects of 
Pollutants: East Asian Seas Region 
$62,900 $15,000  
Australia Development of training Materials for Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management 




Integrated Management of Watersheds in 
relation to the Management and Conservation of 
Coastal and Marine (Nearshore) Areas of the 
East Asian Seas Region 
$469,000   
UNEP Valuation of Environmental and Natural 
Resources with Particular Reference to Coastal 
and Marine Ecosystems 
  $75,000 
Philippines East Asian Regional Symposium/Workshop on 
Small Cetaceans 
  $44,500 
Cambodia Capacity Building Programme for Protection and 
Management of Marine and Coastal Areas of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia 
   
Malaysia Ecological Consequences of Land-based Oil 
Discharges into Coastal and Marine Areas of the 
East Asian Seas 
  $80,000 
EAS/RCU International Coral Initiative Regional 
Workshop for the East Asian Seas 
  $120,000 
Source: EAS/RCU, Bangkok Thailand 
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The projects covered pollution; public awareness and participation; training 
and capacity building assessment; and integrated coastal zone management to 
various research projects and studies.  The EAS/RCU actively sought funding from 
other bilateral aid agencies and UN agencies.  Additionally, some activities were 
initiated to support the implementation of global programs, such as GPA/LBA.  A 
regional workshop on the implementation of the GPA/LBA was held in Cairns, 
Australia, 30 April – 3 May 1997, and a Regional Plan for Action was prepared 
and distributed to all member countries.  An overview of land-based sources and 
activities affecting the marine environment in the East Asian Seas was prepared 
and sent to the member countries by the EAS/RCU.48  The implementation of the 
Action Plan became more diversified with a variety of projects, activities and 
funding during 1993-1998.  All eighteen projects were concluded in 1998: a few 
were terminated due to the failure to secure additional funding.  Since 1998, the 
implementation of the Action Plan has mainly focused on assisting in the 
implementation of some global and international marine-related programs or 
projects, particularly the GPA/LBA and ICRAN have been the major activities. 
Under the framework of the regional GPA/LBA, a project was initiated in 
2001 to identity regional hotspots of land-based pollution, their characteristics and 
impacts.  The project developed regional guidelines for the control and treatment 
of sewage.  A questionnaire was developed to collect data and information to 
establish a regional Geographic Information System (GIS) for better management 
of regional hotspots of land-based pollution.49  This project was completed in 
                                                 
48 UNEP (WATER)/EAS IG. 9/3.  1998.  Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the COBSEA, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 18-19 November 1998. 
 
49 UNEP(DEC)/EAS IG. 17/4 Rev. 1.  2004.  Report of the Executive Director on the 
Implementation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan in 2002-2003.  Also see www.unepeasrcu.org. 
 181
2003.  The regional component of ICRAN in the East Asian Seas was initiated in 
2001 and concluded in 2004.  Eight coral reef sites in the region were selected for 
the implementation of activities based on a study of management gaps.50  
Additionally, an important initiative has been undertaken since 1996 in 
collaboration with UNEP’s Division of Global Environment Facility 
(UNEP/DGEF) to develop a large marine environment project for the South China 
Sea, involving multiple countries with operational activities on the ground.  




From the beginning, the aim of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme was 
to develop an action-oriented program at the regional level, with a legal framework 
to support its implementation.  An umbrella regional convention in most regional 
seas areas provides the legal framework for an action plan.  It also expresses the 
political will and legal commitment of the governments to tackle their common 
environmental problems, acting both together and individually.  Conventions are 
put into practice through protocols dealing with specific problems—oil spills, 
response to emergencies, land-based pollution, and conservation of wildlife and 
habitats, for example.51  Among all thirteen UNEP regional seas action plans, only 
three have not adopted a regional convention.  Interestingly all three no-convention 
                                                                                                                                       
 
50 Activities include training, workshops on management, preparation and distribution of public 
awareness materials, coral reef monitoring, tourism capacity studies, and feasibility studies on pilot 
projects for alternative income livelihoods.  See UNEP(DEC)/EAS IG. 17/4 Rev. 1.  2004. 
 




action plans are located in Asia: East Asian Seas, North-West Pacific, and South 
Asian Seas.  The East Asian Seas action plan is the oldest among the three, the 
latter two being launched only in the 1990s.52 
At the adoption of the action plan in 1981, ASEAN countries failed to 
reach an agreement on the development of a regional convention to provide legal 
backing for the implementation of the Action Plan, due to the countries’ political 
preference for safeguarding their sovereignty.  Furthermore, the development of a 
legally binding agreement to provide the legal framework for the action plan was 
seen as a possible impediment to the future extension of membership to other 
countries in the East Asian Seas.53   
ASEAN countries generally had an aversion to a legally binding 
convention.  Indonesia, as the leading country of the organization, was unwilling to 
enmesh itself in a multilateral legally binding agreement.  Unsure about the 
implications of legally binding agreements for their newly gained independence 
and sovereignty, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore also preferred to work in 
a gradual, informal and voluntary way to implement the Action Plan.  Thailand, 
being the only country in Southeast Asia without a recent history of colonization 
by external powers, was the only country that supported the idea of developing a 
regional convention.54  In the second meeting of the COBSEA, Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia, 25 – 26 March 1983, Mr. K. Snidvongs from Thailand, acting as the 
Interim Coordinator, requested the delegations to consider the legal aspects of the 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 UNEP.  1987.  The East Asian Seas Action Plan: Evaluation of its Development and 
Achievements.  UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 86.  
 
54 See UNEP/IG.44/11.  1983.  Report of the Second Meeting of the Co-ordinating Body on the Seas 
of East Asia.  Second Meeting of the Co-ordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia, 25-26 March 
1983, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
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Action Plan.55  Other countries indicated their preferences for working together on 
various programs through developing and implementing the Action Plan, and that 
it was not opportune to take steps to formulate a regional convention.56 
The 1991 UNEP initiated high-level consultative mission found that “the 
ASEAN countries still prefer to work by way of consensus and agreement in 
conformity with the traditional ASEAN spirit, and therefore the question of 
conventions and protocols should not be considered at this point in time.  However, 
Thailand is of the view that effective conventions and protocols should be 
considered for a suitable EAS Action Plan legal framework.”57  This is related to 
Southeast Asia’s recent history of struggling for independence and sovereignty.  
With the exception of Thailand, all Southeast Asian nations achieved independence 
or have experienced society-transforming movements within the past three 
decades.  Many are still struggling with the basic problems of nationhood, thus 
inserting a nationalistic fervor into regional and marine environmental affairs.58 
This aversion to legalization of environmental cooperation was carried 
forward until very recently.  The sensitivity of this issue reached its highest level 
during the development and approval of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  
In the past one or two years of the implementation of the project, however, there 
appears to be a trend towards the loosening of some governments’ stands on the 
issue.  This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid.  
 
56 Ibid.  p. 3. 
 
57 M. S. Kismadi and A. Maheswaran.  1991.  p. 15. 
 
58 Valencia.  2000.  p. 239. 
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The Marine Scientific Community in the East Asian Seas 
Due to the complexity of marine environmental problems, government 
officials cannot deal with the problems effectively without seeking advice from 
marine scientists.  Given the uncertainty, a scientific community, which shares 
views regarding the causes of environmental degradation, is critical in forging 
common understandings regarding the cause and effect of environmental problems 
among policy and decision-makers, and facilitating governmental learning 
regarding the necessity for environmental cooperation and the development of new 
state objectives in accordance with common interests.59   
A mature “epistemic community” has not formed under the East Asian Seas 
region.  Due to lack of data and information, scientists themselves were still not 
sure what the priority problems were in the region, and the root causes of problems 
were not well analyzed.  However, early activities of the Action Plan helped the 
scientific community to gain incremental coherence in their views, and contributed 
to later regional environmental cooperation.  Scientists trained with different 
academic backgrounds had to work together to adopt a compatible methodology, 
techniques and skills for regional consolidation of data and information. 
Shared or perceived shared interests are the basis for environmental 
cooperation, which derive from a common understanding of the causes and effects 
of marine environmental degradation.  Achieving common understanding of the 
causes or effects of a complex marine environmental problem should not be taken 
for granted.  A scientific community becomes an epistemic community only when 
scientists in the community share the same approach, view, and a common 
                                                 
59 See Peter Hass.  1990. 
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interpretive framework and maintain “consensual knowledge”.  According to Peter 
Haas, 
An epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the 
same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and 
shares common values.  As well as sharing an acceptance of a 
common body of acts, its members share a common interpretive 
framework, or “consensual knowledge,” from which they convert 
such facts, or observations, to policy-relevant conclusions.60 
 
Experts were consulted for the preparation, development and 
implementation of the Action Plan.  Leading scientists have been relied upon to 
implement various projects under the framework of the Plan.  However, the East 
Asian Seas cover the geographical area from South Korea to Australia.  Due to the 
vast geographical coverage of the East Asian Seas, extraordinarily diverse 
environmental problems, and linguistic diversity, marine scientists in the East 
Asian Seas are not well organized and do not share a common view regarding 
regional marine environmental protection.  An epistemic community has not been 
formed despite the dramatically increased number of marine and environmental 
scientists in the region.  Large geographical coverage, few shared common 
concerns, and uncontrollably diverse environmental problems sometimes tend to 
water down environmental cooperation simply into “talk shops” or “No Action 
Talk Only” forums, in which no substantive or meaningful concrete actions can be 
developed to meet the interests of all member countries.61   
                                                 
60 Haas.  1990.  p. 55. 
61 In the Regional Partners Workshop for the East Asian Seas Action, Bangkok, Thailand in April 
2005, participants complained that the COBSEA has become a “talkshop”.  Ms. Srisuda 
Jarayahband, the new regional coordinator of EAS/RCU, indicated that the vast geographical 
coverage of the Action Plan made it difficult to identify common marine environmental problems of 
interest to all member countries. 
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UNEP contributed to the development of a scientific community by 
convening various expert meetings, and establishing/funding the Association of the 
Southeast Asian Marine Scientists (ASEAMS), which was established in 1989 and 
financially supported by the Action Plan.  ASEAMS provided scientific and 
technical assistance to the implementation of the Action Plan.  As of 1995 when it 
ceased to function, the membership of the ASEAMS stood at 213.62 
Marine scientists in the East Asian Seas share a general concern about the 
environmental degradation trends in the seas of the region, and have proposed that 
governments take measures to address the problems.  They have also tried to 
persuade governments to act.  However, when it comes to specific measures and 
operational level advice, they do not share the same views.  For example, 
Southeast Asian marine ecologists are very concerned about the loss of mangroves 
and coral reefs, but South Korea has no mangroves or coral reefs along its coast.  
As a result, actions to be taken in such a vast region tend to focus on capacity 
building activities such as training and conferences, from which all member 
countries can benefit, and operational level actions tend to be national or sub-
regional.   
The coherence in the views of the marine scientists in the entire region is 
limited regarding regional environmental problems, but the scientific networking 
and connections among Southeast Asia provide a good foundation for later 
development of an epistemic community.  Such a community would develop and 
mature through the development and implementation of the UNEP/GEF South 
China Sea Project, see Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
62 UNEP (OCA)/EAS IG. 5/6.  1994.   
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Financial Sustainability   
The Trust Fund of the East Asian Seas Action Plan was established to 
provide financial support to the Action Plan during the second intergovernmental 
meeting in 1981.  The financial resources for the Trust Fund came from the 
contributions of the national governments and the UNEP Environment Fund.  It 
was agreed that the participating governments would contribute $US 86,000 in 
both 1982 and 1983, and future contributions would be decided bi-annually 
through COBSEA meetings. 
Indonesia, as the biggest country in ASEAN, took on a leadership role in 
consolidating ASEAN.63  Indonesia took the lead in contributing the largest 
amount ($30,000) to the East Asian Seas Trust Fund.  Malaysia contributed 
$17,000, while the Philippines and Thailand each contributed $19,000 per year.  
Singapore surprisingly made the minimum pledge of $1,000 to the Fund, which is 
merely a symbolic contribution.  Singapore’s consideration was that its coastline 
was very short with a small population as a proportion of the entire East Asian 
Seas.64  Both ASEAN’s and UNEP’s goal was to secure the participation of all 
ASEAN countries, and build environmental cooperation from scratch.  ASEAN 
practiced “quiet diplomacy” and avoided confrontational ways in dealing with 
issues.  The decisions regarding the amount of financial contribution to be made to 
the collective “Trust Fund” was entirely based on voluntarism.65  Both the ASEAN 
                                                 
63 See Bilson Kurus.  1993.  “Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d’Etre.”  Asian Survey 
Vol. 33: 819-831. 
 
64 Interview with Mr. Yihang Jiang, former Senior Programme Officer of the Regional 
Coordinating Unit for the East Asian Seas Action Plan. 
 
65 Interviews with Dr. Manuwadi Hungspreugs, Professor of Department of Marine Science, 
Chulalongkorn University, who was expert member for the East Asian Seas Action Plan and Mr. 
Henk Uktolseya, Indonesian senior government official, who is among the few have attended every 
single meeting of the COBSEA since its establishment. 
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countries and UNEP did not want to jeopardize the spirit of cooperation by 
confronting Singapore at the early stage.  However, during the implementation of 
the East Asian Seas Action Plan, Singapore received an almost equal amount of 
funding from the Trust Fund in terms of training and fellowships to scientists and 
researchers.66  Consequently, there was a phenomenon of “the poor supporting the 
rich” in the Action Plan, simply due to the political consideration of other ASEAN 
countries in maintaining cohesion, and engaging every ASEAN country in the 
Action Plan.   
UNEP, having agreed to provide the technical co-ordination for the interim 
period of the Action Plan, agreed to contribute the cost of the technical co-
ordination in so far as its own staff and related costs were concerned (estimated at 
$ 50,000 per year).  In addition, UNEP contributed $50,000 in 1982 for program 
activities.  Since then, UNEP has increased its financial support through project 
implementation or other mechanisms, until very recently.67   
Table 4.3 summarizes changes in the pledges of the participating countries 
to the East Asian Seas Trust Fund.  Among the five founding members (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), the pledges to the Trust Fund 
only increased 10 percent over the period 1981 to 1994.  Between 1994 and 2005, 
no other country, except Australia and China, increased its contribution.  Since 
                                                                                                                                       
 
66 Interview with Dr. Manuwadi Hungspreugs. 
 
67 UNEP/IG.31/6.  1981.  Report of the Intergovernmental Meeting on the East Asian Seas Action 
Plan.  Intergovernmental Meeting on the East Asian Seas Action Plan, Bangkok, Thailand, 9th – 
11th December 1981.  p. 14. 
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1981, the region has witnessed rapid economic growth, but COBSEA failed to 
establish a rate of regular increase in members’ contributions to the Trust Fund.68 
Table 4.3.  Level of Pledges of the Participating States to the East Asian Seas 
Trust Fund (Thousand $US) 
State 1981 1994 2003 
Australia  15 20 
Cambodia   5  (for 1995) 5 
China  15 30 
Indonesia 30 33 20 
Korea   15 
Malaysia 17 18.7 18.7 
Philippines 19 20.9 25 
Singapore 1 1.1 10 
Thailand 19 20.9 20.9 
Viet Nam  7 (for 1995) 7 
Total 86 136.6 171.6 
Source: EAS/RCU, Bangkok, Thailand 
In April 1984, as the first pledge expired, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
stated that their governments were prepared to contribute to the Trust Fund at the 
1982-1983 level plus ten percent on the condition that all governments agreed to 
contribute at the higher level.  It was also stated that their proposal to contribute at 
this higher level was contingent on the Environment Fund at least matching the 
increase.  Since the Philippines and Singapore could not make matching level 
contributions, the pledges from all countries remained the same as in the period 
1982-1983.   
By 1986, the Trust Fund achieved “savings” of $175,799 due to slow 
approval and implementation of project activities.  In 1987, an independent 
evaluation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan pointed out, “the resources pledged 
to be contributed to the Trust Fund were and are received with considerable delays, 
                                                 
68 Average GDP growth rates between 1982 and 2003 for the member countries are: Australia 
(3.5%), China (9.8%), Indonesia (5.1%), South Korea (7.1%), Malaysia (6.2%), Philippines (2.6%), 
Thailand (6.1%), Viet Nam (6.6%) for 1985-2003, and Cambodia (6.6.%) for 1994-2003.  Data are 
from the World Bank Development Indicators 1982-2003.   
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hampering the implementation of programme activities according to agreed 
schedules.  The problem is further compounded by the slow project approval 
procedure of UNEP, even once the funds are available.”69  This probably 
contributed to the countries’ unwillingness to increase their pledges, which 
remained the same over a period of 12 years (1982-1994).  In 1994 when the 
membership was extended to five other countries in the East Asian Seas region, the 
pledges from the original member countries increased 10 percent.  From 1994 to 
the present the pledges of member countries remain the same, except in the cases 
of China and Indonesia.  While China increased its contribution from $15,000 to 
$30,000, in 1999, Indonesia decreased its contribution from $33,000 to $20,000 
after the East Asian financial crisis. 
Since the adoption of the East Asian Seas Action Plan, UNEP has provided 
more funds to COBSEA than to any other regional seas action plan.70  Following 
two decades of heavy support, UNEP was forced to consider reducing its financial 
support due to its' own financial difficulties.  During the seventeenth meeting of 
the COBSEA, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 – 11 March 2004, UNEP informed COBSEA 
of its plans to phase out UNEP contributions to the Trust Fund.  UNEP will make a 
contribution of US $300,000 to the Trust Fund for the period 2004/5.  UNEP 
management proposed a contribution of US $200,000 to the Trust Fund for the 
period 2006/7, subject to approval by the Governing Council.  Beyond 2007, 
UNEP management is considering to contribute US $50,000 annually to the Trust 
Fund and possible project support in line with programs of work approved by the 
                                                 
69 UNEP.  1987.  The East Asian Seas Action Plan: Evaluation of its Development and 
Achievements.  UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 86.   
 
70 UNEP (DEC)/EAS IG. 16/3.  2001.  Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the COBSEA on the East 
Asian Seas Action Plan.  Sixteenth Meeting of the COBSEA on the East Asian Seas Action Plan, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 24th – 26th October 2001. 
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Governing Council.  UNEP suggested the proposed budget be linked with: 
strengthening of COBSEA through increased ownership, increased partnerships, 
policy approaches, and increased communication with the member countries.   
At present COBSEA has centered on a struggle to sustain the EAS/RCU 
with decreased UNEP financial contributions.  Currently, there is about a $1 
million “savings” in the Trust Fund from previous years.  The “income” of the 
Trust Fund during 2004/2005 includes interest from the “savings”, UNEP 
Environment Fund contribution of $150,000 per annum, and member countries’ 
annual contributions.  The total “income” per annum would be around $350,000.  
Extensive discussions during the seventeenth COBSEA meeting focused on 
various scenarios to reduce the secretariat core budget to $350,000 to ensure 
financing is sustainable.  No funding would be available from UNEP's regular 
budget to cover project activities, if no additional funding were raised.  If no 
additional funding is secured, and no activities are undertaken under the Action 
Plan, the value of the mere existence of the EAS/RCU becomes questionable. 
To summarize: the Action Plan did not succeed in mobilizing the required 
national financial resources for the solution of environmental problems at the 
national or regional levels.  It was also unsuccessful in attracting substantial 
financial support from funding organizations or donors; the Environment Fund of 
UNEP has been the major source of cash contributions to these activities.  
Resources of the Trust Fund are inadequate for any larger scale environmental 
action in the region.   
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Recent Challenges and Developments 
The Action Plan has incurred a series of problems and challenges in the 
past two years.  The main problems include: 1) inability to raise adequate financial 
resources to meet increasing expectations of member countries; 2) lack of a strong 
and fully staffed EAS/RCU; 3) vast geographical coverage of the Action Plan, 
along with financial constraints, resulting in the difficulties to identify shared 
marine environmental problems at the operational level. 
The effectiveness of the implementation of the Action Plan has been 
questioned by both UNEP and member countries recently.  The Action Plan has 
been the most heavily funded plan by UNEP in the past three decades, yet it has 
failed to achieve financial sustainability.  Member countries complain that no 
tangible benefits are obtained through the implementation of the Action Plan.  
There are many similar programs/ projects going on in the region, partly because 
there is a lack of coordination among UN agencies involved such as UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, IMO, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO. 
Not only do they lack coordination, but they are also competing for funding 
external donors to implement similar programs on the coastal and marine 
environment.  In the past decade the region has witnessed a growing number of 
marine environment projects, through which countries receive funding from 
external donors to implement activities at the national and local level.  This has 
raised governments’ expectations to receive funding from UNEP through the 
Action Plan, and governments feel that although they have a financial obligation 
for the Action Plan they have not received tangible benefits from the Action Plan.71   
                                                 
71 Interviews with Ms. Srisuda Jarayahband, regional coordinator of the EAS/RCU, who derives her 
statement from her visits to member countries. 
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COBSEA, with extremely limited financial resources, cannot initiate 
concrete regional activities at the operational level.  Consequently, although the 
Action Plan was designed as an action-oriented program, the implementation 
remained small-scale and stagnant.  National rather than regional based projects or 
activities have therefore dominated the portfolio for the implementation of the 
Action Plan.  As of 31 December 1992, a total of US $1,911,296 had been 
disbursed from UNEP’s Environment Fund to support twenty eight projects, 
among which nine projects were implemented by the countries participating in the 
Action Plan, thirteen by other UN agencies, five were internal projects 
implemented by UNEP, and one was implemented by the EAS/RCU.72 
A strong and fully staffed EAS/RCU is a critical factor to seek external 
funding and revitalize the implementation of the Action Plan.  However, the work 
of the EAS/RCU has lacked continuity, planning and coherence in the past two 
years.  Dr. Hugh Kirkman, the coordinator of the EAS/RCU (1998-2003), was a 
strong believer that the COBSEA should be terminated, and that its activities 
should be integrated into ASEAN.73  Upon his retiring from the office, the Senior 
Expert, Mr. Yihang Jiang, took over as the interim coordinator (2003-2004), but 
worked for the EAS/RCU only on a half-time basis, and spent his other half time 
working for the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  During 2003-2004, the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project was severely under-staffed; hence Mr. Jiang 
committed more than half of his time to the implementation of the South China Sea 
                                                 
72 UNEP/OCA/EAS IG.4/6.  1993.  Environment Fund and the East Asian Seas Trust Fund: Their 
Contribution and Support to the Development of the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  Tenth Meeting 
of the Co-ordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), Bangkok, 9th –10th July 1993. 
 
73 Interview with Dr. Hugh Kirkman, former Regional Coordinator of EAS/RCU. 
 
 194
Project.74  The EAS/RCU was completely paralyzed upon Mr. Jiang’s leaving the 
office in September 2004 until January 2005, because there was no professional 
staff working for the EAS/RCU for more than four months.  The regional 
coordinator was recruited only in January 2005, with two professionals joining in 
later months, so the office became fully staffed in June 2005.  However, all the 
professionals were recruited from outside the UN system, with no professional 
experience in dealing with the administration, procedures and rules of the UN.  
More importantly, the East Asian Seas Action Plan had a long history of 
development and implementation, involving complex relationships with various 
partners, including governments, other UN agencies, external donors, and regional 
and national institutions.  The current regional coordinator, Ms. Srisuda 
Jarayahband, a former senior official from Royal Thai Government, said her 
biggest problem with the current job was the lack of continuity of work of the 
EAS/RCU.75  This problem is caused mainly by the UNEP internal administration, 
in that UNEP provided no institutional back-up to ensure at least a short period of 
overlap between old and new staff.   
ASEAN continues to exert influence on the future development of the East 
Asian Seas, and its members intend to use it as a political mechanism to promote 
environmental cooperation within the ASEAN political block.  The vast 
geographical coverage of the Action Plan has already imposed a challenge to the 
COBSEA to identify shared or transboundary problems and common interests, but 
                                                 
74 Interview with Mr. Yihang Jiang, fromer Senior Expert of the EAS/RCU and the UNEP/GEF 
South China Sea Project Coordinating Unit.  He left the EAS/RCU to take the post the Project 
Manager of the UNDP/GEF Yellow Seas Project. 
 
75 Interviews with Ms. Srisuda Jarayahband, regional coordinator of the EAS/RCU, who derives her 
statement from her visits to member countries. 
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ASEAN countries are still interested in expanding the COBSEA to invite other 
ASEAN countries to participate in the Action Plan.  In 2003, Dr. Chou Loke Ming, 
hired by UNEP to evaluate the Action Plan and seek government perspectives, 
visited eight member countries and consolidated his recommendations based on the 
visits.  He recommended that attempts should be initiated/continued to invite 
Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and East Timor to join COBSEA.  He outlines the 
reasons, as follows: 
Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar are two ASEAN nations with a 
marine environment that are not members of COBSEA.  Their 
involvement will facilitate the integration of activities and 
collaboration with the AWGCME,76 and improve regional efforts in 
dealing with international waters.  East Timor lies within ASEAN 
seas and should also be involved.77 
 
In the seventeenth COBSEA meeting, March 2004, this recommendation to 
further expand the membership was considered and discussed.  The meeting had an 
extensive debate on the definitions of the geographic area, the “East Asian Seas,” 
and the meaning of ecological “borders.”  Myanmar is not even bordering the East 
Asian Seas, and the proposed expansion is driven by political rather than 
environmental considerations.  Despite the debate, Indonesia strongly supported 
the expansion due to its leadership in ASEAN, with a view to use the COBSEA to 
consolidate and integrate ASEAN marine environmental cooperation.  The 
seventeenth COBSEA meeting report recorded, “the delegate from Indonesia 
suggested, and the meeting agreed that the Secretariat should contact Brunei 
Darussalam to gauge her interest in participating in COBSEA.  The delegate from 
Indonesia also suggested, and the Meeting agreed that at a later stage, the 
                                                 
76 AWGCME is ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment. 
 
77 Chou Loke Ming.  2003.  Review of the East Asian Seas Action Plan and Strategy for Future 
Development.  UNEP (DEC)/EAS IG. 17/8.  p. 15. 
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Secretariat would contact Myanmar and Timor Leste to gauge their interests in the 
programme.”78 
Further expansion of the membership of the Action Plan without due 
consideration to common or transboundary environmental problems will pose 
serious operational challenges for the Action Plan in the future.  One problem that 
has haunted the Action Plan since its 1994 expansion is that countries find it 
difficult to identify shared marine environmental problems in the large 
geographical coverage.  In the light of this, South Korea already indicated in 2003 
the possibility of pulling out of COBSEA as it is more fully involved with the 
North West Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), and that its marine resource systems 
are influenced by processes different to that of the Southeast Asian region.79 
 
COBSEA: Searching for a New Identity  
 Thirty years ago, when UNEP initiated the activities to develop the East 
Asian Seas Action Plan, there were few regional initiatives on marine 
environmental problems; today, the region is thriving with various operational 
projects with large external funding.  Many government officials and scientists 
attribute the growing activities to the initial work of the Action Plan in promoting 
networking, awareness and capacity building in the region in the 1980s.  COBSEA 
is now facing competition from various entities in playing a coordinating role and 
serving as a policy forum.  Some other regional programs are taking on roles and 
convening high level senior officials’ or environmental ministers’ meetings; for 
                                                 
78 UNEP (DEC)/EAS IG. 17/3.  2004.  Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Co-ordinating 
Body on the Seas of East Asia on the East Asian Seas Action Plan.  Seventeenth Meeting of 
COBSEA on the East Asian Seas Action Plan, Bangkok, Thailand, 9th – 11th March 2004. 
 
79 Chou Loke Ming.  2003.  p. 15.  
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example this is the case with ASEAN’s Environment Ministers meeting and 
ASOEN.  Even some regional projects have moved from operations to policy 
consultation with a view to leveraging political support and influence for the 
projects.  The PEMSEA project, for example, has organized its own ministerial 
meetings and various high-level inter-governmental policy meetings.80  In May 
2005 during a COBSEA partner’s workshop, a participant questioned, “is there a 
need for continuing existence of the Action Plan and COBSEA, if their children 
have grown up and matured?”81 
COBSEA has had both technical and political in nature since its 
establishment.82  In its first decade, the roles of COBSEA were quite technical and 
mechanical: reviewing, approving projects, allocating budgets, and evaluating 
projects’ results.  The focal points of COBSEA, however, are high-level 
government officials, who may not have certain technical or environmental 
expertise in the related areas, and are usually not responsible for the 
implementation of projects at the national level.  One of the serious deficiencies of 
the Action Plan’s institutional arrangement is the lack of a forum, which could 
comprehensively examine and analyze the major environmental problems of the 
                                                 
80 The PEMSEA project is the UNDP/GEF Project entitled: “Partnerships in Environmental 
Management for the Seas of East Asia or PEMSEA.”  Twelve countries bordering the East Asian 
Seas participates in this project, i.e. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand and Viet Nam.  See www.pemsea.org. 
 
81 This question was raised by a meeting participant during the First Regional Partners Workshop 
on Regional Coordinating Mechanisms in the East Asian Seas Region, Bangkok, Thailand 9-10 
May 2005. 
82 Interview with Dr. John Pernetta.  He strongly believes that a successful management framework 
for marine environmental cooperation should separate the scientific and technical functions from 
policy and decision-making body, so that the two processes will not mess up and result in fruitless 
discussions.  His idea is reflected in the institutional design for the implementation of the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project. 
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region and recommend actions for consideration of the Action Plan’s policy-
making body (COBSEA).  
Faced with recent challenges to the Action Plan, UNEP initiated two 
workshops to redefine COBSEA’s roles, with a view to identifying a niche for 
COBSEA’s functions.  In March 2004, a technical workshop for regional 
coordination enhancement was organized in Bangkok, Thailand.  The workshop 
generally agreed that there was a need for greater coordination and integration of 
growing activities in the region, and that “COBSEA should change her approach to 
a more policy-driven approach, rather than project-driven.”83 
UNEP has tried to turn COBSEA into a policy forum with a view to 
playing a “coordination” role to enhance its political role and utility.  In May 2005, 
the First Regional Partners Workshop on Regional Coordination Mechanisms in 
the East Asian Seas Region was organized to explore COBSEA’s potential as a 
coordinating mechanism.  The workshop was attended by, representatives from 
fifteen UN agencies, regional programs or projects.  There was a general 
recognition that there was overlapping among regional bodies/projects from both 
the policy and the scientific perspectives.  Meeting participants were divided into 
four groups to explore potential roles and functions of COBSEA for its future 
coordination role.  Different groups had different views; UNEP claimed that there 
was a “general support for COBSEA future direction to be an inter-governmental 
policy forum and COBSEA to be responsible for high level policy coordination of 
                                                 
83 UNEP.  2004.  “Workshop Summary: Technical Workshop for Regional Coordination 
Enhancement, Bangkok, Thailand, March 2004.”  In UNEP (DEC)/EAS IG. 17/3.  Report of the 
Seventeenth Meeting of the COBSEA on the East Asian Seas Action Plan, Bangkok, Thailand, 9-11 
March 2004. 
 199
projects.”84  However, there was no agreement on whether and how to coordinate 
the existing large portfolio of activities in the region.   
 
The Roles of UNEP, ASEAN and Other Member Countries 
UNEP.  The roles of UNEP in the development and implementation of the 
Action Plan have been critical from three aspects: intellectual and technical inputs, 
financial support and institutional support.  These roles are instrumental, enabling 
UNEP to serve as a facilitator for collective action and a catalyst for other regional 
actions. 
UNEP’s intellectual input and coordinating role was of particular and 
decisive importance in the preparatory phase of the action plan.  UNEP took 
overall responsibility for the logistics and administrative arrangements for the 
preparation, consultation, drafting and revision of the text of the Action Plan.  
During the process, UNEP hired regional experts or consultants to draft the Action 
Plan and relevant policy documents, and organize various expert meetings to 
review them.  UNEP has the power to influence the outcomes of the meetings not 
only by directly participating in these meetings and enunciating their technical 
opinions on the text (in most cases their opinions would be well taken by other 
participants), but also by choosing experts to participate in the meeting and 
drafting a meeting agenda.   
UNEP has been the major source of financial support to the East Asian 
Seas Action Plan.  UNEP failed to phase out its financial contributions and the 
Action Plan failed to achieve financial sustainability over a period of more than 
                                                 
84 UNEP (DEC)/EAS 1.  WS.  2005.  Report of the First Regional Partners Workshop in the 
Regional Coordinating Mechanisms in the East Asian Seas Region, Bangkok, Thailand 9-10 May, 
2005. 
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two decades.  In this sense, UNEP did not play a catalytic role as it did in the 
Mediterranean Action Plan.  However, by embedding COBSEA in ASEAN and the 
Action Plan’s providing financial and technical support to ASEAN environmental 
cooperation have promoted ASEAN environmental cooperation both institutionally 
and financially. 
UNEP’s symbolic power as an authoritative international organization also 
helps to draw countries toward multilateral cooperation.  Participation in UNEP 
sponsored activities provides countries with a way to present themselves as 
responsible states addressing regional environmental problems.  Furthermore, for 
newly independent countries, such as Singapore, participation in international 
organizations’ activities is a good way to execute their statehood, acting as equal 
sovereign states to their counterparts in the region. 
UNEP’s influences have had a double-sided effect on the development and 
implementation of the Action Plan.  On the positive side, UNEP has been able to  
secure government support and participation in a relatively easy way, because 
UNEP can claim that this is a program approved by the Governing Council of 
UNEP.  On the negative side, the Action Plan focused on environmental issues that 
were influenced or determined by factors external to the region. The Action Plan 
followed the global trend in addressing marine pollution, which in the 1970s was 
exemplified by a series of major oil spill accidents in the temperate northern 
hemisphere that raised extensive global attention due to their serious impacts on 
the marine environment.  The oil spills problem was not a priority problem in the 
East Asian Seas region except in the Straits of Malacca, in comparison to the rapid 
loss and degradation of coastal habitats in the region.    With the notable exception 
of projects dealing with control of pollution from accidental oil spills, most of the 
 201
other program activities were in the field of environmental assessment (research 
and monitoring) without much real impact on the management of environmental 
problems of the region.”85  The failure to identify regional priorities and shared 
marine environmental problems in the region was probably the main factor causing 
the failure to mobilize strong governmental financial support to the Action Plan. 
The “ASEAN Way” and Its Institutional Impacts.  Embedded in ASEAN 
for nearly a decade, COBSEA inevitably inherited its institutional and procedural 
norms, influencing the form and nature of environmental cooperation in the region: 
an aversion to a legally binding agreement and a preference for working with 
voluntarism.  
The ASEAN states have often facilitated inclusion of all through an 
informal diplomacy that limits obligations and protocol.86  It brings together a 
group of highly disputatious countries for dialogue and discussion.  ASEAN 
provides a forum for member countries to exchange information and enhance trust 
and confidence; hence it promotes regional cooperation on various issues.  In its 
early stage, it was envisaged that the Action Plan would grow to encompass other 
neighboring countries subject to favorable political developments in the region.  A 
legally binding agreement providing the legal framework for the Action Plan was 
seen as a possible impediment to this future expansion of its membership. The 
strong attachment to the principle of “non-interference” and caution in reaching 
any legally-binding agreements, based on a fear of losing some aspect of 
“sovereignty” led to the inability of member countries to reach a regional 
convention based on the East Asian Seas Action Plan.   
                                                 
85 UNEP.  1987.  The East Asian Seas Action Plan: Evaluation of its Development and 
Achievements.  UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 86.   
86 Michael Antolik.  1994.  “The ASEAN Regional Forum: the Spirit of Constructive Engagement.”  
Contemporary Southeast Asia 16: 117-136. 
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The “ASEAN Way” has contributed positively to the successful expansion 
of COBSEA membership, but in contrast it is the main reason that COBSEA has 
failed to reach a legally binding regional convention.  As David Rosenberg 
observed, 
ASEAN serves as a useful forum for promoting economic growth, political 
stability, and social and cultural exchange in the region; however, it is 
sometimes subject to a “lowest-common-denominator” syndrome, whereby 
policies are watered down to satisfy the wishes of members with conflicting 
interests.87 
 
The “ASEAN Way” also contributed to the missing opportunity to address 
some problems in a timely manner.  Meeting participants felt it inappropriate or a 
“transgression” of other countries’ sovereignty by confronting other countries with 
their problems in implementation or pointing out the delay of activities in other 
countries.  This was unfavorable to mutual monitoring and supervision.  For 
example, the most obvious issue was the lowest contribution of the richest country 
to the East Asian Seas Trust Fun.  Singapore, with the highest GDP per capita, had 
been contributing merely $US 1,000 for over a decade. 
ASEAN countries’ participation in the Action Plan was initially driven by 
the need to consolidate the ASEAN identity through UNEP, and strengthen 
environmental cooperation with members of the organization.  As the Action Plan 
developed and expanded to other countries, ASEAN countries have treated it as a 
good opportunity to engage China and other countries, while still promoting 
ASEAN’s cooperation through UNEP. 
Roles of Non-ASEAN Countries.  Non-ASEAN countries in the COBSEA 
are Australia, China and South Korea, and they all joined COBSEA in October 
                                                 
87 David Rosenberg.  1999.  “Environmental Pollution around the South China Sea: Developing a 
Regional Response.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia 21 (1): 118-145. 
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1994.  Australia, as the only developed country, with a strong marine program at 
the national level, should play a more active role in COBSEA.  However, Australia 
has not been a leader in the Action Plan.  Its contribution to the Trust Fund is a 
mere $20,000 per annum.  In 1996, the Australian representative to the twelfth 
meeting of COBSEA indicated that his government would increase its contribution 
to $30,000 only if other countries agreed to increase as well, or at least maintain 
the same level of contribution.  This was a consideration resulting from Australia’s 
support for the implementation of the GPA at the regional level through the Action 
Plan.88  During the thirteenth meeting, Indonesia reduced its contribution by 
$13,000 due to the East Asian financial crisis.  As a result, Australia has not 
increased its contribution up to the present. 
Since joining the Action Plan, Australia has provided some technical 
assistance and capacity building to assist countries in implementing the agreed 
project activities.89  These activities have been on a project and individual basis, 
sometimes coming from the discussions during the COBSEA meeting.  Australia 
has the ability to initiate more systematic and comprehensive capacity building and 
training activities to facilitate the implementation of the Action Plan, and the 
EAS/RCU should find a way to approach and motivate the Australian government 
to secure greater support. 
China, trying to build good neighbor relationships with ASEAN countries 
and realizing that COBSEA is the only intergovernmental body for marine 
environment in the East Asian Seas region (covering the sensitive sea of the South 
China Sea), has demonstrated a great interest in supporting and strengthening 
                                                 
88 UNEP (WATER)/EAS IG. 8/6.  1996.  Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the COBSEA.  Manila, 
Philippines, 3-4 December 1996.  p. 18. 
 
89 For example, Australia supported for the implementation of the regional GPA/LBA. 
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COBSEA.  It is the member country with greatest annual financial contribution to 
the Trust Fund.  Upon joining the Action Plan, China pledged US$15,000 to the 
East Asian Seas Trust Fund.  Two years later China unilaterally decided to increase 
its contribution to the East Asian Seas Trust Fund by doubling its original 
commitment, to $US30,000 per annum starting from 1996.  China’s intent to build 
mutual confidence and trust with the ASEAN countries is demonstrated in the 
Statement made by the Head of Chinese Delegation, Mr. Liu Yukai, as follows: 
“China is in favor of the making out of the East Asia Sea Action 
Plan and the equal cooperation between other countries bordering 
the East Asia Sea within the framework of this Action Plan, for the 
purpose of protection of the marine environment of this region…  
Embracing the sincere and cooperative attitude, China will 
cooperative with all the countries and positively take part in the 
various actions taken for the environmental protection of our region, 
for the end of making contributions to the marine environmental 
protection of this region.”90 
 
China also expressed its concern at the latest dysfunction of the EAS/RCU 
and enunciated the need to strengthen the EAS/RCU, but China has shown 
continuous political support for COBSEA, despite its current challenges and 
problems.  In the seventeenth meeting of COBSEA, China emphasized that 
“COBSEA is an appropriate body, and can and should coordinate activities…”91  
The eighteenth meeting of COBSEA will be hosted by China in Beijing in October 
2005.  China’s support to UNEP activities is also manifested in its leadership in 
implementing the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project, which will be analyzed in 
Chapter 5. 
South Korea’s participation in the COBSEA has been through its 
participation in various regional workshops and meetings.  No projects have been 
                                                 
90 UNEP (WATER)/EAS IG. 8/6.  1996.  Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the COBSEA.  Manila, 
Philippines, 3-4 December 1996. 
 
91 UNEP (DEC)/EAS IG. 17/3.  2004.  p. 7. 
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implemented by South Korea for the region.  The main reason is that South 
Korea’s marine environment is less linked and integrated with the traditional “focal 
area” of the Action Plan — the seas of Southeast Asia.  As South Korea is more 
actively involved in NOWAP, it is now considering withdrawing from its 
membership to become only an observer to the COBSEA.  
 
Conclusion 
In the nearly three decades’ during which the Action Plan has developed, 
UNEP has facilitated regional cooperation by developing and adapting the Action 
Plan to changing regional political dynamics.  UNEP started the Action Plan with a 
smaller geographical coverage that was limited to the regional organization, 
ASEAN, and only pushed for the expansion of the Action Plan when geopolitical 
changes allowed for that. 
This case has demonstrated that UNEP’s roles in regional cooperation 
should be examined in its interactions with regional politics.  In the development 
and implementation of the Action Plan, UNEP’s roles are mostly functional and 
instrumental, providing financial resources and technical assistance, raising 
environmental awareness among the development-minded countries, and building 
institutional and individual capacity for environmental management and studies.   
The political roles of UNEP have been unintended in the following two 
aspects: 1) ASEAN’s consolidation of its own identity and the; 2) confidence and 
trust building among member countries, firstly within ASEAN, and later mainly 
between ASEAN and China.  As a result, the successes and failures of the Action 
Plan have been mixed.  On the one hand, the Action Plan has successfully 
catalyzed marine environmental cooperation in the region.  On the other hand, it 
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failed to achieve financial sustainability, and build a unique “COBSEA identity” 
for its future roles.   
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CHAPTER 5 
MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE  
SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 
In the past fifteen years or so, the South China Sea region has witnessed 
two seemingly conflicting trends:  escalating small-scale conflicts and increasing 
environmental cooperation.  The conflict in the sea attracts great international 
attention since China’s physically entering the occupation of the Spratly Islands 
(see chapter 3).  Since 1990, a series of workshops of an established Informal 
Working Group had been organized by Indonesia with funding from the Canadian 
International Development Agency.  Marine environmental problems were 
identified by this Informal Working Group as one of the most important areas for 
cooperation in the South China Sea.  Various meetings of the Informal Working 
Group considered and discussed the possibilities and implications of marine 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  Building on the success of the 
convening of the informal workshops and experiences of the East Asian Seas 
Action Plan, UNEP further promoted informal marine environmental cooperation 
to formal intergovernmental cooperation; and turned regional policy consultations 
into operational level actions to protect marine environment by developing and 
implementing the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.1   
The approval of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project in 2000 signifies 
the first large-scale multilateral inter-governmental initiative on marine 
environmental protection, involving all major countries of the South China Sea.  
This is the first multilateral inter-governmental initiative signed by China on any 
                                                 
1 The full title of this project is: Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China 
Sea and Gulf of Thailand. 
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issues related to the South China Sea.  With a total of $32 million funding, the 
project aims to reverse the environmental degradation trend in the South China 
Sea, with components including mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass, wetlands, land-
based pollution and fisheries.   
The importance of the signing of this project in 2000 goes much beyond its 
environmental implications.  Environmental cooperation in the South China Sea 
critically hinges on China’s attitude, because China was strongly opposed to any 
efforts to internationalize the South China Sea issue.  Given that China was 
strongly opposed to multilateral cooperation on issues related to the South China 
Sea, its changing attitude towards multilateral environmental cooperation in the 
South China Sea seems puzzling.  More interestingly, during the implementation, 
China has played a leading role in implementing the project, with strong support 
from both the Central Government and local governments and executing agencies.  
How and why did China transform its role from a laggard in multilateral 
environmental cooperation to a leading implementer of the project? 
This chapter surveys the evolution of environmental cooperation; from 
informal to formal intergovernmental cooperation; from policy consultations to 
operational level actions to reverse the trends of marine environmental 
degradation.  It will explore factors that made multilateral environmental 
cooperation possible in such a sensitive and contentious sea area, and how various 
actors behave/act towards that end.  This chapter analyzes the roles of UNEP, 
ASEAN and China in the development of environmental cooperation in the South 
China Sea.  It explores how UNEP leveraged its inductive power to help China to 
re-define its interests and change its attitude towards environmental cooperation in 
the South China See during the negotiation and approval stage of the project, and 
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how UNEP facilitates regional cooperation during the implementation of this 
project. 
The chapter contends that the development of marine environmental 
cooperation was driven less by the seriousness of degradation of the marine 
environment, than by the political and economic needs for further development of 
Sino-ASEAN relationships.  That is, both sides were eager to build strong and 
cooperative relationships with a view to providing a stable political environment 
for further economic exchanges and development.  The escalating conflicts among 
the bordering countries of the South China Sea pose a potential threat to the 
stability and prosperity of the region.  Environmental cooperation provides an ideal 
mechanism for confidence and trust building among the littoral countries of the 
South China Sea.  Both parties perceive UNEP as a neutral and authoritative 
organization through which environmental cooperation can be facilitated.  During 
the process, UNEP applied various strategies to promote environmental 
cooperation among counties bordering the sea, including providing technical 
assistance to and alliance with domestic pro-cooperation factions, fostering the 
maturing of regional epistemic community, and nurturing a regional sense of the 
“South China Sea community.”   
This chapter will therefore start with analyzing China and ASEAN’s 
interests, positions, diplomatic goals and policies towards each other regarding 
South China Sea issues and will provide a political and diplomatic background for 
analyzing their attitudes towards environmental cooperation in the South China 
Sea.  The chapter will then review the development of environmental cooperation 
under the auspices of UNEP, and analyze UNEP’s strategies and roles. 
 
 210
China’s Dual Policies towards the South China Sea 
China’s policy goals and the means to achieve them in Southeast Asia are 
complex and to some degree contradictory.  China’s foreign policy is dictated by 
opposing impulses: one is irredentist while the other seeks to show evidence of a 
responsible country among the community of nations in an increasingly 
interdependent world.  On the one hand, in dealing with issues of sovereignty, the 
Chinese Government does not have wide-ranging diplomatic options other than 
upholding entrenched territorial claims, as indicated by its numerous statements: in 
short, sovereignty issues are not negotiable.2  On the other hand, the Chinese 
government desires stable and peaceful relationships with Southeast Asia so that 
China can concentrate on its domestic economic development and reap the benefits 
from the growing Southeast Asian economies.   
From the first Opium War in 1840 until the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese people suffered from weak governments 
and military forces, which failed to defend the nation from the invasion by Western 
countries and Japan.  The recent history of “blood and tears”3 has resulted in the 
Chinese government jealously defending its sovereignty and independence, which 
the Chinese consider as having cost the efforts of generations to gain, not in an 
easy way.  In the eyes of the nationalists, no Chinese Government can stand firm if 
it does not uphold the country’s claim on its territories.  Territorial claims are 
central to the efforts of re-legitimization of the current Chinese regime now riding 
                                                 
2 You Ji.  1995.  “A Test Case for China’s Defense and Foreign Policies.”  Contemporary Southeast 
Asia.  Vol. 16, No. 4 March 1995: 375-403. 
 
3 The history textbook characterizes the recent history (1840-1949) of China since the Opium War a 
history of Chinese people’s “blood and tears.”  This has been in great contrast of Chinese 
perception of their past history of grandeur and pride in the long civilization, and has encouraged 
generations after the Opium War to seek a road for the nation’s revitalization. 
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high on a surge of nationalism and patriotism.4  The popular irredentist pressure on 
the Chinese government is demonstrated in the popularity of a book called “China 
Can Say No,”5 and more recently evidenced by the “Anti-Japan” demonstrations, 
triggered by Japan’s efforts to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.  
Due to domestic nationalism, the Chinese government cannot compromise on 
territorial disputes, but has to demonstrate its determination to guard the entirety of 
its territory, including the disputed South China Sea.6   
Another factor that might have contributed to the strong Chinese attitude 
towards the issues in the South China Sea is the unique strategic importance of the 
South China Sea to China’s territorial integrity, i.e. the sea’s strategic position 
bordering Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.  China’s claim to the South China Sea 
arises from the desire to consolidate the country’s borders in the modern era and 
promote the integration of Hong Kong and Taiwan with the mainland.  Seen in 
these terms, the issue for China is one of defining the territory of the motherland 
and removing the consequences of the intrusion of Western powers that artificially 
separated areas rightfully belonging to China.7   
Motivated by domestic pressures to act determinedly with respect to the 
issues of sovereignty, the Chinese government has since the mid-1970s undertaken 
a series of steps towards increasing its presence in the South China Sea.  In 1974, 
China occupied the entire Paracel Islands as a consequence of a war with South 
                                                 
4 You Ji.  1995.  “A Test Case for China’s Defense and Foreign Policies.”  Contemporary Southeast 
Asia.  Vol. 16, No. 4: 375-403. 
 
5 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Ben, Gu Qingsheng and Tang Zhengyu.  1996.  Zhongguo 
keyi shuo bu (China Can Say No).  Beijing: Lianhe chubanshe. 
 
6 The pressure on the South China Sea is less than that on the territorial disputes with Japan on the 
sovereignty issue of “Diaoyu Island” in the East China Sea due to historical conflicts with Japan. 
7 Leszek Buszynski.  1992.  “Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security.”  
Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 9): 830-847. 
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Viet Nam.  In March 1988, a confrontation took place between Chinese and 
Vietnamese naval vessels in the Spratly Islands resulting in the sinking of three 
Vietnamese ships and the deaths of 78 Vietnamese navy soldiers.8  In February 
1992, China enacted “The Law of People’s Republic of China on It Territorial 
Waters and Contiguous Areas,” claiming, among other things, all the islets in the 
South China Sea.  Beijing made no effort to disguise its intention to use force to 
oust other claimants if necessary.9  In 1995, Chinese-built structures were 
discovered by the Philippines on Mischief Reef, which was lying 135 miles west of 
Palawan, Philippines. 
On the other hand, since the introduction of the open-door policy in 1978, 
the Chinese leadership has made economic modernization China’s overriding 
national priority.  To facilitate this goal, China needs a peaceful regional 
environment in which to pursue economic reform.  Hence Chinese foreign policy 
towards Southeast Asia has emphasized the importance of economic cooperation 
with other countries.  China has realized that it is not able to act independently in 
the Spratlys.  If it adheres to its economy-in-command foreign policy and accepts 
the benefits of an interdependent world, it has only one choice: a settlement of the 
disputes through peaceful means.  
China has preferred bilateral negotiations to multilateralism, because China 
believes it can exert more influence or pressure in bilateral negotiations with its 
smaller neighbors separately than with a group of them in multilateral forums.  At 
the 22-23 July 1994 meeting of the foreign ministers of ASEAN in Bangkok, 
                                                 
8 The Manila Times.  03 March 2005. 
 
9 See Lee Lai To.  1993.  “ASEAN-PRC Political and Security Cooperation: Problems, Proposals, 
and Prospects.”  Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 11: 1095-1104.  Wayne Bert.  1993.  “Chinese Policies 
and U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia.”  Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3: 317-332. 
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China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen rejected an Indonesian proposal to host 
talks among the claimants, indicating that China is opposed to multilateral talks on 
the Spratlys.10  China’s public position is that while sovereignty over the islands is 
non-negotiable, joint ventures to exploit the natural resources of the area can be 
negotiated on a bilateral basis.  As stated by Craig Snyder, “China believed that if 
the issue were internationalized, international opinion would side with the smaller 
states.” 11  From its perspective, Beijing perceives multilateralism as an attempt to 
encircle China as a threatening rising power and to interfere in its domestic affairs.   
However, the Chinese government also fears being isolated on the issue in 
an international forum, and China could not afford to be left out of a multilateral 
security forum that included the most significant regional states.12  China’s 
suspicions towards multilateralism are reduced when it engages in countries less 
powerful or smaller than itself in a flexible and informal way, for example, China’s 
participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum.  China has perceived the forum as a 
vehicle for “promoting multipolority in the Asia-Pacific to counter America’s 
unipolar status in the post-Cold War world.”13  A United States- or Japanese-led 
arrangement would have been unacceptable to China.  China has made particularly 
                                                 
10 Esmond D. Smith, Jr.  1994.  “China’s Aspiration in the Spratly Islands.”  Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 16 (3): 274-294. 
 
11 Craig A. Snyder.  1997.  “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea.”  
Asian Perspective 21(1).  p. 28. 
 
12 Ralf Emmers.  2001.  “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN 





clear its opposition to extra-regional powers’ participation in discussions on 
resolution of the territorial disputes.14 
Therefore, when the Chinese leadership is pressured by two opposing 
forces, its response is naturally a policy that exhibits a great deal of ambiguity or 
even contradictions: conciliatory foreign policy efforts vis-à-vis an increasing 
military presence in the South China Sea.  China’s policies towards the South 
China Sea are to some extent conflicting.  On the issue of sovereignty, China 
would not compromise due to pressures from both the army and nationalists’ 
views.  With that principle in mind, China has tried to build a cooperative and 
friendly image towards neighboring countries to ensure the economic gains from 
economic integration of the region.  The most important priority in China’s foreign 
policy objectives in Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea is to ensure a 
stable external environment conducive to China’s economic modernization and 
growth.15 
China has two conflicting diplomatic goals towards the South China Sea, 
and at the domestic levels has different domestic alliances in supporting each of the 
two goals.  When a state is split at the national level regarding an issue, a third-
party international player (in this case, UNEP) can play an important role by 
allying with domestic factions to promote the achievement of one diplomatic goal 
in consistence with the goal of the international player. 
                                                 
14 Chen Jie.  1994.  “China’s Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and 
Malaysia.”  Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10: 893-903. 
 
15 Shee Poon Kim.  1998.  “The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking.”  Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 19 (14): 369-387. 
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ASEAN’s Need to Engage China 
In the post-Cold War era, China’s rising power has been the most important 
issue facing ASEAN member countries.  The ASEAN countries are concerned 
about China’s influence in the region with the changing security environment 
following American strategic retreat from the region.  It is obvious that it is not 
possible for ASEAN countries to ignore and contain China, but that they have to 
engage China for regional peace and security reasons.  In the early 1990s, when 
China was attempting to improve relations with its neighbors, to ensure that it 
would enjoy a peaceful international environment, the ASEAN states were also 
considering how to meet the challenge of integrating China into the Asia-Pacific 
community by offering it a reasonable stake and a constructive role in the 
region.”16   
China’s importance to Southeast Asia cannot be over-exaggerated, in 
economic, political and security areas.  In the economic arena, China looms both as 
an opportunity and a challenge to Southeast Asian countries.  Statistics from 
China’s Ministry of Commerce show that since 1990, ASEAN has been the fifth 
largest trade partner of China.  China’s potentially huge markets and investment 
potential can provide abundant business opportunities, although similar export 
products’ structure may pose severe competition to the manufacturing industries of 
the Southeast Asian countries.   Mr. Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General 
of ASEAN, stated, “the opening-up of the Chinese economy not only makes more 
formidable the challenge of China as a competitor of ASEAN for investments and 
export markets.  It also presents a tremendous opportunity, offering a large – in 
                                                 
16 Joseph Y.S. Cheng.  2001.  “Sino-ASEAN Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century.”  
Contemporary Southeast Asia 23 (3): 420-51. 
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many cases, new – market for ASEAN exports, for products of companies 
operating in ASEAN.”17 
In the security arena, the ASEAN countries shared a stand in preferring 
multilateral to bilateral approaches, in dealing with China with respect to the South 
China Sea territorial issues, due to stark differences in national power between 
China and any other claiming countries, because they believe that bilateral talks or 
negotiations lead to results favorable to China.  For example, despite the fact that 
China and the Philippines signed a code of conduct, the Philippines failed to stop 
China from building infrastructures in the Mischief Reef.  In Sino-Viet Nam 
relationships, Viet Nam was at a disadvantage in dealing with China.  In dealing 
with China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, other claimant countries have 
attempted to regionalize the problems, and pushed to include the problem in the 
agendas of regional forums or discussions under the framework of ASEAN.   
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has not only stimulated other 
claimant countries to resort to a regional forum for support, but also has reinforced 
non-claimants’ perception that China is a potentially destabilizing force in pursuit 
of a hegemonic regime in Southeast Asia.  In dealing with issues regarding 
sovereignty and territorial disputes, the ASEAN countries have demonstrated their 
willingness to take a united stand on the issue and indirectly rebuke China.18  
While the South China Sea dispute does not involve all ASEAN members (there 
are four ASEAN claimants—Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Viet Nam), it 
does have an impact on the stability of Southeast Asia and is therefore a concern to 
                                                 
17 Rodolfo C. Severino.  2001.  “ASEAN and China—Partners in Competition”.  Remarks at the 
ASEAN Forum sponsored by the ASEAN Consulates, Guangzhou, China, 9 June 2001. 
 
18 Ian James Storey.  1999.  “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China 
Sea Dispute.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(1): 95-118. 
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all members.  This explains the signing of various declarations on the South China 
Sea by all ASEAN members, regardless of whether they are claimant countries or 
not. 
In the South China Sea disputes, none of the claimants are significant 
competitors in comparison with China in terms of economic and military capability 
if they individually deal with China in a bilateral way.  Both claimant and non-
claimant countries of the South China Sea realize the need to engage China in a 
multilateral form with “rule-based arrangements that provide sufficient incentive to 
constrain hegemonic ambitions”… “to encourage it in the practice of good 
international behavior.”19  The good international behavior may include the non-
use of force to resolve territorial disputes, and commitments to peace and 
cooperation.  It was believed that engaging China in multilateral arrangement 
would “lock China into a network of constraining multilateral arrangements”20, 
which will serve as a soft constraining power against possible aggressive actions of 
China.  Moreover, they may have anticipated that China would find itself isolated 
within the arrangement if it failed to follow a policy of self-restraint.21 
Due to China’s aversion to internationalizing the South China Sea issue, 
and its reluctance to discuss sensitive issues, such as territorial or sovereignty 
disputes in multilateral forums, the Southeast Asian countries have undertaken two 
strategies in engaging China.  First, they started from informal consultation with 
Chinese government officials, experts and researchers in their personal capacity.  
                                                 
19 Ralf Emmers.  2001.  “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia 23 (2): 275-291. 
 
20 Michael Leifer.  1996.  “Truth about the Balance of Power” in the Evolving Pacific Power 
Structure, edited by Derek Da Cunha.  Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  p. 51. 
 
21 ASEAN in its early establishment had an aim to lock Indonesia in a regional framework. 
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Second, less political or sensitive issues were given priority at the beginning.  
Marine environmental protection and scientific research have been one of the most 
prominent issue areas for cooperation among disputing countries.   
In summary ASEAN’s goals and policies towards China pare much in line 
with UNEP’s.  Both parties aim to engage China in multilateral cooperative 
initiative, for different reasons.  ASEAN intends to lock China in a multilateral 
arrangement, to make sure China’s behavior within certain range.  UNEP’s reason 
to engage China is because China’s effect on marine environment in the South 
China Sea is tremendous, and will continue growing due to its economic 
development. 
 
Informal Cooperation: The Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in 
the South China Sea 
Cooperation in the South China started in the form of “informal 
consultation” in 1990, when academics and officials realized that the disputes 
concerning sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys were becoming 
prominent issues that might pose threats to the peace and security of Southeast 
Asia.  Dr. Hasjim Djalal, a former senior Indonesian diplomat, had been among 
those who foresaw the possible escalation of a dangerous situation, and had 
conceived of the possibility of convening informal meetings to discuss the issues 
of sovereignty and jurisdiction.22  In view of difficult and sensitive territorial 
issues, it was believed that informal approaches would be better, at least during the 
early stage, to facilitate communications among disputing countries, enhance the 
                                                 
22 Hajim Dijala and Ian Townsend-Gault.  1999.  “Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea.”  In Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, 
Crocker, Hampson and Aall editors, United States Institute of Peace Press. 
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confidence and trust of countries in the region, and prevent small-scale conflicts 
from escalating to regional conflicts.   
A series of informal workshops on the South China Sea were organized by 
Indonesia under the framework of the project entitled “Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea” between 1990 and 1999, with financial support 
from the Canadian International Development Agency.  The purpose of the 
workshops was not to resolve the disputes but to develop confidence-building 
measures in the region and to establish precedents for cooperation among the 
South China Sea littoral states that would facilitate a peaceful resolution.  The 
participants of the workshops comprised of government and military officials, 
academics, and scientists from each of the claimant state and other ASEAN 
countries, participating in the workshops in their “personal capacity.”  Participants 
were invited to make statements regarding jurisdiction over the Spratlys and 
Paracels, but no discussions were allowed.  The informality meant that participants 
attended these workshops in their “personal capacity”, and statements made during 
the meeting did not represent government perspectives, and should not be used to 
justify political claims or policies.   
The project had two objectives: first, to manage the potential conflicts by 
seeking an area in which everyone could cooperate; second, to develop confidence 
building measures or processes so that the various claimants would be comfortable 
with one another, thus providing a conducive atmosphere for the solution of their 
territorial or jurisdictional disputes.23  The assumption of the project was that 
talking in any form is better than lack of communication, and will eventually 
                                                 
23 Hajim Dijala and Ian Townsend-Gault.  1999.  “Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea.”  In Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, 
Crocker, Hampson and Aall editors, United States Institute of Peace Press. 
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contribute to trust and confidence building among the littoral countries, which 
would eventually lead to the peaceful solution of the territorial disputes.   
The informal South China Sea Working Group was established, and held 
annual meetings between 1990 and 1999.  During the ten years’ period, thirty-two 
meetings were convened under the aegis of the workshop process.  During the 
process, considerable confidence and trust was built among the meeting 
participants, who then brought the cooperative spirit back to their countries.   
The first informal South China Sea workshop was held in 1990 in Bali, 
Indonesia, exclusively attended by ASEAN participants.  In preparing the second 
workshop, ideas had been brought that Mainland China and Taiwan24 should be 
included in view of the fact that they have claims in the South China Sea, and they 
also occupied some parts of the area.  This would not have been possible if the 
forum was a “formal” one mainly due to China’s concerns that the South China 
Sea issues should not be “internationalized”, and that China would discuss the 
problems with its neighboring countries directly and bilaterally, not through a third 
party or in a multilateral forum.25  It is Mainland China’s practice of foreign 
diplomacy that there is only “one China” in the international arena, and that China 
should be represented by, the People’s Republic of China.  The Republic of China 
(Taiwan) should be excluded from any formal inter-governmental forums or 
meetings.  The “informality” of the workshop process and the fact that individuals 
participate in the workshops in their “personal capacity” enabled the inclusion of 
                                                 
24 It is in the official view of the Mainland China that Taiwan is an inseparable part of People’s 
Republic of China.  Currently Taiwan is governed by the Republic of China, which had governed 
the entire China before it was expelled by the communist movement.  Here in this chapter, Taiwan 
is mentioned as a geographical area, not with political implications. 
 
25 Hajim Dijala and Ian Townsend-Gault.  1999.  “Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea.”  In Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, 
Crocker, Hampson and Aall editors, United States Institute of Peace Press. 
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participants from both Mainland China and Taiwan.  By the second workshop in 
Bandung in 1991, China, Viet Nam, Laos and Taiwan were already able to attend 
the workshop.   
The only goal of the workshops that the organizers claimed was to provide 
a forum for countries in dispute to sit together and freely exchange ideas.  Later 
developments showed that the initiator and funding agency of the workshops did 
wish the informal consultations and confidence building would result in some 
formal or legal agreements for the resolution of the South China Sea issues.26 
Form of Cooperation.  Far from removing the process from the attention of 
senior officials, the “informality” allowed such officials to attend and participate in 
the meetings.  The participants in the informal workshops were high-level 
government officials, researchers, academics or even military personnel.  Despite 
the fact that they participated in the workshops in their personal capacity, the 
workshops attracted wide attention due to the seniority of the participants in their 
respective fields.  Most of the informal workshops, for example, were opened by 
His Excellency Ali Alatas, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia.  High-level 
participation from countries also ensured that meeting results were brought back 
directly to the senior government officials in their home countries. 
The informal nature of the workshop opened doors for all claimants of the 
South China Sea, regardless of their international standing because it is the only 
channel where Mainland China and Taiwan can sit together and address common 
maritime issues.  The informal procedure of the workshop process is probably the 
only way to engage various actors.  Moreover, the discussions and ideas could flow 
                                                 
26 Tom Nass.  2001.  “Environmental Cooperation around the South China Sea; the Experience of 
the South China Sea Workshops and the United Nations Environment Programme’s Strategic 
Action Programme.”  The Pacific Review, Vol. 14: 553-573. 
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more freely in an informal context while in a more formal meeting participants 
would be greatly constrained by the policies of their respective governments. 
Issues/areas of Cooperation.  Various areas of possible cooperation were 
discussed, and those technical and scientific issues were identified as potential 
areas for future cooperation.  Identified issues included protection of the marine 
environment, political and strategic issues, safety of navigation, marine scientific 
research, and territorial disputes, including the dispute over the Spratlys and 
Paracels, and institutional mechanisms for cooperation.  On the Spratlys and 
Paracels, in view of the extremely sensitive nature of the disputes, each participant 
was given only five minutes to express his or her views without entering into 
discussion.   
By the third workshop in 1992, a decision had been made by the working 
group to establish two Technical Working Groups, one on marine scientific 
research and the other on resource assessment and means of development.  As the 
informal workshops identified more technical issues for cooperation, three other 
Technical Working Groups were formed to discuss cooperation on these issues, 
including marine environmental protection, safety of navigation and 
communication, and legal matters.  The outputs and results of these Technical 
Working Groups were reported to the annual informal working group meetings. 
The Role of Canada and Indonesia.  The Informal South China Sea 
Working Group was financially supported by the Canadian International 
Development Agency between 1990 and 2001, which was the only external actor 
that had funded the initiation and development of activities under the framework of 
the informal working group.  Canada withdrew its funding in 2001, because littoral 
countries of the South China Sea were weary of “external funding with political 
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strings attached,”27 after which the region failed to secure funding to continue the 
activities.  
Canada’s role in mediating and financing the cooperative activities in the 
contentious South China Sea stemmed from two facts.  First, Canada has a well-
demonstrated interest in ocean affairs.  It is one of largest ocean country in the 
world in terms of its coastline, depending on how one does the computation.  
Second, Canada was considered as a politically neutral country by the littoral 
countries of the South China Sea.  It has maintained relatively friendly 
relationships with all littoral countries, without any history of conflict or negative 
involvement in regional affairs.  While countries such as Australia, Japan, Russia, 
the United States, and others might be expected to have played a role in financing 
and promoting regional cooperation, for a number of political reasons they are 
effectively barred from doing so.  Each of these countries has had bilateral 
relationships with different countries in the region, and a historical engagement in 
some countries to balance others in the region.  Hence none of them could be 
trusted by all littoral countries to engage fairly in the regional process. 
Indonesia has no claim to the any of the islands of the Spratly, hence is 
strictly speaking an “external player” as far as the Spratly dispute is concerned.28  
As the leading member of ASEAN, however, its influence is critical in the region.  
The escalating of the conflicts in the sea would have direct impact on overall 
regional security, and directly link with Indonesia’s national security and stability.  
                                                 
27 Karsten von Hoesslin.  “Informal Dialogue on the South China Sea Works to Singapore’s 
Advantage”, originally submitted to the Straits Times. 
 
28 Bjorn Moller.  2002.  “The Military Aspects of the Disputes.”  In War or Peace in the South 
China Sea, Timo Kivimaki ed., Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 
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Indonesia was the organizer of these workshops, and had lent great political 
support to the organization of these workshop meetings. 
China’s Participation.  China’s participation in the Informal Workshop 
meetings was largely driven by the need to build good relationships with its 
neighboring ASEAN countries in 1990.  After the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
incident, China was sanctioned by major western powers, and its diplomacy with 
the western countries plunged into a low point.  The response from the ASEAN 
countries was muted and “rational”, especially when compared with that of the 
West, and this was greatly appreciated by Beijing in view of various domestic and 
international problems in the aftermath of that event.29  At the beginning, China 
had been extremely cautious since it was organized by Indonesia which had 
suspended its relationship with China for more than two decades. 
China’s participation in the informal workshop meetings was entirely 
facilitated by the “informal” form of cooperation.  It provided an opportunity for 
the Chinese government to interact with and understand its neighboring countries 
after long-time diplomatic break.  After several years’ involvement of the Chinese 
government officials, experts and scholars in the workshop meetings, they found 
that “ASEAN countries aren’t that scary, and that people are fairly reasonable.”30  
By mid-1990s, China was fully engaged in various meetings of ASEAN.  The 
relationship built through the workshop process helped the later development 
formal environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
                                                 
29 See Lee Lai To.  1991.  “Domestic Changes in China since the 4 June Incident and Their 
Implications for Southeast Asia.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia 13(1): 35-42. 
 
30 Interview with Professor Huang Zhengguang. 
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The Development of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project 
Building on the trust and confidence gained through the Informal South 
China Sea Working Group, the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project has made 
path-breaking progress in formalizing regional marine environmental cooperation 
in the South China Sea, and undertaking substantive cooperative activities to 
address marine environmental problems.  Following the Informal Working Group 
activities, UNEP initiated the development of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project in 1996, the first intergovernmental project involving all major South 
China Sea littoral countries.  Seven countries bordering the sea participated in the 
preparation and development of this project, including Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.  The other two littoral 
countries, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, are non-participants because they are 
not eligible for funding from the Global Environment Facility.  The 
implementation of the project started in early 2002, and the project should be 
completed by the end of 2007. 
The preparation and approval of the project took unusually lengthy time, 
mainly due to China’s refusal to sign the project.  Considering strong Chinese 
aversion to internationalizing the South China Sea issue, and formalizing any 
forums for the South China Sea, the fact that UNEP successfully put the words of 
“South China Sea” in the project document indicated a significant achievement 
towards formal, multilateral, inter-governmental environmental management in the 
South China Sea.   
The UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project is one of the largest marine 
environment projects of the GEF, with a total funding of over US$ 32 million 
(Table 5.1).  The project is funded by the Global Environment Facility, the 
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financial mechanism to address global environmental problems, and is 
implemented by UNEP to “develop regionally co-ordinated programmes of action 
designed to reverse environmental degradation particularly in the area of coastal 
habitat degradation and loss, halt land-based pollution and address the issue of 
fisheries over-exploitation.”31  The project has four major components, namely: 
habitat degradation and loss, over exploitation of fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand, 
land-based pollution and project co-ordination and management. 
Table 5.1.  UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project Budget Summary and 
Component Financing (million $US).32 
 
Co-financing Grand Project Activities GEF 
Governments Other Sources Total 
1. Habitat Degradation & Loss     
1.1 Mangroves 2.733 2.374 1.585 6.692 
1.2 Non-oceanic Coral Reefs 2.587 2.326 1.560 6.473 
1.3 Seagrass 2.529 2.305 1.585 6.419 
1.4 Wetlands 0.975 0.400 0.082 1.457 
2. Over-exploitation of fisheries in 
the Gulf of Thailand 
1.650 0.735 0.960 3.345 
3. Land-based Pollution 1.760 0.461 0.110 2.331 
4. Project Co-ordination and 
Management 
3.580 0.294 0.505 4.379 
EA Overheads 0.600   0.600 
Project Total 16.414 8.895 6.622 31.931 
PDF-B 0.335 0.176 0.076 0.587 
Grand Total 16.749 9.071 6.698 32.518  
 
The project document outlines the overall goals of the project as follows: 
“to create an environment at the regional level, in which collaboration and 
partnership in addressing environmental problems of the South China Sea, between 
all stakeholders, and at all levels is fostered and encouraged; and to enhance the 
capacity of the participating governments to integrate environmental 
                                                 
31 See UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project: www.unepscs.org. 
 




considerations into national development planning.”33  In the medium term, the 
project aims to “elaborate and agree at an intergovernmental level, the Strategic 
Action Programme (SAP) encompassing specific targeted and costed actions for 
the longer-term, to address the priority issues and concerns. More specifically the 
proposed activities are designed to assist countries in meeting the environmental 
targets specified in the framework SAP that was developed over the period 1996-
1998.”34 
The Formulation of the Project. The UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project 
was the brainchild of Dr. John Pernetta, one of the most respected international 
waters specialists in the Global Environment Facility system.35  When Pernetta was 
recruited to the UNEP Division of the Global Environment Facility in early 199636 
as the Senior Programme Officer of International Waters, he was asked to develop 
an International Waters portfolio for UNEP to secure funding from the Global 
Environment Facility.  Pernetta had been actively formulating and seeking project 
ideas and concepts in various regional seas, and the East Asian Seas were one of 
the geographical areas.  The existing Regional Seas Programs served as a 
convenient forum to develop multi-country large marine projects, and obtain 
governmental approvals. 
                                                 
33 UNEP.  2001.  Project Document for the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  
www.gefweb.org.  p. 4. 
 
34 Ibid.  p. 4-5. 
 
35 Interviews with UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and GEF Secretariat officials between 2001 and 
2005. 
 
36 At that time the Division was merely a small office of five people within the Office of the 
Executive Director of UNEP. 
 
 228
The original project concept was driven and shaped by the policy 
preferences and funding priorities of the potential donor, the GEF.37  Starting in 
1996, UNEP took the initiative to develop a regional project to address marine 
environmental problems in the East Asian Seas, under the framework of the UNEP 
East Asian Seas Action Plan.  However, the Global Environment Facility does not 
fund UNEP regional seas programmes, action plans or conventions; hence UNEP 
had to develop a project independent of the thematic and geographic scope of the 
East Asian Seas Action Plan for GEF funding.  The East Asian Seas Action Plan 
covers a vast geographical area with a diversity of environmental problems; in 
contrast the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand contain a reasonably contiguous 
geographical area with common resources and problems that are more amenable to 
substantive environmental cooperation.   
The eleventh meeting of the COBSEA (see chapter four) decided to 
develop a project proposal on marine biodiversity of the East Asian Seas region. 
During the twelfth meeting of the COBSEA, in Manila, 3-4 December 1996, 
Pernetta briefed the meeting on the draft proposal for a project Development and 
Preparation Facility (PDF) Block B Grant which had been cleared by the GEF 
Secretariat subject to the endorsement of participating member countries.  The 
government delegates reviewed, discussed and endorsed the PDF proposal to 
prepare a project document to request GEF grant assistance.  The preparation 
activities for the development of a regional marine project in the South China Sea 
officially commenced following that approval.   
The PDF grant was provided by the GEF to support countries to develop a 
full project for funding of the GEF.  GEF funding for international waters required 
                                                 
37 Interviews with UNEP and GEF officials during 2002-2005. 
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the development of a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) and a regional 
Strategic Action Programme (SAP).  The TDA is a document outlining 
transboundary environmental problems at the regional level, and identifying 
regional priorities or problems based on common national priorities or problems.  
The TDA identifies major regional problems, causes of these problems and 
possible actions to address the major problems by preventing or eliminating the 
causes.  The TDA served as fundamental justifications for GEF interventions and 
government actions to address the problems.  In order to address the problems 
identified by the TDA, an SAP was also developed to specify the actions needed to 
address them. 
The TDA/SAP Process.  The process of developing a TDA and an SAP in 
the region is a process of reaching a common regional understanding of 
environmental problems, their causes, and impacts, and of identifying priority 
actions or interventions to address them.  The TDA of the South China Sea and its 
associated catchments areas is a process that focuses on identifying water-related 
problems and concerns, their socio-economic root causes, and the sectoral 
implications of actions needed to mitigate them. The analysis further seeks to 
determine which issues have transboundary (that is, multicountry) dimensions, 
causes and/or impacts, appropriate mitigation of which will have to be done on a 
regional or bilateral basis. The analysis then becomes the basis for a SAP, which is 
coordinated at both the national and regional levels.38 
Following the twelfth meeting of the COBSEA, national coordination 
committees were identified and formed through the initiative of the UNEP national 
                                                 
38 Liana Talaue-McManus.  2000.  Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the South China Sea.  
EAS/RCU Technical Report Series No. 4.  UNEP, Bangkok, Thailand. 
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focal points in each of the seven countries. Headed by a coordinator, each national 
committee was asked to prepare a country report that would provide a country-
based analysis of water-related problems and concerns. To brief the seven 
coordinators, a first meeting was held in March 1997, during which the outline of 
the country reports was prepared and accepted by the group.  National committees 
were charged with the responsibilities to identify national priority marine 
problems, which then served as the raw data for the formulation of the TDA and 
identification of priority actions to be included in the SAP.  Two Task Managers 
were hired to take responsibility in consolidating the data and information, for the 
formulation of the TDA and SAP, i.e. Professor Liana Talue-McManus for the 
TDA and Mr. Charit Tingsabadh for the SAP.   
To reach a common understanding among seven participating countries 
regarding priority marine environmental problems should not be taken for granted, 
and neither was it an easy process.  This was mainly due to the lack of data and 
information in some countries, and the compatibility of data and information 
collected at the national level.  UNEP took an interactive process between regional 
and national levels to formulate a regional TDA and SAP.  Regional meetings of 
national coordinators for the formulation of a TDA and a SAP for the South China 
Sea were convened, to agree on the regional format to collect national data and 
information, adopt regional guidelines to develop the TDA and SAP, and reach 
common understanding on certain concepts and frameworks critical for the 
formulation of the TDA and SAP, such as the meaning of “transboundary” 
environmental problems, and the procedures to conduct a “causal chain analysis.”  
National coordinators, attending regional meetings, would then bring those 
regionally agreed formats and requirements back to their national committees, and 
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collect data and information as agreed at the regional level.  Data and information 
collected at the national levels were then consolidated, at the regional level, by 
UNEP.   
During the first meeting of the national coordinators for the formulation of 
the SAP and TDA, it was noted that the term “transboundary” could have a number 
of interpretations depending upon the scale at which a particular problem was 
analyzed or managed.  Extensive discussions had been undertaken during various 
regional meetings, and consensus had been reached that “transboundary” problems 
refer to those problems that have impacts beyond a certain political and 
administrative unit, within or even beyond the region.  Mangrove loss, for 
example, was considered a transboundary environmental problem, because the 
driving force of the mangrove loss, the high global demand for shrimps, lies 
outside the region.  In teaching the members that a seemingly local problem can 
have a transboundary nature, UNEP often used an example to link the increased 
tourism in Mediterranean and the mangrove degradation in the South China Sea. 
The extensive tourism in Mediterranean increased the global consumption of 
seafood, resulting in increased demand and hence the world price of seafood, 
including shrimps, which then contributed to the conversion of mangrove areas 
into shrimp aquaculture ponds in the South China Sea coastal areas.  It was agreed 
that “transboundary” environmental problems refer to those problems that have 
causes from or impacts on human beings or natural environment outside of the 
national jurisdiction.   
The analysis of the chain of cause-and-effect relationships was intended to 
lead from the identified environmental issue or problem to root causes lying in the 
social, economic or cultural spheres of human activity.  Such an analysis thus 
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provides guidance concerning the nature of the actions that could be undertaken in 
executing the Strategic Action Programme, and the economic sectors in which 
remedial action or change was required. 
UNEP’s influences on regional priorities and causal-chain analysis stem 
from the fact that UNEP provided the format for the collection of data and 
information, and the procedures of causal chain analysis.  In the outline and 
contents for national reports, provided by UNEP task manager based on her own 
expertise and experience in the region, four types of marine water-related concerns 
and issues were given as an example in the outline, including pollution, freshwater 
shortage and degradation of its quality, exploitation of living aquatic resources and 
modification of aquatic habitats.39  All national reports therefore collected data and 
information on those four types of problems.   Issues under each type of the 
problems were then ranked at the regional level, with the preliminary ranking 
scores. 
The data sources of the TDA include the national reports and existing 
knowledge on the marine environmental status of the South China Sea.  The 
document covers 97 cities and 122 rivers with a total catchment area of about 
2,400,000 km2.40  Based on national reports and regional consultation, marine 
environmental problems were prioritized in the TDA (Table 5.2). 
                                                 
39 See Annex VII of UNEP(WATER)/EAS/SCS/NCM.1/3.  1997.  Report of the First Meeting of 
National Coordinators for the Formulation of a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and 
Preliminary Framework of a Strategic Action Programme for the South China Sea.  Bangkok, 
Thailand, 31 March – 4 April 1997. 
 
40 UNEP (Water)/EAS/SCS/NCM.3/3.  1998.  Report of the Third Meeting of the National 
Coordinators for the Formulation of a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and a Strategic Action 
Programme for the South China Sea, Bangkok, Thailand, 15-17 November 1998. 
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Table 5. 2.  Preliminary ranking of major concerns and principal issues for 
the South China Sea 
Major Concerns Score Rank Principal Issues Score Rank 
Habitat 18.5 1 Mangroves    21 1 
   Coral Reef    20 2 
   Seagrasses    17 6 
   Estuaries    16 7 
Over exploitation 17.5 2 Marine    19 3 
   Freshwater    16 7 
Pollution 14 3 Sewage    19 3 
   Freshwater 
Contamination 
17.5 5 
   Agricultural loading    15 9 
   Industrial Waste    15 9 
   Sedimentation    14 11 
   Solid Waste    13 12 
   Hydrocarbon    12 13 
   Ship-based sources    12 13 
   Atmospheric 8.5 16 
Freshwater concerns 9 15    
Source: Liana Talaue-McManus.  2000.  Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the South China 
Sea.  EAS/RCU Technical Report Series No. 4.  UNEP, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
The ultimate goal of the Strategic Action Programme is to halt or slow the 
current rate of environmental degradation and as such it contains priority actions 
that must be undertaken at both national and regional levels to address 
transboundary problems identified in the TDA.41  It is designed to assist 
participating states in taking actions individually or jointly within their respective 
policies, priorities and resources, which will lead to the prevention, reduction, 
control and/or elimination of the causes of degradation of the marine and 
freshwater environment.  The general objectives of the SAP are: 1) Formulation of 
principles, approaches, measures, timetables and priorities for action; 2) 
Preparation of a priority list for intervention and investments; 3) Detailed analysis 
of expected baseline and additional actions needed to resolve each transboundary 
                                                 
41 See UNEP (UNEP/SCS/Ver.3).  1999.  Strategic Action Programme for the South China Sea.  
Laurence Mee.  2004.  International Waters Programme Study.  www.gefweb.org. 
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priority problem; 4) Identification of the elements and preparation of guidelines for 
the formulation of national action plans for the protection of the marine 
environment and rational use of marine and coastal resources consistent with the 
regional SAP;  5) Foster the involvement of regional and, where appropriate, 
national Non-Governmental Organizations and the private sector in the 
implementation of the SAP; 6) Foster collaboration and co-operation between all 
regional entities having interests in the environment of the South China Sea in an 
attempt to reduce or eliminate duplication of effort and waste of scarce human and 
financial resources.42 
Although the entire process to collect data and information, consolidate, 
and rank the issues took nearly two years from 1997 to 1999, political struggles 
among the participating countries had been limited during the formulation of the 
project due to the following two reasons.  First, the sensitive sovereignty issue had 
not been brought, because all the participants attending regional meetings and 
undertaking national activities were mainly scientists and experts, with less 
attention to political or sovereignty issue.  They may vary in their views of the 
seriousness of some issues, but since each country only providing the information 
and data of its own coastline bordering the South China Sea.  Individual members 
therefore basically had authority to the information they collected regarding the 
status of environmental problems in their countries’ coastline.  Second, all the 
participants shared an important goal to secure GEF funding, therefore treat the 
TDA/SAP as a procedure to secure GEF funding rather than make countries’ 
                                                 
42 UNEP (UNEP/SCS/Ver.3).  1999.  Strategic Action Programme for the South China Sea. 
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commitments.43  In the formulation of the TDA, UNEP’s views had been given 
particular attention by members because of its access to the information and 
expertise on GEF funding requirement.  For example, some countries indicated that 
land-based pollution should be more important issues than coastal habitats, but 
UNEP’s arguments were that land-based pollution had less global significance than 
the tropical marine biodiversity in the region.44  To meet the requirement of GEF, a 
draft framework SAP was endorsed by the participating countries, but no final 
draft had been adopted.  Therefore, there was no formal or legal binding effects of 
the SAP on the participating countries.  It was agreed that this SAP would be 
finalized and approved by all participating countries upon the completion of the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.   
Despite the lengthy process to develop a TDA and an SAP among seven 
participating countries, the process has proved to be valuable since it provided a 
solid foundation for governments’ understanding of the project, and further built 
necessary trust among participating countries for the successful implementation of 
the project.  This process is particularly important to facilitate regional cooperation 
in a highly contentious region.  During the process of forging a common 
understanding of issues and causes, UNEP played a critical role in providing 
technical information and intellectual support in the causal chain analysis.  
UNEP’s power stems from the operational details, including the provision of 
format or outline for regional needs of data and information, consolidation of the 
data, interpreting GEF policies and drafting the regional TDA/SAP.  Once 
                                                 
43 To meet the requirement of GEF, a draft framework SAP was endorsed by the participating 
countries, but no final draft had been adopted.  It was agreed that this SAP would be finalized and 
approved by all participating countries upon the completion of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project. 
 
44 Interview with Henk Uktolseya, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Environment, Indonesia. 
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countries made a commitment to tackle the problems through a certain scientific or 
technical procedure, UNEP leveraged its position via its expertise on this 
procedure. 
Project Document of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project. 45   The 
project document was drafted in 1999.  It outlines activities to address three 
priority marine environmental problems identified in the TDA, forming the three 
major components of the project, specifically habitat degradation and loss, over 
exploitation of fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand, and land-based pollution.  Among 
the three components, habitat degradation and loss is the most important 
component of the project, and fisheries and land-based pollution components focus 
on activities related to coastal habitats.  In fisheries component, a main task was to 
identify and protect important feeding and nursery grounds of fisheries, and land-
based pollution component focuses on impacts on habitats. 
Actions addressing habitat degradation and loss are detailed under four sub-
components addressing the four priority habitats, i.e. mangroves, coral reefs, 
seagrass, and wetlands, in the region. Activities within each sub-component 
include the following: establishment or revitalization of National Committees or 
technical working groups, to review national data on biodiversity; management; 
restoration and development activities impacting each habitat; research and 
publications; economic evaluation; institutions and legislation; and development of 
compatible, inter-linked national systems for regional data management.  These 
preparatory actions will provide the background against which to prioritize sites for 
interventions and actions, and develop or update national management plans, 
                                                 
45 See UNEP.  2001.  UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project Document.  p. 5. 
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including required legislation, in order to maintain nationally important habitat 
areas. 
The fisheries component focuses on transboundary fisheries issues in the 
Gulf of Thailand.  Activities include: protection of endangered fisheries species; 
evaluation and testing of a prototype blast fishing detection system, the 
development and implementation of a program to provide information on fish 
stock conservation and sustainable fishery practices to fishing communities, the 
promotion of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries through national 
and regional workshops, and the establishment of a system of refugia to maintain 
important transboundary fish stocks in the Gulf of Thailand based on marine 
protected areas identified as critical habitats for fish stock conservation and 
protection. 
Land-based pollution component addresses the major problem of land-
based pollution through an initial review of national standards and controls, and an 
examination of actions required to: harmonize such standards at a regional level; 
review and assess existing knowledge of regional water quality, determine 
information gaps, evaluate carrying/assimilation capacity of sub-regions and 
sensitive ecosystems and transboundary movements of contaminants within the 
South China Sea; produce guidelines/action programs for implementation of the 
GPA/LBA adopted in 1995 at an intergovernmental conference in Washington, 
DC; and prepare guidelines for the development of national management plans, 
including capacity building; legislation, and other appropriate components to 
achieve the agreed water quality objectives; review national capacity to test, 
monitor, control and enforce water quality and effluent standards and to develop 
and finalize national and regional management plans to reach specified objectives; 
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and to initiate capacity building activities and demonstration projects addressing 
specific pollutants of global, regional and transboundary significance. 
 
Negotiation Process for the Project: Changing China’s Attitude 
In January and February of 1999, the UNEP/GEF Division, along with 
EAS/RCU, prepared the project brief.  The project brief was dispatched to the GEF 
National Operation Focal Points of the participating countries for written 
endorsement in March 1999.  Thanks to the long-term consultation and 
cooperation in the process of TDA and SAP, six countries sent their endorsement 
letter within one month.  Initially, China was expected to send its endorsement in 
April 1999, prior to the thirteenth GEF Council, 5th – 7th May 1999.   
The project was included in the Work Program of the GEF Council on 
March 27th, 1999, subject to the receipt of endorsement by China.  In order to 
facilitate China’s endorsement of the project, on April 26th, 1999, the Deputy 
Executive Director of UNEP visited China and met with Deputy Minister of the 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), and was informed that 
China disagreed with the project proposal to be submitted to the GEF Council.  
Hence, the project proposal was withdrawn from the GEF Work Program 
immediately before the start of the Council meeting in April 1999.   
During the Council meeting in Washington DC, Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf and 
Dr. Pernetta, the Director and Deputy Director of the UNEP DGEF, held an 
informal discussion with the Chinese delegate and Mr. Zhang Shengman, the Vice 
President of the World Bank, to seek the Chinese government’s perspectives and 
the reasons why China refused to approve the project.  The initial response from 
the Chinese delegate was very strong and negative, giving an impression that 
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China would never undertake multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea.  
Despite China’s intention to oppose the project, UNEP’s stand was firm with 
strong support from UNEP senior management.  During the discussion, Djoghlaf 
and Pernetta took a strategy to play respectively as a “soft” and “hard” negotiator.  
Djoghalf stressed the importance of China’s participation, and expressed UNEP’s 
wish for China’s support and participation; while Pernetta acted as a hard-line 
negotiator and informed the delegate that the project would go ahead, with or 
without China’s participation, despite the fact that China was such an important 
player.46  After the discussion, there was a slight softening of the Chinese 
government perspective, and Mr. Zhang informed UNEP that China would 
reconsider the decision.  Following the GEF Council meeting and Washington 
discussion, UNEP initiated and undertook a lengthy and tedious negotiation 
process lasting more than one and one-half years with the Chinese government.   
China’s State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) played an important 
role within Chinese domestic politics to change the government’s attitude.  SEPA 
is the “window agency” of UNEP,47 and as such would be responsible for the 
implementation of the project.  All the funding of the project would be remitted to 
SEPA, which would greatly strengthen SEPA’s weak marine program.  However, 
even within SEPA, there were different voices and opinions about the project, and 
opposition to the project got stronger after the objection by the Ministry of Foreign 
                                                 
46 Interview with Dr. John Pernetta. 
 
47 In China, the Central Government designates a “window agency” for each IO.  The “window 
agency” of an IO deals with activities related to that IO.  For example, the Ministry of Finance is 
the “window agency” of the World Bank and IMF and SOA is for IMO. 
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Affairs (MFA) to the approval of the project.48  Within SEPA, the Department of 
International Cooperation (DIC) is responsible for approving and monitoring all 
international projects; while the Office for Marine Environmental Protection 
(OMEP) is responsible for substantive issues of the project, including scientific 
and technical issues and the preparation and development of the project.  OMEP 
officials have a great interest in participating in the project; most of them have a 
scientific background and a keen concern about the impending environmental 
issues, with less consideration regarding the political sensitivity of the region.  
More importantly, the funding, technical and scientific benefits from the project 
would greatly increase the capacity of the office.  DIC, in contrast, did not deal 
with marine problems directly, and DIC officials simply did not want to create any 
problems for their work in the future due to the sensitivity and uncertainty of the 
project. OMEP officials, however, knew that DIC’s concerns could be eliminated 
if the MFA could be persuaded to approve the project. 
The main political obstacle to the approval of the project was from the 
MFA and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA).  MFA’s objection was based 
on the consideration of traditional foreign policy towards the South China Sea.  
SOA’s objection was purely a result of inter-agency conflict and competition for 
domestic and international influences.49  SOA, the major government agency in 
dealing with marine environment, did not wish to see its political influence area 
                                                 
48 Interview with Mr. Tong Yu, Director, Office for Marine Environmental Protection, SEPA  and 
Professor Huang Zhengguan, Senior Engineer, South China Institute of Environmental Science, 
SEPA (April 2005) 
49 SEPA and SOA have traditional strife over their jurisdictional powers.  As one government 
official has put it, “SEPA and SOA follow two ‘whatever’ principles in dealing with one another.  
Whatever SEPA agrees or supports, SOA would disagree, and whatever SEPA disagree, SOA 
would agree, and vice versa.” (Interview, December 2004).  Although this might have exaggerated 
the situation, it reflected the fierce competition between the two agencies.  
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being trespassed by SEPA.  SOA objected to the project only because of its 
concern to protect its jurisdictional power over marine environment.   
MFA’s attitude is the most important factor among all agencies due to its 
extraordinary power in assessing and overruling any international projects, in the 
name of national interests.  The MFA, probably one of the most conservative 
government agencies from the perspectives of Chinese marine scientists,50 was not 
well educated about marine environmental issues, and government officials would 
not want to risk their political careers by venturing into any sensitive or new issues 
or areas.  The project was submitted to the MFA for approval before going to the 
GEF Council, at which point the Chinese government found itself faced with a 
political dilemma.  The MFA found the project would be undertaken in the 
sensitive sea area, and MFA officials worried that China’s participation in such a 
project would create sovereign implications and uncertainty beyond China’s 
control.  This was also inconsistent with traditional Chinese foreign policies 
towards the South China Sea, which preferred bilateral talks to multilateral 
cooperation.51   
UNEP pursued a strategy of allying with SEPA, and providing technical, 
scientific and political support to SEPA during domestic inter-ministerial meetings.  
SEPA’s OMEP office emerged as the strong supporter for the project.  Three 
SEPA officials, Madam Liu Xiuru, Director General of OMEP, Mr. Tong Yu, 
Deputy Director of OMEP, and Mr. Huang Zhengguang, Senior Engineer of 
                                                 
50 One Chinese government official from the SEPA has vividly described the original foreign 
policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “ostrich policies” in dealing with the South China Sea, 
which mean that when sand storms occur, the ostriches will simply put their heads in the sand to 
avoid the storm (Interview, April 2005).   
 
51 As a senior government official stated, “when the number of parties increases in the negotiation 
table, the situation will become more difficult to control.”  
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SEPA, were the main individuals to persuade the government to change its 
position.  In addition to their professional commitment at the domestic level to 
protect marine environment and strengthen SEPA’s OMEP, they also had personal 
obligation cultivated at the regional meetings to push for the Chinese government’s 
approval of the project.  They had participated in the long process of the 
preparation of the TDA and SAP at the regional level, and had assured to other 
countries’ participants and UNEP regarding China’s support for the project during 
the preparation phase.  Personal relationships and friendships had been established 
between them and UNEP officials and other scientists and officials, and a sense of 
“regional cooperation” had been fostered by the preparation of the project.  They 
felt the obligations to make the regional project approved and achieve success.52 
UNEP’s support in technical and scientific matters helped SEPA to fight 
against the objection of SOA.  Two individuals within UNEP played a significant 
role in negotiating with the Chinese government on technical issues: Dr. John 
Pernetta, the Deputy Director of the UNEP DGEF Division, and Mr. Yihang Jiang, 
the Programme Officer of EAS/RCU, a Chinese national who, prior to joining the 
United Nations system, had worked for SOA long enough to know the internal 
process and politics of the Chinese government.  For example, in addressing a 
comment raised by SOA regarding exclusion of coral reefs in the project on the 
grounds that coral reef activities may be conducted in disputed areas, UNEP 
changed “coral reefs” to “non-oceanic coral reefs”, narrowing down the 
geographical coverage of the activities.  SOA argued that there was no such 
technical term in marine ecology, and requested a bibliographic reference.  SEPA 
                                                 
52 Interview with Professor Huang Zhengguang. 
 
 243
officials immediately sought assistance from UNEP, and Dr. Pernetta sent a 
reference to that word from Charles Darwin’s book on the Origina and Formation 
of Coral Reefs.53  After that, SOA stopped questioning the technical issues, but still 
refused to participate in the coral reefs subcomponent, since SEPA will be the 
coordinating agency for all project activities.   
UNEP’s prestigious IO status helped to change MFA’s calculation of the 
costs and benefits of China’s participation in the project.  If China did not 
participate, other governments would still go ahead to implement the project in the 
South China Sea.  China’s non-participation would at least incur three types of cost 
to the country.  First, would be the potential de-legitmization of its territorial claim.  
Second, would be the loss of information and opportunity to enunciate its opinion.  
As one Chinese government has stated, “the Chinese government was afraid that 
other South China Sea countries would discuss the issues behind the Chinese 
government, and China would not have any control on the agenda or issues they 
discuss excluding China.  This will be an even worse situation.”54  Third, there 
would be the risk of harming China’s relationship with UNEP and GEF.  China has 
tried to present itself as a responsible and cooperative actor for global 
environmental issues, having been actively involved with IOs and sought for IO 
funding for environmental protection.55   Currently, China’s the biggest recipient of 
GEF funding.  China was concerned that the rejection to sign such a significant 
                                                 
53 Interviews with Dr. John Pernetta. 
 
54 Interview with a Chinese Government Official, September 17, 2003. 
 
55 Jimin Zhao and Leonard Ortolano argue that one of the two important factors that have China’s 
actions meeting the requirements of the Montreal Protocol is the country’s desire to appear as a 
regional and cooperative actor in solving global environmental problems.  See Jimin Zhao and 
Leonard Ortolano.  2003.  “The Chinese Government’s Role in Implementing Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol.”  The China Quarterly: 708-725. 
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project, to which the UNEP Executive Director had put a lot of emphasis, would 
hurt its relationships with UNEP and future funding from GEF.   
Regional politics, i.e. the relationship between ASEAN and China, has also 
played a significant role in China’s calculation of costs and benefits in 
participating in this regional initiative.  China has a great interest to appear as a 
cooperative, friendly and threat-free regional power to its smaller neighboring 
country.  China’s assertive attitude towards its sovereignty in the South China Sea, 
along with its rapidly growing economy, had already elicited worried reactions 
from the US and China’s neighboring countries.56  It was therefore important for 
China to reduce the possibility that others would be united by their anxiety about a 
purported “China threat.”  Furthermore, China has increasingly taken responsible 
leadership in regional and international issues.  When SEPA officials tried to 
persuade the MFA to approve the project, they argued that China, as a regional 
power, should act like a responsible leading country with daguo fengfan (great 
nation manner).57 
At the same time, the negotiation was also a process of UNEP’s teaching 
the Chinese MFA officials that marine environmental cooperation is possible and 
important for Chinese sustainable economic development without necessarily 
addressing political jurisdictional problems.  UNEP’s senior management showed 
great support to the initiative.  On October 6th, 1999, the Executive Director visited 
China and had a meeting with Minister of the SEPA and Assistant Minister of the 
MFA to further discuss the endorsement of the project. 
                                                 
56 Allen Carlson.  2003.  “Constructing the Dragon’s Scales: China’s Approach to Territorial 
Sovereignty and Border Relations in the 1980s and 1990s.”  Journal of Contemporary China 12 
(37): 677-698. 
 
57 Interview with Professor Huang Zhengguang, September 2002, April 2005, and August 2005. 
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The Chinese government convened numerous inter-ministerial meetings to 
consider and discuss the project document.  The project document was reviewed 
and commented three times by the Chinese Premier, Mr. Zhu Rongji.58  None of 
other international or regional projects have received such high-level attention 
from the Chinese government.  The comments were then consolidated and 
provided to UNEP. 
Following the Executive Director’s visit to China, on October 15th, 1999, China 
sent a letter to the Executive Director of UNEP proposing its six principles with 
regard to the project.59    
To UNEP, the difficulties had passed by the time China was willing to 
provide six concrete principles or comments rather than its original decline without 
specific reasons or comments.  UNEP staff along with their counterparts in China, 
mainly SEPA staff, worked closely to fix the six principles, which did not impose 
many changes to the project.  1) It shall not affect China’s sovereignty.  With 
respect to the sovereignty issue, the project document specifically indicated “the 
term ‘South China Sea’ is used in its geographic sense and does not imply 
recognition of any territorial claims within the area,”60 and the project website has 
similar statement.  2) It shall not cover the salient controversial South China Sea 
islets and waters in their vicinity.  Since the project’s main focus is on coastal 
habitats, it has not covered the controversial South China Sea islets and waters.  
This issue has not brought changes to the project because of coastal focus.  3) It 
                                                 
58 Interview with Chinese government officials. 
 
59 Presentation made by Mr. Yihang Jiang, Programme Officer of UNEP East Asian Seas Action 
Regional Coordinating Unit, during the 14th COBSEA meeting. 
 
60 The project document for the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project, p. 1. 
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shall not cover the issue of multilateral fishery cooperation.  China declined to 
participate in the fisheries component, because the Ministry of Agriculture has 
been in charge of the fisheries issues in China.  UNEP’s linkages with the ministry 
had been weak, and all the influences had to be channeled through SEPA.  Also, 
the time given to the ministry for its consideration was not long enough.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture had been undertaking some unilateral measures to control 
the problems of overfishing along China’s coasts, but was concerned that 
participation in a multilateral initiative might bring some uncertainties beyond the 
national control to the management of its coastal fisheries.61  4) It shall not involve 
legal framework in this project.  The project originally planned to develop a legal 
agreement or regional convention for the South China Sea, but dropped this 
activity due to China’s aversion.  A later section in this chapter will detail how 
UNEP has worked to bring this issue and facilitating a changing attitude within the 
region towards legalization of environmental cooperation.  5) No other countries 
and international organizations shall get involved in this project except COBSEA 
and UNEP and its relevant countries.  All  IOs other than UNEP were excluded 
from the project document, but during the implementation some IOs and regional 
organizations, including FAO, ASEAN and other regional projects, were invited to 
participate in project meetings as observers or experts.  The Informal Working 
Group was also excluded from the implementation of the project, since China 
considered the work of the Informal Working Group was political, not related to 
environmental issues.  6) The project shall work on consensus by all the 
participating countries through consultations.   This is only a procedural 
requirement, which did not request any changes to the project document.  This 
                                                 
61 Interview with Professor Huang Zhengguang. 
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principle, however, has been strictly stuck to during the implementation of the 
project. 
 
Implementation of the Project (2002-Present) 
The implementation of the project has been divided into two phases: the 
preparatory phase (Feb. 2002-Jun. 2004), and the operational phase (Jul. 2004-Dec. 
2007).  During the preparatory phase of the project, project activities mainly 
focused on collecting, compiling and consolidating data and information at both 
national and regional levels to prioritize sites for interventions.  Data and 
information collected included review of national data and information, review of 
past and ongoing activities, creation of national databases and metadatabases, 
identification and characterization of sites, review of economic valuation data, and 
national legislation.  The implementation of project activities at the national level 
has been carried out through the signing of Memoranda of Understanding between 
UNEP and specialized executing agencies (SEA).  At the commencement of the 
project, a total of 38 MOUs were signed to carry out activities on the various 
components of the project.  The major outputs of these activities will include: 1) 
more than 30 national reports on the status of specific marine environment in each 
country; and 2) the development national and regional databases and metadatases 
on various environmental problems.  The implementation of the project in the 
preparatory phase provides a first-time opportunity for the countries to exchange 
data and information on the status of marine environmental problems in the region, 
resulting in the production of four regional booklets regarding the regional status 
 248
of mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands.62  In the past, data and 
information were collected and compiled mostly at the national level, and regional 
exchange of information was conducted on individual and personal basis.   
Regional cooperation also helps to establish the development of national 
knowledge or experience in managing marine environment.  For example, prior to 
the commencement of the project, China had little data on seagrass.  Actually, 
seagrass and seaweed share the same Chinese word.  The work in the regional 
working group on seagrass and the national committee for seagrass in China has 
led to a significantly increased knowledge about seagrass ecosystems and their 
importance in the coastal and marine environment.  As a result of the seagrass 
work, the Guangdong environmental action plan includes seagrass protection as an 
element in the first time.63 
As the project enters the operational phase, the project moves to the 
implementation of a total of eighteen demonstration projects at the local level, and 
focuses on changing national policies in conserving marine environment by the 
development of national action plans to support the updating of the regional SAP.  
It is expected that an updated SAP will be adopted by the regional level, and seven 
sets of national action plans on specific marine environmental issues will be 
developed and adopted by the governments prior to the completion of the project in 
December 2007, in an effort to ensure that actions will be sustained and carried out 
beyond the life of the project both at the regional and national level. 
                                                 
62 See UNEP. 2004.  Mangroves in the South China Sea. UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication 
No. 1.  Coral Reefs in the South China Sea.  UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 2. 
Seagrass in the South China Sea.  UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 3.  Wetlands 
Bordering the South China Sea.  UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No.4. 
 
63 See GEF Secretariat.  2004.  Specially Managed Project Review: Reversing Environmental 
Degradation Trends in the Gulf of Thailand and South China Sea. 
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The impacts of project activities at the national level vary in each country, 
and it is still too early to evaluate them.  China has been a leading implementing 
country in the project.  A total of US$1.9 million has been allocated by the Chinese 
government for the implementation of project activities.  China’s Focal Point, Mr. 
Mingjian Chen, indicated that China would aim to build three demonstration sites 
as conservation models to be replicated nationally, and three sites would evolve 
into national nature reserves.  Malaysia has a relative weak central coordination 
and support of the project, mainly due to domestic restructuring of government 
agencies during the commencement and early implementation of the project.  Since 
UNEP signed an MOU directly with SEA, this ensures that SEAs will continue 
carrying out activities despite changes at the central level, and the negative impact 
has been reduced.   
From the beginning of implementation in 2002 to July 2005, five rounds of 
regional meetings have been organized, for mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass, 
wetlands, land-based pollution and fisheries to identify causes of degradation and 
prioritize sites for interventions with each issue area.  A systematic and 
comprehensive approach was applied by each group to take a step-by-step 
approach to diagnose the problems, prioritize and work out solutions, including 
regionally agreed formats for data and information, parameters to characterize 
sites, criteria, causal chain analysis and effective interventions.  Unlike previous 
regional workshops or meetings organized under the East Asian Seas Action Plan, 
which were general and individualistic, the same members participate in regional 
meetings in order to focus on a specific environmental problem.  Collective 
decisions made at the regional level are carried out by meeting participants.  Later 
sections in this chapter will give detailed information on how the regional working 
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groups work together to formulate regional priorities and regional policy 
coordination.   
These meetings also provide a mutual monitoring and supervision 
mechanism, because each participant has to report to the meetings regarding the 
progress and implementation of decisions made in the previous meetings.  More 
importantly, national outputs would be consolidated for regional use, and inactivity 
of one country would delay the progress of the entire component at the regional 
level.  After continuous and regular meetings, members of each working group 
have become very close to one another.  When one country incurred a problem or 
difficulty, the focal point will resort to the help from other members of the regional 
working group. 
 
Management Framework of the Project 
The project has six components and subcomponents in seven participating 
countries.  The management of such a complex multi-country project was further 
complicated by the political sensitivities in the region.  It poses numerous 
challenges to UNEP in guiding and leading the management process at the regional 
level, including how to ensure decisions would be exempt from political 
considerations, hence being watered down into non-actions at the operational level; 
how to ensure activities carried out at the national level meet regional 
environmental protection goals; and how to secure decisions made at the regional 
level to be carried out at the national level.  The management of such a complex 
project requires the reconciliation of the inherent conflict between the 
“transboundary” nature of environmental problems and man-made political 
jurisdictional divisions of an integral ecosystem in the South China Sea.  This 
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situation gets more complicated when the jurisdictional divisions of such an 
ecosystem have not been clearly agreed upon among the littoral countries 
bordering the Sea.  During the implementation of the project, both UNEP and 
government officials, scientists and experts have carefully avoided the sovereignty 
and territorial issues.  There has been no territorial disputes induced disagreements 
on environmental issues between countries during the implementation of the 
project. 
A seemingly complicated management structure was established to separate 
scientific from political issues, ensure political decisions to be made on scientific 
findings, and ensure that information flows between national and regional levels.  
Such a management framework creates a situation in which “scientific and 
technical considerations do not become obfuscated by political discussions”.64  
Figure 5.1 outlines the management framework, which encompasses both national 
and regional coordination. 
National Coordination.  At the national level, governments selected and 
designated the most prestigious institutes or agencies as the Specialized Executing 
Agencies (SEA) to execute project activities in the countries related to mangroves, 
coral reefs, seagrass, wetlands, fisheries and land-based pollution.  The lead 
individual in each of the SEA serves as members of the National Technical 
Working Group to ensure synergy and information exchanges within the country, 
and also participates in the biannual meeting of the Regional Working Group in 
each component or subcomponent.  Due to the variety of sectors related to coastal 
management and environmental problems, a high-level Inter-Ministerial 
                                                 
64 Mike Bewers and Su Jilan.  2004.  Mid-term Evaluation of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project.  Published in hard copy by UNEP Evaluation and Oversight Unit, and electronically at 
www.unepscs.org. 
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Committee (IMC) was established to address policy conflicts or coordination for 
the project at the national level. 
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Figure 1.  UNEP-GEF Management Framework for the Project: 
Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand
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China will not participate initially in those components in parentheses
UNEP/GEF//SCS [Project document] Annex G page 4
 
Source: UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project (www.unepscs.org) 
Regional Coordination.  At the regional level, six Working Groups were 
established with membership from the Focal Points, the lead individuals in each of 
the SEA.  Each Working Group convened bi-annual meetings during the first phase 
of the project, and annual meeting during the second phase.  The regional working 
groups were responsible for developing criteria during the first phase (2002 to 
2004) that were used in the selection of the various demonstration activities to be 
executed during the operational phase of the project (2005-2007). In addition, the 
working groups were responsible for assembling information and data, for 
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inputting these into a regional GIS and meta-database, and for conducting the 
analyses required to demonstrate the regional and global importance of the sites.  
Next section will give a full account of the process of how UNEP’s technical and 
scientific advices help the region to establish the regional priorities.   
To ensure synergies between the Regional Working Groups, and avoid any 
conflicts between decisions made by the Working Groups, a Regional Scientific 
and Technical Committee was created. The membership of this committee consists 
of the Chairpersons of the six regional working groups, the chairpersons of the 
seven National Technical Working Groups, and up to six additional senior marine 
and social scientists of recognized international standing drawn from the 
participating countries. The primary function of this committee is to “provide 
sound scientific and technical advice to the Project Steering Committee.”65 
The Project Steering Committee (PSC), as the supreme decision-making 
body of the project, is composed solely of representatives of the participating 
countries. The committee has been responsible for reviewing and approving, on an 
annual basis, project activities, including the location of demonstration sites to be 
funded by the GEF project. UNEP acts as Secretariat of the Committee.66  The 
responsibilities of the Project Steering Committee are further amplified in 
Paragraph 40 of the project brief which states: “The Project Steering Committee’s 
primary responsibility will be to ensure synergy and integration in the planning 
and execution of the project sub-components.”67 
 
                                                 
65 John Pernetta.  2005.  “Managing Multi-lateral Intergovernmental Projects and Porgrammes.”  
www.unepscs.org. 
 




Fostering Regional Consensus—Prioritization and Selection of Demonstration 
Sites 
According to the Project Document, nine demonstration sites would be 
selected among the seven countries to demonstrate models of conservation and 
sustainable management of mangroves, coral reefs, and seagrass.  A total of US$ 
3.5 million fund was allocated to fund nine demonstration sites over a period of 
three years.  The project document did not specify the demonstration sites, nor did 
it prescribe an approach to select the sites.  It was originally planned that the first 
phase of the project would provide adequate data and information to decide 
globally and regionally significant coastal habitats for funding as demonstration 
sites. 
The selection of demonstration sites could be extremely politicized, and in 
the past situations depended on the dynamics of inter-state struggles for 
international environmental aid.  Consequently, past processes typically resulted in 
an equal division of funds among countries in a regional setting.  Regional or 
global environmental significance were not given adequate consideration.  As the 
Project Director has correctly pointed out: 
Past practice in regional programmes has generally been based on 
“equity” considerations such that the available resources tend to be 
divided equally or near equally between all participating countries. 
In general, decisions on specific, site-related activities in the 
framework of regional action plans, reflects a simple aggregation of 
the individual national priority actions with little attempt being 
made to either determine, or take into consideration, regional 
priorities independently of the national priorities. Regional priorities 
are thus generally derived from a process of consensus building on 
the basis of the nationally defined priorities without any inclusion of 
supra-national considerations such as the level of biodiversity or 
importance of the habitat from a transboundary perspective. Each 
party in such a process recognises that they would get “something” 
and consequently focuses on their own individual priorities rather 
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than a "collective" priority. National and regional priorities are 
however, rarely congruent68.69 
To avoid repeating past practices, an objective and transparent process was 
needed that could not only determine regional environmental priorities 
scientifically, but also be acceptable to participating countries politically.  As early 
as the second RSTC meeting in December 2002, in Nha Trang, Viet Nam, a three-
step approach of selecting demonstration sites was proposed by UNEP to the 
participating countries.  This approach was adopted by both PSC and RSTC in 
December 2002.  Following the decisions made by RSTC, the regional working 
groups on mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands each undertook the 
process to select potential demonstration sites.70  The process included three steps:  
1)  Site Characterization.  Each site was characterized by the parameters 
agreed at the regional level.  Data and information were collected to characterize 
the sites.  For example, for mangrove sites bordering the South China Sea, each 
site contains information on about nine parameters, including the area of a 
mangrove site, true mangrove species, associated mangrove species, number of 
resident fish species, number of crustacean species, resident bird species, zones or 
species associated, migratory bird species and endangered and threatened species.  
To ensure data compatibility, guidance had been provided by the RSTC regarding 
the collection of data and information at the national level.  Extensive discussions 
had been undertaken at the regional level to agree on the definition of a certain 
                                                 
68 For example, a species considered endangered in one country may be abundant in another and 
may, from a global perspective be considered either threatened, or endangered or neither. 
 
69 John Pernetta.  2005.  The Role and Purpose of the South China Sea Demonstration Sites. 
www.unepscs.org. 
 
70 Full details of the procedure and its application for mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands 
are contained the reports of the Regional Working Groups respectively on these coastal habitats 
(www.unepscs.org).  Summary procedures and results can be found in UNEP Technical Reports 
2004 (UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 1-4).  
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parameter.  A key innovation that helped to forge consensus was the provision that 
sites for which agreement could not be reached regarding the quality of the data 
would be discarded from the regional process. 
2)  Cluster Analysis.  To maximize the range of biological diversity covered 
by a limited number of demonstration sites, it was agreed that the selected sites 
should represent the greatest possible range of conditions represented in the region.  
Environmentally speaking, the selected demonstration sites should cover as many 
different coastal habitats as possible.  To assist in the process of grouping sites 
with more similarities, UNEP introduced cluster analysis to group sites.  All sites 
were grouped into three clusters, and statistically sites within the group are more 
similar to one another than to sites in a different group.  Hence, statistically 
speaking, the top site in each of the three clusters should cover more biological 
diversity than the top sites in similar coastal habitats.   
3)  Site Ranking.  Two sets of indicators with assigned scores were 
developed and agreed at the regional level to rank the sites with quantitative 
scores: environmental and socio-economic criteria.  Each regional working group 
also agreed upon the weighting of the two sets of criteria, with a 70:30 or 60:40 
ratio.  Environmental criteria refer to the density of biological diversity and their 
transboundary and global significance.  Socio-economic indicators include 
seriousness of threat, government support, co-financing, and stakeholder 
involvement. 
As a result of the process, a total of eleven demonstration sites have been 
selected to be funded under the GEF grant of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
project.  Additional seven medium-sized projects to be funded within the GEF 
international waters portfolio were also selected through the same procedures.  
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Figure 5. 2 shows the distribution of demonstration sites by participating country, 
and Figure 5.3 indicates the geographical distribution of the demonstration sites 
and their types of habitats in the region.  This regional selection has resulted in 
different outcomes from the traditional pattern of an equal division of funding 
among the participating countries.  The number of national demonstration sites 
receiving UNEP funds varies from one (Malaysia) to four (Philippines).   
This process heavily depends on data and information collected at the 
national level, hence favoring countries that well equipped with scientific capacity 
and ready data and information.  For example, Cambodia lacks necessary data and 
information on habitat sites, which as a result could not be included in the regional 
prioritization process.  Recognizing this weakness, the RSTC meeting decided to 
initiate capacity building in Cambodia to continuously promote scientific research 
in the operational phase of the project.  Additionally, two habitats bordering 
Thailand and Viet Nam were further developed into joint demonstration sites with 
the two countries.  This will encourage bilateral cooperation between Cambodia 
and its two neighboring countries under the multilateral framework of the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  Except Cambodia, the rest of the countries 
do not vary dramatically in their scientific capacities in the coastal marine 
environment.  They may excel in one or another area.  For example, despite 
China’s overall strength in marine scientific research, its research and scientific 
capacity in seagrass have been limited.  The project in general contributes to 
exchange of knowledge and even out the differences in scientific capacity among 
participating countries. 
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Figure 5.3.  Geographical Distribution of the Demonstration Sites 
 
Source: UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project (www.unepscs.org)
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The scocio-economic indicators enabled some habitats with strong political 
and government support to rank high in their socio-economic criteria, and boosting 
their ranks.  Some China’s sites have been strongly supported by the government, 
hence received high socio-economic indicators.  For example, China’s 
Fangchenggang mangrove site and Hepu seagrass site both do not belong to top 
three in mangroves and seagrass portfolio in their environmental scoring, but 
moved to the top with their high scores on socio-economic indicators.  This 
process therefore encourages governments to lend strong political and financial 
support to the selected demonstration sites. 
The regional prioritization process turned out to be a lengthy, even tedious, 
process during the meetings of the regional working groups.  Countries used 
different types of data, the same ecological term at times meant different things to 
each country, and approaches to collecting the data also varied.  It took two 
regional meetings in one year to make the data and information compatible at the 
regional level.  When countries failed to provide compatible data, the sites were 
automatically eliminated.  During the fourth-round meeting, each working group 
worked over fifteen hours a day to review, check, and ensure regional 
compatibility of the data. 
The scientific process for regional site selection ensured the transparency, 
objectivity and the environmental coverage of the demonstration sites, and avoided 
the possibility of political struggles for funding.  Consequently, the regional 
decisions for the PSC were unusually easy when facing the recommendations made 
by the RSTC based on the results of the meetings of each Working Group.  There 
were no political complaints or bickering about the selected demonstration sites.  
Consensus had been reached that these demonstrations sites were selected based on 
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a scientific approach using criteria agreed upon before the initiation of the process, 
and that these sites were selected due to their regional and global environmental 
significance. 
UNEP played a critical role in fostering the sense of “regional priorities” 
and teaching the participating countries a process to prioritize coastal habitats in an 
environmentally and politically sound approach at the regional level.  The process 
was proposed and designed by Dr. Pernetta, and UNEP staff worked hard to ensure 
data accuracy and compatibility.  Members of various working groups indicate that 
they learned much from this exercises, and some members have intended to apply 
this approach at the national level to select national priority sites.71   
During the implementation of activities in demonstration sites, 
environmental cooperation at the operational level will be further boosted by the 
regional networking of demonstration sites.  UNEP has initiated a regional 
exchange and networking program for all the demonstration sites.  This has 
particular significance considering that most demonstration sites will be 
implemented by local governments in the coastal areas of the South China Sea.  
Local governments will then exchange their staff and participate in each other’s 
training programs or study tours.   
                                                 
71 For example, Thailand seagrass focal point, Dr. Suvaluck Satumanatpan, is planning to write a 





Interactive Policy Coordination: Setting Regional Environmental Goals and 
Standards  
The draft SAP, published in 1999 was prepared during the preparatory 
activities leading to the approval of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea project.72 At 
the time of its formal approval in 1998 by the meeting of COBSEA, the member 
countries requested that the further elaboration and development of the SAP be a 
defined output from the operational phase of the project.   
During the implementation of the project, the further elaboration and 
revision of the regional SAP did not reach the working group meeting agenda until 
the fifth round meeting.  It was expected that better data and information and 
experience with activities carried out during the project would provide a better 
foundation for the development of an operational, targeted, costed regional action 
program with realistic timelines.  It was also believed that certain confidence and 
trust should be fostered among members of the working group before they 
commence to make commitments and targets at the regional level.  After two years 
of implementation, both conditions were ripe for the initiation of the elaboration of 
the SAP. 
During the fifth round of meetings, each working group formulated 
regional goal, targets and actions regarding the each component, based on the 
baseline data and information collected in the two years’ implementation of the 
project.  These regional goals and targets will not be finalized before 2007.  Here I 
am giving an example on how mangroves working group reach their agreements 
                                                 
72  UNEP EAS/RCU. 1999. Strategic Action Programme for the South China Sea (Draft Version 3, 
24 February 1999) East Asian Seas Regional Coordinating Unit.  Bangkok, Thailand. 
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regarding regional goals and targets.73  In the fifth meeting of the regional working 
group on mangroves, members collectively agreed that the preliminary target in the 
draft SAP, i.e. to maintain the area of mangroves in the region at not less than 90 
percent of the 1998 level, was not realistic.  Based on the data and information 
collected, the working group collectively categorized mangrove areas in different 
uses and worked out a provisional target that 66% of the present mangrove area 
should be brought under protection by the year 2010. Table 5.3 outlines the 
provisional regional and national target for mangroves by year 2010.  This was still 
considered a provisional regional target, which members of the working group 
would bring back to their respective governments for further considerations prior 
to the convening of the sixth round meeting in August 2005. 
Table 5.3  Areas of Mangrove under Different Forms of Management and 
Potential Targets for Mangrove Protection to be included in the SAP. 
 
 Cambodia China Indonesia Philippines Thailand Viet Nam Total Percent
Total area 
(ha) 72,350 23,446 934,000 24,783 34,677 156,608 
1,245,86
4  
Production 0 0 610,800 0 0 40,000 650,800 52




19 67 17 93 33 73 27 
Target (%) 90 90 60 95 70 80 66  
Source: Meeting Report of the Fifth Regional Working Group on Mangroves 
 
Recognizing the importance of national actions in reversing environmental 
degradation trends, each country commits to develop national action plans 
specifically on each component to support the regional SAP.  Unlike other national 
action plans, the development of national action plans in the South China Sea 
                                                 
73 The regional goals and targets for coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands, fisheries and land-based 




countries has fully taken into account the consideration of regional environmental 
problems and results from regional activities.74   The working group collectively 
reviewed each country’s draft national action plan, with a view to assess its 
contribution to reach regionally set goals and targets.  A common format and 
elements of an operational national action plan was agreed at the regional level in 
the fifth round of regional working group meetings in second half of year 2004.  
The regionally agreed goal, targets and actions will be reflected in the national 
action plans, which will be approved by the national governments upon the 
completion of the project.   
This process has ensured that the regional goals and targets are concretely 
supported by national actions.  At the same time, national action plans are built not 
only on national priorities but also on regional environmental considerations.  
These national action plans, unlike previous generic action plans, are operational 
documents which specify “who does what, when, where, and how” and the 
financial sources for the actions.75   
 
Searching for Alternative Regional Cooperative Instruments and Mechanisms 
Considering that the countries of the East Asian Seas failed to reach a 
regional convention or other legal framework in support of the action plan, UNEP 
originally planned to include the development of a regional convention or other 
forms of legal frameworks as an important project activity for the UNEP/GEF 
South China Sea, with a view to formalizing environmental cooperation in South 
China Sea upon the completion of the project.  The idea to develop a regional legal 
                                                 
74 See meeting reports of the fifth working groups meetings on mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass, 
wetlands, fisheries and land-based pollution (www.unepscs.org). 
 
75 The fifth UNEP/GEF/SCS Regional Working Group meeting document.   
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agreement was included in the draft SAP, and was considered and agreed upon by 
national coordinators for the formulation of the TDA/SAP. 
At the regional level, considerations and discussions to develop a regional 
convention and protocol were started during the development of the TDA and 
SAP.  During the second meeting of national coordinators for the formulation of 
the TDA/SAP, in June 1998, developing and strengthening legal instruments were 
identified as a priority action to improve marine environmental management in the 
region.  The preliminary proposed actions included “development of national 
instruments where necessary and regional harmonization of existing and planned 
legal instruments.”76  Based on this proposition, Mr. Charit Tingsabadh, the Task 
Manager of the SAP, further elaborated this idea in the draft SAP, in which he 
proposed “a regional legal framework/protocol on the protection of the marine 
environment from pollution should be established in the region.”77  This 
recommendation was discussed and considered by the third meeting of the national 
coordinators for the formulation of a TDA/SAP, in November 1998. The 
discussions seemed to be smooth, and no aversion to that proposal was expressed 
by any national coordinator.  UNEP even provided some background information 
with regard to the establishment of other regional seas conventions, including the 
Mediterranean, SPREP, the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, and the 
Black Sea Convention, which, the meeting noted, “provide effective and useful 
                                                 
76 UNEP.  1998.  “Framework for a Strategic Action Programme to Address the Integrated 
Management of Water-Related Resources and Environment in the South China Sea.” p. 2 of Annex 
VIII in UNEP(WATER)/EAS/SCS/NCM.2/3.  Report of the Second Meeting of National 
Coordinators for the Formulation of a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and Preliminary 
Framework of s Strategic Action Programme for the South China sea, Bangkok, Thailand, 23-29 
June 1998. 
 
77 UNEP(WATER)/EAS/SCS/NCM.3/3.  1998.  Report of the Third Meeting of National 
Coordinators for the Formulation of a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and a Strategic Action 




legal instruments.”  To allow some flexibility regarding the form of a legal 
instrument, the meeting agreed that the word “legal framework” should be used 
instead of “convention” in the SAP document.78  The meeting further agreed on a 
target and a timeline to develop such a regional legal framework during the 
implementation of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project: 
Recognizing that negotiation of a legal framework normally takes 
an extended period of time it was agreed that appropriate 
preparation and negotiation should be commenced within the 
framework of this project.  The target for this issue is to initiate 
intergovernmental negotiation on a legal framework within 2 years 




Following the third national coordinators’ meeting, the draft SAP with a 
target to develop a regional legal framework was then presented to the thirteenth 
COBSEA meeting, in November 1998.  This aroused opposition from the 
Indonesian delegate over the use of the words “convention and protocol” in the 
draft SAP.  Even after UNEP agreed to change all the words of “convention and 
protocol” to “legal framework,” Indonesia still opposed it, stating that: 
“government was not in favor of making legal/formal commitments.”80  Indonesia 
is still in the position to oppose the legalization of environmental cooperation.  As 
champion of non-alliance principle, and the biggest Southeast Asian countries, 
Indonesia hesitated binding itself to any international legal agreements. 
                                                 
78 IbId.  p. 6. 
 
79 UNEP(WATER)/EAS/SCS/NCM.3/3.  1998.  Report of the Third Meeting of National 
Coordinators for the Formulation of a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and a Strategic Action 
Programme for the South China Sea, Bangkok, Thailand, 15-17 November 1998.  p. 6. 
 
80 UNEP(WATER)/EAS IG.9/3.  1998.  Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the COBSEA on the 




Philippines and Vietnam have the greatest stakes in the South China Sea 
among all ASEAN countries, and have incurred most challenges from China 
regarding the territorial issues.  Both countries have actively sought to 
internationalize the South China Sea issue and pushed it to ASEAN agendas.  They 
do not have strong aversion to legalization, as it will enable both countries with 
legal justification for their rights and responsibilities equal to China, and lock 
China into a formal legal agreement.  To accommodate Indonesia’s objection, the 
Philippines proposed changing the word “legal framework” to “mechanism”, but 
Viet Nam considered that a mechanism would be too soft to be effective.  While 
Viet Nam preferred to legalize multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea, 
China indicated that even if a legal framework were needed, it should cover the 
entire East Asian Seas region, rather than the South China Sea, indicating an 
aversion to internationalizing the South China Sea issue.  The other countries 
indicated that such an approach needed extensive discussions at the national level, 
prior to regional adoption.81 
Faced with various opinions and limited support from the countries, 
UNEP’s strategy to persuade the governments to adopt a legal target was to resort 
to the preferences of the funding agency, the GEF.  UNEP indicated that the 
inclusion of such a “legal framework” target would show the political commitment 
of national governments to reverse environmental degradation trends, which the 
GEF would like to see.  Furthermore, UNEP referred to some global conventions 
that COBSEA member countries had signed or ratified, to support the legal target.  
                                                 




The meeting report of the thirteenth COBSEA meeting recorded UNEP’s effort to 
persuade the governments as follows: 
The Secretariat informed delegates that the GEF had supported the 
development and elaboration of regional conventions and 
agreements, and actions to implement them, most notably in the 
Black Sea and Caspian. It was noted that the development of these 
agreements required an extensive period of negotiation and 
consultation at both the national and regional levels. It was further 
noted that various Global agreements, including inter alia the 
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land Based Activities, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which most COBSEA 
countries were signatory, called upon states to establish appropriate 
regional arrangements for the management and protection of semi-
enclosed seas and other shared marine waters. It was suggested that 
agreement on the part of COBSEA to initiate a dialogue leading to 
the establishment of more formal arrangements for the protection of 
the South China Sea would be taken by bodies external to the 
region, such as the GEF, as a clear signal of a strong commitment 
on the part of the Governments of the region to addressing and 
halting the trends of environmental degradation.82 
Considering that SAP was a required document to apply for GEF funding, 
and given UNEP’s explanation of GEF preferences, the national governments 
agreed to retain the legal target in draft form, but also decided that further 
discussions were required at the national level.  The final elaborated SAP is 
expected to be completed by 2007.   
In October 1999, the effort to include a legal target met a more serious 
challenge when the Chinese government put “no involvement of legal framework” 
as one of its six conditions to sign the project, due to China’s political aversion to 
multilateralism as discussed previously.  The lengthy negotiation with the Chinese 
government regarding the signing of the project agreement, along with overall 
regional aversion to legalization of commitments, had turned the phrase “regional 
convention” or “legal framework” into a taboo when UNEP initiated 
                                                 
82 Ibid.  p. 7. 
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implementation of the project in February 2002.  The project document retained a 
carefully written paragraph (paragraph 31) to stipulate the regional legal 
component of the project, inter alia: 
A regional expert working group will be convened to: review the 
current obligations of countries under Global Conventions including 
inter alia the UNFCC, the CBD, the UNCLOS, and MARPOL; 
review the similarities and differences between national legislation; 
consider ways in which such legislation might be harmonized to 
achieve the common objectives of the countries as expressed in the 
Strategic Action Programme; prepare recommendations concerning 
the optimum mode of countries meeting their obligations under the 
global conventions and thus protecting the environment of the South 
China Sea. It is anticipated that the recommendations of this group 
will be considered by a high level intergovernmental meeting for 
inclusion as activities in the revised Strategic Action Programme.83 
 
UNEP took a gradual approach to initiate the activities.  UNEP started the 
work related to legal matters at the national level.  Countries cannot oppose to 
legislation activities to build the capacity of legal development, because national 
legal instruments are among the most effective tools to protect environment, and 
the countries bordering the sea do need to strengthen their institutional and legal 
arrangements for environmental management.  Members of each working group 
were requested to review and collect national legislation information to identify 
which countries are strong or weak regarding certain issues or areas.  No regional 
activities had been undertaken during the first seven months of the implementation 
of the project, due to the sensitivity of the legalization issue.   
In December 2002, during the second PSC meeting, the Project Director 
proposed to establish two regional task forces to strengthen the legal component 
and economic valuation of the projects, as there was a weakness in these two 
aspects of the project.  The PSC approved the establishment of the Task Force on 
                                                 
83 UNEP.  2001.  Project Document for the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  p. 10. 
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Economic Valuation with no difficulties, but took extraordinary caution for the 
establishment of the Regional Task Force on Legal Matters (RTF-L).  The meeting 
had a lengthy discussion of the purpose of the RTF-L during which sensitivity of 
legal matters was raised.  The meeting clearly indicated that the establishment of 
such a task force should not interfere with internal affairs: 
It was not the intention to create a task force that would interfere 
with the internal affairs of the participating countries but rather to 
provide a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas and 
experience and through which possible ideas could be made 
available for use at the national level should they so wish.84 
 
The Task Force is composed of a group of environmental lawyers with a 
strong commitment to their professions, and has held three meetings since its 
establishment, which has contributed to the networking and close connections 
among the members.  Dr. Daud Silalahi, the Chairperson of this Task Force in its 
first meeting, has played a critical role in pulling members together to explore legal 
approaches to address environmental problems.  As the most senior member in the 
Task Force, Dr. Silalahi, a 68 years’ old professor, is very well respected by other 
members of the Task Force.  He is particularly interested in transboundary 
environmental problems identified in the TDA, and believed that the only solution 
to address these problems is to promote regional cooperation.  In the first meeting, 
UNEP prepared a document entitled “Review of Obligations of Signatory States 
Under Global Environmental Conventions with regard to Regional Cooperation,” 
outlining countries’ obligations for regional cooperation under fifteen global 
                                                 
84 UNEP/GEF/SCS/PSC.3/3.  2002.  Report of the Second Meeting of the Project Steering 




environmental conventions.85  This document has provided legal justification for 
promoting regional cooperation, and helped the Task Force to identify its mission.  
The Task Force further reviewed the status of regional cooperation in the region, 
and concluded that great potential exists for strong regional cooperation because 
the only formal environmental cooperation in the South China Sea is the project, 
which will be completed within five years.86  By the end of the second meeting in 
May 2004, the Task Force reached a consensus that members should work to 
promote regional cooperation, and that environmental cooperation needs to be 
strengthened in the region.  The Task Force is very cautious regarding their 
responsibilities and mandates, and cannot propose officially to develop legal 
agreements at the regional level.  
The work of the Task Force has gradually reduced the suspicions of 
countries regarding legal frameworks.  In February 2004, during the Regional 
Scientific Conference, in which 120 senior government officials, scientists, 
researchers and advocates participated, there was a strong consensus that regional 
cooperation should be promoted, and proposals to establish regional conventions 
did not invite any objection during the conference.87  However, this is still not an 
official indication of the change of governments’ attitudes towards the legalization 
of environmental cooperation in the region.  The conference was mainly a 
scientific and technical event, and there was no formal initiation for the 
development of such a legal instrument.  Those senior government officials present 
                                                 
85 UNEP/GEF/SCS/RTF-L.1/13.  2002.  Review of Obligations of Signatory States under Global 
Environmental Conventions with Regard to Regional Cooperation.  www.unepscs.org. 
 
86 UNEP/GEF/SCS/RTF-L.2/7.  Review of Regional and Subregional Agreements and Soft Laws on 
Marine Environment in the South China Sea.  www.unepscs.org. 
 
87 For example, Indonesian wetlands focal point, Mr. Dibjo Sartoso proposed to develop a 
regionalized wetlands convention in the region to promote better management of wetlands 
bordering the South China Sea. 
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in the conference did not have to object to the opinion, until it really reached the 
stage for governments to decide.  However, this has indicated that a regional 
consensus among scientists had been reached, and the sensitivity of the South 
China Sea issue had gradually reduced since the implementation of the project.   
In December 2004, the fifth RSTC meeting instructed the RTF-L to explore 
alternative regional cooperative instruments and mechanisms to promote regional 
cooperation.  Following the RSTC decision, the RTF-L decided to undertake two 
parallel sets of activities in year 2005-2006 to explore potential instruments and 
mechanisms for regional cooperation.  At the national level, members of the RTF-
L will organize two national consultation workshops to seek perspectives from 
different government sectors regarding potential instruments and mechanisms.  At 
the regional level, a consultant has been hired to explore lessons and experiences 
from other world regions that might be applicable to the South China Sea.88  The 
results of these two sets of activities will be revealed by the next RTF-L meeting in 
May 2006. 
The legalization of environmental cooperation in the South China Sea still 
has a long way to go.  The project has de-sensitized legal issues, and contributed to 
enhanced trust and confidence building, resulting in a softening attitude of 
governments towards legal matters and legalization.  From my observation and 
participation in the working group and task force meetings, members have become 
more and more relaxed in making their statements and sharing their ideas.89  More 
                                                 
88 For the details of these two sets of activities, see the meeting documents of the Third Meeting of 
the Regional Task Force on Legal Matters, 28 Feb. – 3rd March 2005.  www.unepscs.org. 
 
89 For example, during the first RTF-L meeting, Phuket Thailand, September 2003, the Task Force 
members discussed the possibility of legalizing the environmental cooperation in the meeting under 
the leadership of the Chairperson.  China member, Dr. Bei Tao, remained reticent and did not speak 
a word during the entire discussion.  Later, I asked him why, he said before the meeting, he was 
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and more government officials have realized, through their involvement in the 
project, that legalized environmental cooperation does not entail sacrifice of 
sovereignty or independence, but can actually increase governments’ capacity to 
deal with environmental problems, hence strengthen their sovereignty 
UNEP played a subtle role in dealing with the sensitive issue.  UNEP’s 
principle has been that countries should not feel that the idea is being imposed 
upon them by UNEP.  UNEP has had to work as a mediator to stimulate 
discussions and allow the idea to ferment.  UNEP invoked global environmental 
conventions to provide the necessary legitimacy to initiate the activities.  Many 
discussions, consultations, and efforts at persuasion took place outside of the 
meeting room, during coffee breaks or meeting dinners.  UNEP often approached 
key individuals to take a lead in facilitating the activities 
 
The South China Sea Epistemic Community 
Peter Haas’s analysis of the epistemic community in the Mediterranean Sea 
environmental cooperation mainly focuses on the impacts of the epistemic 
community on policy changes and environmental cooperation in the region.90  The 
epistemic community was treated as an independent variable, and its formation and 
evolution were not questioned or explored.  Whose knowledge matters and how a 
group of scientists achieve consensual knowledge and reach agreements regarding 
                                                                                                                                       
instructed by SEPA’s Department of International Cooperation that he should be extremely cautious 
in issues related to legal matters.  However, after participating the meeting, Dr. Bie Tao himself 
indicated that he learnt that environmental cooperation should not be complicated by the 
sovereignty issues, and that the project would bring benefits to China, regardless whether territorial 
disputes resolved or not.  After two years’ involvement with the project, Dr. Bie is much more 
willing to share the ideas than before, and he personally approached key individuals within SEPA to 
persuade them that environmental cooperation should be strengthened. 
 
90 See eg. Peter Haas.  1990.  Saving the Mediterranean.  1992.  “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: 




the causal effects of certain environmental problems are equally interesting 
questions as the analysis of their impacts.   
As discussed in Chapter 4, no epistemic community has been formed 
within the wider East Asian Seas region due to its vast geographical area, diversity 
of problems, and limited financial resources.  Marine scientists in Southeast Asia 
are much more integrated than those in the larger East Asian Seas region.  The 
scientific community is even more coherent and integrated around the specific 
domain of the South China Sea’s marine environmental problems, evolving into a 
mature epistemic community with shared views and “consensual knowledge.”  
However, the causal direction has been reversed, with the project initiatives driving 
the formation of the community rather than vice versa.  The development and 
implementation of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea has played a critical role in 
promoting the networking among scientists, and helping scientists in achieving 
“consensual knowledge” in the South China Sea.   
The project management framework ensures maximum interactions and 
networking among involved individuals, with knowledge flowing both horizontally 
and vertically at the regional, national and local levels.  At the national level, each 
country establishes national committees on specific components (for example, a 
national mangroves committee) to consolidate knowledge on a component at the 
national level.  Demonstration site managers automatically become members of 
national committees, ensuring information flow between national and local levels.  
At the regional level, the chairpersons of the national committee participate in the 
meetings of the regional working groups, and serve as a communication line 
between national- and regional-level interactions on knowledge related to a special 
marine environment.  Hence, information and knowledge flow across the three 
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levels, and decisions made at the regional level can be more effectively carried out 
at the national and local levels. 
The project fosters the development of “specialty knowledge” in a specific 
issue.  The national committees and regional working groups were established to 
address specifically mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass, wetlands, fisheries, and land-
based pollution.  This has avoided problems in many multilateral programs or 
projects in which scientists meet to address the “general” marine problems, without 
much focus on specific problems.  As the Project Director points out, 
Putting coral reef biologists, mangrove foresters and seagrass 
scientists together will not result in sound advice on “coastal habitat 
management” since the nature of the environmental and ecological 
processes in these three systems; their use by human populations; 
and the management measures required for their sustainability; are 
fundamentally different, and frequently not part of the “shared” 
body of ecological knowledge.  By creating a more specialized 
lower level forum the opportunity exists to consolidate a wider body 
of highly specialized knowledge and experience before sharing it 
with specialists having other, often very divergent interests and 
concerns.91 
 
In the South China Sea, about 120 government officials, scientists, and 
researchers meet regularly at the national and regional levels, fostering a common 
view on priority problems and causal chain analysis of marine environment 
problems in the region.  I select 24 senior scientists and officials that have actively 
been fostering the regional consensus and taking leadership in promoting sound 
environmental management at both regional and national level.  Table 5.4 is a list 
of these scientists and government officials and their titles.  This list is in no way 
an exhaustive one, but a representation of the members of the epistemic 
                                                 
91 John Pernetta.  2005.  Managing Multilateral Intergovernmental Projects and Programmes: The 
Case of the UNEP/GEF Project Entitled: “Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the 




community.  This core group of scientists have claim to “authoritative knowledge” 
in the region and tend to have more influences on policies at the national level, and 
decisions at various regional working groups.92   
This core group of people, during the development and implementation of 
the project, has reached consensus on the following aspects.  First, the priority 
marine environmental problems in the South China Sea have been defined as 
degradation of coastal habitats, decline of fisheries, and land-based pollution.  
Within the coastal habitats, the priority should be accorded in the following order: 
mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands.  Second, a holistic and integrated 
approach should be developed to address the problems.  This consensus leads to 
the development of some conservation models including multi-sectoral 
management and multiple stakeholders’ consultations in developing and 
implementing demonstration sites.  For example, the recently approved China 
Fangchenggang mangroves demonstration site, Thailand Trat Province mangrove 
site, and China Hepu seagrass sites share these elements that have been agreed at 
the regional level.93  Third, within the four prioritized coastal habitats, a regional 
list of priority sites for intervention has been developed, including 26 mangroves 
sites, 43 coral reefs sites, 26 seagrass sites, and 43 wetlands. 
                                                 
92 I must emphasize the list of core members is based on my personal views, resulting from my 
participation in various regional meetings, observation and interviews with government officials 
and scientists in the region.  I selected these individuals based on the following criteria: 1) national 
technical focal point who is responsible for national and regional coordination of various 
components; 2) chairpersons of the working groups; 3) experts in the fields with international 
standing; 4) abilities to contribute to the discussions during various meetings. 
 
93 See www.unepscs.org for the approved full proposals of these three sites. 
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Table 5.4.  Core Scientists of the Epistemic Community in the South 
China Sea 
Name Profession Position Function with UNEP/GEF Nationality 
Alino, Porfirio Marine Scientist Professor, Marine Science 
Institute 










Marine Biologist Professor, The National University 
of Singapore 










Marine Scientist Professor, Guangxi Mangroves 
Research Center 
Mangroves focal point China 














Department of Marine and Coastal 
Resources 





Senior Engineer, South China 
Institute of Environmental 
Sciences 
NTFP China 










 Professor, Vice President, Viet 
Nam National University 





Chief of Coastal and Marine 
Resources Management Group 
NTFP Thailand 
Ong, Jin-Eong Marine Scientist Professor retired Regional Expert 
(mangroves, RSTC) 
Malaysia 
Padilla, Noel Environmental 
Economist 
Development Management Officer 
Dept. of Environment and Natural 
Resources 
Chair of RTF-E Philippines 
Pernetta, John Ecologist Project Director, UNEP/GEF 
South China Sea Project 
Coordinating Unit 
Project Director British 
Satumanatpan, 
Suvaluck 
Marine Scientist Associate Professor, Mahidol 
University 
Focal point of seagrass Thailand 
Savath, Koch Government 
official 
Deputy Director General of 







Professor, University of 
Padjadjaran-Bandung 
Chair, RTF-L Indonesia 
Snidvongs, 
Anond 
Oceanographer Director, Southeast Asia START 
Regional Center 









Expert Ministry of Environment Regional Expert (land-
based pollution) 
Indonesia 
Vo, Si Tuan Marine Scientist Senior Expert, UNEP/GEF South 
China Sea PCU 
Senior Expert 











Although these core members are not evenly distributed among the 
countries, for example, China and Viet Nam have only two members, but both 
countries have strong national coordination at the national level, which, to a large 
extent, can be attributed to the national technical focal points: Professor Huang 
Zhengguang in China and Dr. Vo Si Duan in Viet Nam, replaced by Dr. Mai Trong 
Nhuan in February 2005.  National technical focal points are extraordinarily 
critical in forging national and regional consensus, since they are the coordination 
points for all project activities at the national level, and they are also representing 
the countries as permanent members for the Regional Scientific and Technical 
Committee meetings.  Strong national technical focal points lead the work at the 
national level towards achieving regionally agreed decisions.  Hence the uneven 
distribution of the core members tends to have little influence on a country’s 
attitude at the national level. 
UNEP’s influence on the formation of this epistemic community was 
channeled through the preparation of workshops or meetings, and direct 
participation in the discussions at these events.  UNEP prepared meeting agendas 
and all documents prior to all expert and inter-governmental meetings.  From my 
own experience of participating and organizing inter-governmental and expert 
meetings, well-prepared meeting documents determine the productivity and the 
level of success of a meeting.  Meeting documents should include not only 
problems but more importantly suggest solutions and make recommendations.94  
The documents serve as discussion documents for regional meetings, to solicit 
                                                 
94 When I started to prepare and organize meetings as a junior officer, my supervisor always poses a 
question to me—“what do you expect from the meeting and why?”  A good secretary of a 
successful meeting should have a clear idea of what to be achieved, work hard to justify the idea, 
facilitate the adoption of that idea during the meetings, and follow up with the implementation of 




comments and advice from regional experts and during the meetings, the 
documents are normally adopted with no substantive change, but often extensive 
additions and amplification.  Simply posing a problem to an expert or official 
meeting will not result in any productive outcomes, because experts or officials 
tend to vary in their opinions, and engage in lengthy academic debates, leading to 
the inability to get a reasonable conclusion in a short meeting.  Only in very rare 
cases will UNEP organize some expert “brainstorm” meetings to seek advice and 
solutions, without preparing substantive documents.95  Ostensibly, regional experts 
have been consulted for the development of certain policies or initiatives.  Less 
noticed by academics is that the process of scientists’ sitting together and 
discussing the policy documents contributes to the building of “consensual 
knowledge,” which is normally shaped by the meeting documents prepared by 
UNEP.   
UNEP would sometimes ally with or engage leading experts or 
chairpersons of the regional working groups to forge a consensus or decision at the 
regional level.  In each regional working group, a number of regional experts were 
invited to act on behalf of the “regional” interests in addition to each government-
designated member of the group.  The mandate of these regional experts is to act 
“neutrally” and ensure common regional benefits.  Their views or opinions are 
given more weight or considerations by the working group.  Regional leading 
experts and UNEP’s organizational authority create a strong alliance to forge 
regional consensual knowledge.  Whenever the UNEP secretariat got into difficulty 
                                                 
95 In my three and half years’ work with international organizations, I have participated in more 
than thirty intergovernmental or expert meetings (about twenty in the region and ten outside of the 
region).  I have seen only one meeting in which no sufficient guiding documents were prepared, and 
experts were organized in groups to brainstorm recommendations and solutions to problems or 
questions during the meeting.  The result of the meeting, as many participants stated, was a disaster. 
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to persuade members to agree on certain matters, regional experts were always 
resorted to for technical comments.  The chairpersons of each working group, once 
elected, have the mandate to forge regional consensus and decisions.  They have 
the motivations to act or present themselves to act on behalf of regional benefits.  
This was apparent in the process of the meetings and even in important decisions.  
For example, in the fourth RSTC meeting, in Pattaya, February 2004, the RSTC 
reviewed recommendations from each working group regarding the selection of 
demonstration site.  The chairperson of the working group on mangroves, Dr. 
Sonjai Havanond, a Thai national, pointed out to the RSTC should consider 
allocating funding for a selected Philippines mangrove site.96   
At the national level, government officials tend to pay more attention to 
“international” advice or expertise, especially opinions from international 
organizations.97  Scientists, after attending the regional expert meetings, will 
normally report to their national governments, and resort to the international 
authority of the carrier of the knowledge or policy documents to support their 
lobbying or persuading governments to take certain measures or efforts in line with 
the regional agreements.  Participation in UNEP organized meetings empowers 
scientists’ views at the national level. 
Although the formation of the epistemic community takes a seemingly top-
down approach, with UNEP in alliance with some experts in building the 
                                                 
96 Funding was not allocated to the Philippines site due to the UNEP Secretariat’s omission.  If 
funding was not allocated to Philippines site, additional funding would be available to the other 
countries, including Thailand, for the execution of other activities.  The fact that it was pointed out 
by the Chairperson of working group on mangroves, rather than by a Philippines delegate, indicates 
that the Chairperson feels the responsibility to maximize interests for the working group, and that a 
group sense or identity has been formed by the group. 
 
97 Several scientists mentioned to me that governments in the region respect international or foreign 
experts more than their own national or regional experts, which has been the result of the belief of 




consensual knowledge, the approach will not reduce the significance of such a 
shared-views community.  The epistemic community is the only mechanism that 
knowledge can be transferred to carried on beyond the life of the project. 
 
UNEP: De-politicization of Environmental Cooperation in the South China 
Sea 
Environmental cooperation in the South China Sea has never been a purely 
technical or environmental issue.  ASEAN countries want to engage China on 
South China Sea issues in a multilateral forum.  China is, on the one hand, afraid of 
losing its stakes if it is forced to negotiate with multiple states in a multilateral 
forum, and on the other hand, concerned that non-participation in such a forum 
would put it into a more disadvantageous position by missing information and the 
loss of opportunity to influence the agenda within the forums.  The third party’s 
strategies become extremely important in promoting regional cooperation. 
UNEP’s most important strategy in the region is to de-politicize 
environmental cooperation, and it tries to build a “neutral” and “independent” 
image in the eyes of ASEAN countries and China.  The practice of environmental 
cooperation in the South China Sea has provided some good experience for forging 
environmental cooperation in similarly highly contentious regions.  The 
environmental cooperation started in an informal forum, and later evolved into a 
formal cooperative form under the framework of a politically neutral yet 
authoritative UN forum.   
Emphasizing the “Neutrality” of Environmental Protection.  During the 
process, the “neutral” and “non-political” nature of environmental problems has 
made marine environmental cooperation a convenient and relatively easy issue 
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area for initiating and forging substantive inter-governmental cooperation.  Marine 
environmental degradation problems have been picked by environmental activists 
as “neutral” problems, which transcend national jurisdictional boundaries, and 
which should be exempt from political contests.  These activists, normally marine 
scientists, academics, and international civil servants, have tried to persuade the 
government officials that environmental cooperation does not require clear 
benchmarking of national boundaries, and “that the benefits resulting from co-
operative actions in managing the environment of the South China Sea are not 
dependent on a resolution of the unresolved issues.”98  Hence, marine 
environmental protection has been identified by the Informal South China Sea 
Working Group as a priority area for regional cooperation.  The particular 
“neutral” nature of marine environmental protection was also a critical factor for 
the successful initiation of formal environmental cooperation in the region.   
Clear Separation of Political and Scientific Issues.  The clear separation of 
roles of the policy and decision-making structures from the scientific and technical 
functions has been a key to the successful implementation of the UNEP/GEF South 
China Sea Project.99 The highest-level decision-making structure is the Project 
Steering Committee, which consists entirely of government officials from the 
participating countries. The main scientific and technical forum, Regional 
Scientific and Technical Committee, forms the bridge between the PSC and the 
Regional Working Groups (RWGs) dealing with the scientific and technical 
aspects of the project. The RSTC makes recommendations to the PSC as to the 
                                                 
98 UNEP.  2001.  UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project Document.  p. 10. 
 
99 Mike Bewers and Su Jilan.  2004.  Mid-term Evaluation of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 




appropriate actions based on the scientific work carried out within the RWGs and 
at the national level. This structure has allowed the PSC to make its decisions 
based on accurate and appropriate scientific and technical advice. 
Major decisions had to be based on sound scientific and technical 
arguments.  The selection of demonstrations sites had been entirely based on 
transparent and sound scientific procedures, which proved to be effective in 
preventing political struggles. 
Avoidance of Sovereignty Debates.  The Informal South China Sea 
Working Group had adopted a rule in the meeting that each country was given only 
five minutes to state their justifications for claims of the Spratlys and Paracels.  No 
questions or debates were allowed after the statements.  This rule effectively 
prevented the workshops from degrading into a useless debate over “who owns 
what.”    
The UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project has prevented the possible 
obfuscation resulting from fruitless debates and arguments on sovereignty issues, 
by stating clearly that the “South China Sea” is used in its geographic sense.  
During the execution of the project, the principle has been restated in various 
regional intergovernmental and expert meetings, and has been generally followed 
by meeting participants. 
Minimization or Exclusion of External Influence.  The littoral countries of 
the South China Sea, as prosperous developing countries, have been carefully 
defending their rights of independent decision-making, and avoiding external 
influences in the disputes of the South China Sea.  China is particularly sensitive 
about any external involvement in the South China Sea.  While other small 
countries may wish to introduce their external allies, different countries have 
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different external allies.  Hence, despite the fact that the Informal South China Sea 
Working Group had been financially supported by Canada, a politically neutral 
country to the region, it was excluded from participation when it comes to formal 
intergovernmental cooperation under the framework of the UNEP/GEF South 
China Sea Project. 
One of the Chinese conditions to approve the UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project was that no other organizations, except COBSEA or UNEP, would 
participate in the implementation of the project.  The project has no external 
agenda or conditions attached to the grant allocated to countries, which helped 
UNEP to gain trust from the participating countries. 
Socializing Environmental Cooperation.  The South China Sea region 
basically shares a culture of preference for informality.  Very often, businesses are 
done in informal situations outside the meeting rooms.100  Socialization becomes a 
critical factor and sometimes a determining factor for the success of an inter-
governmental meeting.  Under the project framework, the same small group of 
people, having met at least five times in two and one-half years, helped to build 
close and personal relationships among them.101  The icebreaker receptions and 
informal dinners in the duration of the meeting provide good opportunities for 
participants to interact with one another and build personal relationships, which 
become an important asset for future regional cooperation. 
 
                                                 
100 See e.g. Tun-jen Cheng and Brantly Womack.  1996.  “General Reflections on Informal Politics 
in East Asia.”  Asian Survey Vol. 36: 320-337.  Lowell Dittmer.  1995.  “Chinese Informal 
Politics.”  The China Journal No. 34: 1-34.   
 





Environmental cooperation in the South China Sea has been largely shaped 
by Sino-ASEAN relations, and political dynamics in the region.  Following the 
trends of improved relationships between China and ASEAN, the development of 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea reflects a growing trend in 
environmental cooperation, from informal to formal, from a general approach, 
which covers broad sea areas, to a more specific but inclusive approach.  Both 
ASEAN and China shares an aim to ensure a peaceful and regional environment to 
sustain their economic growth, but this aim has been to some extent obfuscated by 
the territorial disputes and conflicts in the South China Sea.  Environmental issues, 
as being scientific, technical, and non-political, have served as an issue area to 
build confidence and trust among all the countries bordering the South China Sea.   
During the formulation of environmental cooperation, UNEP’s power 
stems from its access to international funding, interpretation of international rules, 
and possession of technical expertise.  During the implementation, UNEP’s power 
has been lifted by presenting itself as a legitimate, knowledgeable and independent 
actor and de-politicizing itself and the environmental cooperation.   UNEP has 
played a critical role in promoting regional environmental cooperation in the South 
China Sea by acting as a neutral mediator, allying with domestic pro-cooperation 
factions, fostering a regional epistemic community, and leveraging support from 
regional experts.   
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CHAPTER 6 
TOWARDS A STRENGTHENED REGIONAL MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 
 
In Chapter 1, I posed the puzzle: why has environmental cooperation 
occurred among development-minded countries situated in what has been known 
as a sea of conflict?  The South China Sea constitutes a “hard case” for explaining 
environmental protection because it emerged under very difficult circumstances, 
including the broad disparity that exists in the interests and power of countries in 
the region and the territorial disputes among them. The South China Sea case 
provides a strong basis for understanding the process by which global forces can 
take advantage of regional political dynamics to not only promote environmental 
cooperation, but also shape its form, nature, and characteristics. 
The concluding chapter first briefly re-assesses theories on international 
cooperation, and discusses the implications of the South China Sea case for the 
theories of international cooperation.  Second, it summarizes the roles of the three 
forces, i.e. UNEP, states bordering the South China Sea, and ASEAN that have 
influenced and shaped regional environmental cooperation in the South China Sea.  
Third, it provides policy recommendations for the future roles of UNEP and 
discusses the implications for IOs’ involvement in regional environmental 
cooperation; and last, it discusses the generalizability of the case and provides 
some directions for future research agendas. 
 
Re-assessing Theories on International Cooperation 
In Chapter 2, theories on international cooperation were reviewed and 
found to be inadequate for explaining the emergence of environmental cooperation 
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in the South China Sea. This section revisits those traditional theories, and 
discusses the implications of this case for the validity of these theories, based on 
empirical studies on environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
Realism.  For realists, environmental cooperation in the South China Sea, 
like other forms of international cooperation, would be explained in terms of 
general patterns of international behavior as shaped by states’ pursuit of maximum 
power.  Realist theory argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate 
anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation.  For realists, international 
institutions are barely outcomes of states’ competition for power, and do not 
execute independent roles from states’ actions. 
Empirically, the reality of world politics continues to show the importance 
of international institutions, and the problems with the realist assertion that 
“institutions do not matter.”  The practice of international environmental politics in 
the South China Sea has proved wrong the realist assertion that international 
institutions are irrelevant, and has shown that international institutions are not 
simply an instrument of rational states, but execute independent roles in shaping 
world politics.   
Another criticism of realism lies with the realist notion of security. 1  
Traditional realist definitions of national security are concerned with keeping 
countries safe from military threats and invasions from other countries.  From the 
1970s onwards, an array of scholars has set out to provide alternative answers to 
                                                 
1 .  See e.g. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams.  1996.  “Broadening the Agenda of Security 
Studies: Politics and Methods.”  Mershon International Studies Review Vol. 40: 229-254.  Kendall 
Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks.  2003.  “A Double-edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity.”  
International Security Vol 28: 123-148. 
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the question: security from what? 2  As a result, environmental security literature 
expanded significantly in the past decade.3  This increased juxtaposition of security 
and environment came at a time when the conventional understandings of security 
had become obviously insufficient for analyzing the increasing number of threats 
to the security and welfare of human beings, from sources other than military 
offenses.  There is a growing consensus that environmental degradation can and 
does trigger, amplify or cause conflict and instability, and a growing concern that 
environmentally induced conflict might increase.  The fact that marine 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea has been heavily politicized by 
the littoral countries illustrates that environmental degradation is a severe threat to 
states, which needs to be addressed. 
In summary, realism would predict extremely limited environmental 
cooperation at best, due to military conflicts and the zero-sum game of territorial 
competition.  In the South China Sea, where countries are concerned about their 
territorial claims and achieving relative gains in resources, any environmental 
cooperation that emerged would reflect the power structure of the countries 
bordering the sea.  China is the most powerful state in the region and has been 
opposed to any sort of internationalization of the South China Sea issue as well as 
to multilateral talks on the South China Sea.  This strategy has been based on the 
Chinese calculation of its military capability in comparison with those of the other 
                                                 
2 .  Early works on linking environment with security include: Richard Falk.  1971.  This 
Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survivals.  New York: Random House.  
Lester Brown.  Redefining National Security.  Worldwatch Paper No. 14.  Washington D.C.: 
Worldwatch Institute.  Richard Ullman.  1983.  “Redefining Security.”  International Security Vol. 
8: 129-153.  
 
3 .  See e.g. Thomas Homer-Dixon.  1991.  1994.  1999.  Jon Barnett.  2001.  The Meaning of 
Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era.  London and New 
York: Zed Books Ltd.  Dennis C. Pirages and Theresa M. DeGeest.  2004.  Ecological Security.  
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
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claimant states in the region.  This suggests that China should strongly oppose 
multilateral environmental cooperation, and use its power to prevent such 
cooperation.  From a realist perspective, given this kind of pressure from China, 
environmental cooperation should be unimaginable.   
In point of fact, China originally acted along what realist predictions would 
expect: it strongly opposed the internationalization of any issues related to the 
South China Sea.  China’s perspective, however, has been changed by UNEP in 
alliance with pro-cooperation domestic factions.  This leads to two points which 
are contradictory to realist theories.  First, international organizations do matter.  
Second, states are not coherent one-unit actors.  They have domestic divisions, 
which compete against each other for preferred options. 
Institutionalism.  Rational institutionalists argue that institutions can make 
four major changes the environment in which international interactions among 
states occur, thereby creating a context more conducive to international 
cooperation.   First, institutions can increase the number of interactions between 
particular states over time. 4   Second, institutions can tie together interactions 
between states in different issue areas.  Issue linkage aims to create greater 
interdependence between and among states, which will then be reluctant to cheat in 
one issue area for fear that the victim—and perhaps other states as well—will 
retaliate in another issue area.  It discourages cheating in similar way as iteration.  
                                                 
4 See Joseph Greico.  1994.  “The False Promise of Institutionalism.” Joseph Greico summarizes 
three ways in which the iteration of games discourages cheating.  First, it raises the costs of 
cheating by creating the prospect of future gains through cooperation, thereby invoking the 
“shadow of the future” to deter cheating today.  A state caught cheating would jeopardize its 
prospects of benefiting from future cooperation, since the victim would probably retaliate.  In 
addition, iteration gives the victim the opportunity to pay back the cheater: it allows for 
reciprocation, the Tit-for-Tat strategy, which works to punish cheaters and not allow them to get 
away with their transgression.  Finally it rewards states that develop a reputation for faithful 
adherence to agreements, and punishes states that acquire a reputation for cheating.   
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It raises the costs of cheating and provides a way for the victim to retaliate against 
the cheater.  Third, institutions can increase the amount of information available to 
players, and stabilize players’ expectations.  Fourth, institutions can reduce the 
transaction costs, i.e. “costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie 
exchange,”5of individual agreements.6   
According to rational institutionalists, the key to solving the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is for each side to convince the other that they have a collective interest 
in making what appear to be short-term sacrifices (the gain that might result from 
successful cheating) for the sake of long-term benefits (the substantial payoff from 
mutual long-term cooperation).  This means convincing states to accept the 
second-best outcomes, which is mutual collaboration.  Hence, the major obstacle to 
international cooperation is the threat of “cheating”.  Rational institutionalists 
argue that institutions can help to achieve international cooperation by inhibiting 
states’ incentives to cheat, i.e. to defect.   
Sociological institutionalism sheds lights on the role of international 
organizations in changing state’s perceptions and the definition of their national 
interests.  Through agenda setting and issue prioritization, UNEP, along with 
leading scientists, has been a teacher in scientific and technical aspects, and has 
fostered a need for regional cooperation among the littoral countries.  Furthermore, 
UNEP’s perceived authority and independence have greatly lifted its power in 
shaping regional environmental cooperation in the South China Sea. 
It should be pointed out that the rational and sociological institutionalisms 
have not paid much attention to the “power” factor in environmental cooperation.  
                                                 
5 Douglas North.  1984.  “Government and the Cost of Exchange in History.”  Journal of Economic 
History 44:255-264.  p. 256. 
 
6 See Robert Koehane.  1984.  p. 89-92. 
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In the South China Sea case, state’s behavior and changing perspectives have been 
shaped by IOs in combination with domestic politics and state’s calculation of 
power. 
An Integrated Approach.  The empirical evidence from the South China 
Sea case demonstrates that IOs have assumed an enhanced role in international 
politics.  Their impact on regional politics is greater than initially perceived by 
state dominated theories of international politics.  From the development of 
environmental cooperation in the South China Sea, we can conclude that neither 
realism nor institutionalism can adequately explain the patterns and dynamics of 
cooperation without incorporating elements or considerations from the other.  The 
case has demonstrated that states with a concern in seeking security and territorial 
claims can cooperate with each other in environmental issues with IOs’ facilitation.   
Although I follow an institutionalist approach in exploring the power, roles, 
and mechanisms used by IOs, I incorporate the security considerations found in 
realist theories, and contend that countries do not act as passive “recipients” of 
environmental cooperation that is imposed by international institutions but rather 
as active transformers of that environmental cooperation.  They manipulate 
environmental cooperation in such a way that it becomes a tool for them to achieve 
other diplomatic goals, goals that may not be intended by the IOs.  The nature of 
environmental cooperation in the South China Seas has been both inductive and 
instrumental.  “Inductive cooperation” means an IO uses its own unique power to 
persuade, mediate and induce countries to participate in multilateral cooperation.  
“Instrumental cooperation” has two layers of meanings: 1) An IO is used by states 
as an instrument to address the environmental degradation as a collective action 
problem; 2) IO-sponsored environmental cooperation is used by states to achieve 
   291
their diplomatic goals beyond environmental protection, including political, 
security and economic considerations.   
 
UNEP’s Evolving Roles 
I hypothesize in chapter 2 that UNEP plays a critical role in facilitating and 
forging environmental cooperation in the South China Sea, first, through 
conventional roles to address collective action problems, and later, with an 
inductive role that draws countries in dispute into multilateral cooperation.  This 
dissertation demonstrates that without the overtly active role of UNEP, marine 
environmental cooperation, as defined by institution building, networking, and 
capacity building, would not have developed as quickly as it did.  Environmental 
cooperation in the South China Sea would not have been made possible without the 
unique political functions of UNEP which, to a large extent, can be attributed to 
UNEP’s intellectual and political leadership. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that UNEP plays both instrumental and 
inductive roles in fostering and forging environmental cooperation in the region.  
The roles of UNEP have evolved in its nearly thirty years’ involvement in 
environmental cooperation in the East Asian Seas and recently in the South China 
Sea, with UNEP adapting and positioning itself to facilitate environmental 
cooperation in a changing geopolitical context.  Table 6.1 summarizes the evolving 
roles of UNEP in marine environmental cooperation in the region, as UNEP has 
shifted from being more of an instrumental to an instrumental/inductive actor. 
In the East Asian Seas and the South China Sea, UNEP has provided 
scientific assistance for environmental cooperation.  Scientific knowledge on the 
causes and impacts of environmental degradation is the basis for designing the 
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most effective interventions and persuading governments to take appropriate 
actions to reverse the degradation trends.  UNEP has introduced new methods and 
procedures in analyzing transboundary environmental problems.  Often UNEP is 
staffed with international experts in a certain environmental area, and can provide 
direct scientific inputs to various regional studies on the causes and impacts of 
environmental problems. 
Table 6.1.  Evolving Roles of UNEP 
Types of Roles East Asian Seas Action Plan 
UNEP/GEF South China 
Sea Project 
Instrumental Roles   
1) Information provider Yes (compilation of data 
and information) 
Yes (establishment of 
regional GIS  database and 
metadatabase, national 
reports) 
2) Node of network Yes (the establishment of 
ASEAM) 
Yes (secretariat for regular 
meetings of ten regional 
committees) 
3) Technical assistance Yes (training, development 
of proposals) 
Yes (training, development 
of proposals) 
4) Financial source Yes (UNEP Environment 
Fund) 
Yes (GEF grant) 
Inductive Roles   
1) Inductive negotiator Partly (persuade ASEAN 
countries to expand 
membership of the Action 
Plan) 
Yes (solicit China’s 
participation) 
2) Issue prioritization No Yes (cluster analysis, 
regional ranking of habitat 
sites, and identification of 
regional hotspots) 
3) Forgoing regional consensual 
knowledge 
No Yes (TDA, causal-chain 
analysis) 
4) Fostering a sense of regional 
community 




In the development and implementation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan, 
UNEP basically executed the conventional roles of IOs as an instrument and 
facilitator for achieving collective action, first among a small group of ASEAN 
countries, and later expanding to cover other countries in reaction to changing 
regional politics and intra-regional relations.  During the process, UNEP acted as 
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an information provider, node of network, and provider of technical assistance and 
financial resources.  The roles of UNEP have been mostly of a technical and 
financial nature.  The significance of its technical role has been tremendous in the 
early development of marine environmental cooperation in the region.  These 
technical roles include: 1) catalyzing marine environmental protection activities in 
the region; 2) fostering the networking among scientists; 3) building institutional 
and individual capacities.   
However, as the region has grown in scientific capacity, small-scale 
individual projects of the Action Plan do not meet the needs of the region any more.  
UNEP adopted an approach to refocus the activities on regional problems and 
issues.  Building on the cooperative experience of the Action Plan, UNEP initiated 
the development and implementation of multilateral environmental cooperation in 
the sensitive South China Sea area.   
During the development, negotiation and implementation of the 
UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project, UNEP not only continues its functions as an 
instrument for collective action, but also takes an inductive role to forge 
environmental cooperation in the sea.  UNEP’s roles include: 1) mediator and 
negotiator to draw all major countries, especially China, into multilateral 
environmental cooperation; 2) setting environmental priorities; 3) fostering 
regional “consensual knowledge”; 4) fostering a “South China Sea” community 
and family.  Many scientists and government officials involved in this project have 
started to refer to the individuals involved as a “South China Sea” family. 
The different roles that UNEP has played in the two initiatives vary due to 
four reasons.  First is the different institutional strength in the two cases.  The 
Action Plan did not establish a regional coordinating unit 1993, twelve years after 
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the adoption of the Action Plan.  UNEP had no staff to work in the region to act as 
a proactive player in the region’s environmental cooperation.  All UNEP could 
provide was the financial and technical assistance from its headquarter located far 
away from the region.  Despite the establishment of the coordinating unit, the staff 
has been unable to follow a consistent strategic approach to the implementation of 
the Action Plan, since there are no institutionalized arrangements or commitments.  
In the Case of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea project, a project coordinating unit 
has been in existence since 2002; it has been headed by the same person who was 
involved in the formulation of the project before he moved into his current 
implementation role.  The project has a well-established regional management 
framework, providing it with a strong institutional arrangement for scientific 
networking.  
Second are the financial resources available to the two initiatives.  The 
Action Plan has limited financial resources, and environmental projects tend to be 
individual and country-based, rather than regional activities due to the limited 
financial resources available.  The UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project has a total 
budget of $32 million over the period of five years.  Thirty-eight institutes or 
government agencies signed MOUs directly with UNEP, receiving funds to 
support scientific research.  Over 400 institutions or agencies have been directly or 
indirectly involved in the project.  These beneficiaries formed UNEP’s domestic 
alliances of support for regional cooperation because of their direct financial 
interests.  GEF has a policy that any countries receiving GEF grant must have at 
least 1:1 co-financing ratio.  This policy provides both UNEP and its domestic 
beneficiaries (who can be considered UNEP’s alliance partners) with the 
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legitimacy necessary to extract government financial support for marine 
environment protection. 
Third is the difference in the timing between the two programs.  It is fair to 
state that without the prior experience provided by the implementation of the East 
Asian Seas Action Plan the development of environmental cooperation in the 
South China Sea would probably not have been possible, at least not starting in 
1996.  During the implementation of the Action Plan, UNEP had established a 
supra-regional intergovernmental forum and won trust from other countries that it 
had no intention to intervene with their sovereignty issues during the 
implementation of the Action Plan.  The COBSEA provides an inter-governmental 
forum for the development of the project for the South China Sea, so that UNEP 
did not need to start from scratch, which probably would have scared countries 
away immediately.  This provides a sound political foundation for UNEP to be 
perceived by the countries as an independent and trustable organization. 
Fourth, there was a substantially different geographical coverage in the 
case of the East Asian Seas Action Plan than the South China Sea Project.  The 
East Asian Seas have a broad geographic coverage and a lesser density of sensitive 
political issues.  The South China Sea entails numerous sensitive issues as well as 
clear disputes.  This creates both opportunities and challenges for UNEP’s ability 
to draw countries with disputes into cooperative arrangements. 
 
Political Utilities of Environmental Cooperation 
The roles of UNEP are only part of the story.  Marine environmental 
cooperation is nested within the process of regional integration politics among 
ASEAN countries, and their interactions with China.  I also hypothesized that 
   296
beyond environmental benefits, both ASEAN and China exploit political utilities 
from the multilateral cooperation sponsored by UNEP to achieve their own 
diplomatic goals.  Usually, states will try to turn environmental cooperation into an 
instrument to contribute to the achievement of higher political and diplomatic goals.  
This is particularly true when environmental cooperation happens in a region 
where some other prominent issues remain unsolved and sensitive. 
International environmental cooperation is an instrument of a state’s 
foreign policy.  The dissertation has shown that non-environmental considerations 
act as both an obstacle and a facilitator for environmental cooperation in the South 
China Sea.  Ostensibly, territorial disputes may be a major obstacle to regional 
cooperation, and the fact that China initially refused to join UNEP’s initiative in 
the South China Sea indicated the difficulties of forging cooperation among 
countries in dispute.  However, the case shows that it is the very presence of the 
danger of conflict that provides a possible catalyst for regional marine environment 
cooperation in the South China Sea.  While countries are trying to consolidate their 
sovereign claims, they do share a desire to sustain a peaceful regional environment 
that has buttressed the prosperous economic development that the region has 
enjoyed in recent decades.  Countries were actively looking for less sensitive 
“issue areas” where countries could cooperate without jeopardizing any 
sovereignty claims.  Marine environmental problems provided such an issue area.   
For ASEAN countries, the political utilities from the implementation of the 
East Asian Seas Action Plan have also changed over three decades.  In the first 
decade, the development and implementation of the Action Plan helped ASEAN 
countries to consolidate an ASEAN identity, in addition to achieving the 
environmental benefits stemming directly from. As Chapter 4 has shown, in the 
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late 1970s and early 1980s, ASEAN countries were actively looking for 
opportunities to engage each other and foster ASEAN identity through 
environmental cooperation under the framework of the Action Plan.  
Environmental cooperation under the framework of the Action Plan provided a 
significant mechanism for ASEAN countries to socialize and consolidate within 
the organization, and to learn the skills for political engagement with each other 
through non-political marine environmental cooperation.  This utility has 
decreased as ASEAN has evolved into a more mature and prominent regional 
organization, with its own identity.  ASEAN still uses the Action Plan to promote 
cooperation within the member countries as shown in Chapter 4.  That is the reason 
why ASEAN countries support the expansion of the Action Plan to cover other 
ASEAN non-East Asian Seas countries.   
After ASEAN countries successfully formed an identity, the Action Plan 
became a convenient mechanism for ASEAN countries to engage China in a 
multilateral forum.  This utility was significant in the early-to-mid-1990s, but has 
declined recently.  ASEAN has actively engaged China in various issue areas, 
including trade and economic cooperation and security issues.  In environmental 
issues, it has an ASEAN + 3 environmental ministerial meeting, a channel for 
environmental ministers to exchange their ideas and policies.  
China continues to support the strengthening of COBSEA, mainly due to 
political reasons.  COBSEA is the only inter-governmental forum on regional 
marine affairs in which China is a full and equal member with other ASEAN 
countries.  China views COBSEA as a preferable option to ASEAN. 
In the South China Sea case, as shown in Chapter 5, the political utility of 
environmental cooperation mainly derives from the symbolic and legitimization 
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power of IOs in highly sensitive political areas.  We cannot say that participation in 
the IO sponsored activities would lead to potential legitimization of territorial 
claims in a UN forum, but states definitely do not want to de-legitimize their 
claims by non-participation.  Non-participation will potentially reduce the 
international recognition of a non-participant’s claims of the South China Sea 
islands.  Additionally, it provides both ASEAN and China a mechanism to build 
confidence and trust between them.    
In both the East Asian Seas Action Plan and the South China Sea project, 
ASEAN and China take environmental cooperation as a good opportunity to build 
confidence and trust between the parties.  The East Asian Seas Action Plan also 
helped to develop ASEAN marine environmental cooperation, hence contributing 
to ASEAN’s integration and consolidation.  The Action Plan only involved the five 
founding members of the organization in its early stage.  This utility is not apparent 
in the South China Sea project, since all the countries participated in the project 
from the same point in time, and they are all equal members within the project.  
The potential legitimization of territorial claims by the UN that is critical to the 
successful approval of the South China Sea project is not apparent in the Action 
Plan because the territorial disputes were less acute and were spread over a vast 
area of the East Asian Seas.   
 
UNEP: Quo Vadimus 
UNEP’s roles in the regional seas have faced great challenges recently due 
to its limited financial budgeting and staffing and the increased regional activities 
of other IOs.  UNEP’s small-scale projects do not bring the same significant 
marginal benefits to the region as three decades ago, since the region has already 
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grown in scientific capacities, financial resources, and marine environmental 
activities funded by other IOs.  Member countries look for some regional large-
scale activities with operational benefits on the ground in marine environmental 
fields.  The small-scale catalytic role of the Action Plan does not meet the 
environmental demands of the East Asian Seas countries. 
Currently, UNEP has a weak Action Plan, but with a strong and large South 
China Sea project.  COBSEA is still struggling to find a new identity or niche 
among various regional organizations involving environmental issues, which I will 
discuss later in this chapter.  Although the implementation of the UNEP/GEF 
South China Sea Project received acclamation from UNEP and the GEF as the best 
international waters project,7 the project activities will be completed by December 
2007.  How will the momentum built through the implementation of the project be 
carried on and sustained beyond the project?  Where does UNEP go after the 
completion of the project, and how can UNEP ensure that project benefits sustain 
beyond the life of the project? 
Project benefits gained at the national level are relatively easy to sustain 
beyond the project; it is in the individual country’s interests to sustain the benefits 
and activities for the better living of its people.  For example, all three 
demonstration sites of China will automatically become national nature reserves or 
marine parks after the completion of the project.  Legislation or laws developed 
and adopted at the national level will remain valid and will be enforced through the 
national political structure.  National action plans developed and adopted during 
                                                 
7 See GEF Secretariat.  2004.  The GEF Specially Managed Project Review.  Unpublished 
document.  GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Team.  2004.  International Waters Program Study.  
www.gefweb.org.  John Michael Bewers and Su Jilan.  2004.  Reversing Environmental 
Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand: Mid-term Evaluation.  
www.unepscs.org.   
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the implementation of the project, and funding allocated to implement the national 
action plans will be enforced by national governments, with pressure from the 
involved government officials and scientists who have a direct stake in 
implementing these national action plans.8 
Part of the project benefits gained at the regional level is likely to be 
sustained automatically.  The maturing regional “epistemic community” will 
provide direct policy recommendations and solutions to future regional 
interventions, and continuously push for national governmental policy reforms for 
sustainable marine management.  The trust and confidence built through the 
implementation of the project will not fade away after the project.  The regional 
priority portfolios developed by the project can serve as a guide to both regional 
and national interventions in the future. 
While some of the national and regional benefits will sustain beyond 2007, 
some other regional momentums are unlikely to be sustained if no careful 
consideration and planning are given to future development.  The regional 
management framework will not exist beyond 2007.  How will UNEP ensure the 
implementation of the revised SAP, and avoid the situation that this document will 
be adopted, shelved and forgotten by governments beyond the completion of the 
Project? 
A conclusion of a recent partners’ workshop of the Action Plan, held in 
Bangkok, Thailand, April 2005, decided that COBSEA should strengthen its role 
in coordinating activities related to marine environmental issues in the region, 
                                                 
8 The national action plans developed under the UNEP/GEF South China Sea project specifically 
stipulates who does what, when, where, how and funding sources.  The action plans specify, for 
example, the activities and projects to be executed by the designated institutes and agencies, with 
allocated funding from the governments.  Once governments adopted the action plan, the institutes 
and agencies have a legal document to turn to support their requests for financial resources to 
execute the activities. 
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especially the activities of the UN agencies and programs involved in the region.   
If COBSEA’s role will be defined as a “coordinating” body for the region’s UN 
activities, it will not be a successful mission.  Although UNEP has succeeded in 
promoting environmental awareness, prodding governments to integrate 
environmental considerations into their development plans, and serving as a data 
clearing house to promote scientific research,9 it has failed in fulfilling its mandate 
to play a coordinating role within the UN system.  UNEP’s failure to coordinate 
environmental activities within the UN system may shed some light to COBSEA’s 
current direction or attempts to transform its role.   
The reason for this failure lies in the institutional arrangement within the 
entire UN system.  The UN lacks any coherent institutional mechanism for dealing 
effectively with environmental issues.  UNEP itself is a creature of a mere General 
Assembly resolution as an integral part of the UN, to coordinate environmental 
programs within the UN system.10  Despite the fact that UNEP was established by 
the General Assembly to coordinate environmental matters within the UN system, 
other UN agencies including FAO, WHO, IMO, UNESCO, and UNDP have 
gradually assumed environmental and sustainable development responsibilities,11 
mainly due to the increasing awareness of environmental matters promoted by 
UNEP.  These agencies have their own mandates, reporting to their own principals.  
                                                 
9 See e.g. Geoffrey Palmer.  1992.  “New Ways to Make International Environmental Law.”  The 
American Journal of International Law 86: p. 259. 
 
10 The Governing Council is mandated with the coordinating role of UNEP, i.e. “to provide general 
policy guidance for the direction and co-ordination of environmental programmes within the United 
Nations System.”  The UNEP Secretariat is mandated, in resolution 2997, to “co-ordinate, under the 
guidance of the Governing Council, environmental programmes within the United Nations System, 
to keep their implementation under review and to assess effectiveness.”  See General Assembly 
Resolution 2997.  1972.  Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental 
Cooperation.  http://www.un.org/ga/subsidiary/. 
 
11 Palmer.  1992.  p. 259. 
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They are better equipped with organizational capacity and more personnel.  Some 
of them have their own country and regional offices.  UNEP is probably the 
smallest program in terms of financial budgets and personnel resources.  UNEP is 
just too small, too poor and too remote to coordinate and promote sustainable 
development effectively.12  As Haas, Kanie and Murphy pointed out, “to some 
extent, UNEP’s success has led to its own obsolescence, because it is no longer 
equipped to conduct its activities or to serve as the UN system’s conscience on 
environmental issues now that the system has become so robust and 
decentralized.”13 
Financial resources for environmental protection activities come from the 
World Bank, the GEF, UNDP and other bilateral aid agencies.  UNEP has little 
influence on the decisions of these large bilateral and multilateral financial 
mechanisms.  UNEP has to compete with those larger agencies for international 
funding for environmental matters.  With its limited personnel resources and 
restricted location in Nairobi, UNEP’s ability to secure funding is small.14 
UNEP’s coordinating dilemma is replicated at the regional level.  COBSEA, 
having no legitimate power mandated to it by the member countries, simply cannot 
execute such a coordinating role at the regional level.  All the regional 
                                                 
12 See Peter Haas, Norichika Kanie and Craig N. Murphy.  2004.  “Conclusion: Institutional Design 
and Institutional Reform for Sustainable Development.”  In Emerging Forces in Environmental 
Governance, Norichika Kanie and Peter M. Haas, eds.  Tokyo: United Nations University Press.  
Branislav Gosovic.  1992.  The Quest for World Environmental Cooperation.  London: Routledge.  
Jan Stefan Fritz.  1998.  “Earthwatch twenty-five years on.”  International Affairs Vol. 10, No. 3: 
173-196.   
 
13 Haas, Kanie and Murphy.  2004.  p. 270. 
 
14 As a consequence, UNEP’s funding from GEF accounts for only 7 percent of the total GEF 
funding.   As of June 30 2004, GEF has allocated $5,126 million.  The World Bank accounts for 
53%, UNEP 29% and other agencies 11%.  Competition for GEF funding has become fiercer since 
the GEF decided to include other international or regional organizations, such as the ADB and 
FAO, as new implementing agencies.  See GEF/ME/C.25/1.  2005.  GEF Annual Performance 
Review (2004).  www.gefweb.org.   
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organizations, programs or organs have their own headquarters with their own 
mandates and financial resources.  They are responsible for reporting to their 
headquarters or funding agencies.  Substantive activities tied to such a coordinating 
role will be extremely limited and superficial, except for facilitating exchange of 
information between projects or programs in the region and convening some 
regional meetings.  This role will not meet the increasing expectations of member 
countries to obtain “tangible” benefits from the Action Plan. 
In a region that has been spoiled by large amounts of external funding, 
including the continuous large GEF funding of the PEMSEA project, acquiring 
financial resources is a key factor to regain governments’ confidence in COBSEA 
and the Action Plan.  In the short term, the EAS/RCU should take a lead in 
building and revitalizing donor relationships, and assisting countries in developing 
proposals and securing financial funding from international and bilateral aid 
agencies.   
After gaining confidence from member countries of the EAS/RCU’s 
capacity by demonstrating some tangible financial benefits, UNEP should consider 
undertaking activities to strengthen the institutional arrangement for the Action 
Plan, geographical focus, and take the following steps:  
1) Institutional strengthening.  COBSEA should be elevated to be 
responsible purely for high-level policy and decision-making at the regional level, 
and leveraging domestic financial and political support for the Action Plan at the 
national level.  A separate regional scientific and technical committee or working 
group should be established to provide scientific and technical support to the 
COBSEA, formulate project proposals and promote scientific capacity in the 
region.  A marine scientists’ network or association should be established, or the 
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ASEAM should be revitalized to support this regional scientific or technical 
committee.   
2) Geographical Focus.  The geographical coverage of the Action Plan is 
very broad, consisting of ten countries from Australia in the South, to South Korea 
in the North.  With such a broad geopolitical coverage, countries failed to identify 
shared priorities or to systematically develop actions to address the problems, with 
the exception of the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project.  Therefore COBSEA 
should reconsider carefully its geographical focus, and adopt a strategy to deal with 
the broad areas without losing governments’ confidence and support.  In the 
following section, I will discuss in more detail how a region is defined for 
strengthened regional cooperation.   
3) Regional knowledge node.  The region will continuously increase data 
and information collected by different large marine international projects in the 
region, but none of the projects will have a regional institutional setting to maintain 
and distribute the knowledge beyond the project life.  UNEP can act as a data 
house to consolidate and distribute the information at the regional level.  To further 
improve UNEP’s role in scientific and technical issues, UNEP should consider 
consolidating data and information from various projects and regularly publish a 
report on the status of the marine environment in East Asia. 
 
Other IO-led Regional Activities 
International organizations, including the UN agencies and the Bretton 
Woods institutions, have actively been involved in carrying out environmental 
protection activities to implement the policies and decisions made at the global 
level.  The GEF, the major financing mechanism for international environmental 
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conventions on biodiversity, climate change, persistent organic pollutants, and 
desertification, has relied heavily on its implementing agencies, UNDP, UNEP and 
the World Bank, to formulate, develop and implement project proposals.  These 
IOs have particular power in influencing environmental protection in the region 
due to the financial resources they possess.  Table 6.2 lists the main IOs’ regional 
office, projects or programs related to marine environmental cooperation in the 
region.  In addition to the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project in the East Asian 
Seas, there are two other GEF funded large marine projects in the region: 
PEMSEA project and UNDP/GEF Yellow Sea Project. 
PEMSEA has been funded by the GEF for more than a decade; UNDP and 
IMO act as implementing agency and executing agency, respectively.  PEMSEA is 
a result of two continuous GEF funded projects.  The first is entitled “Prevention 
and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas ($8.03 GEF fund, 
1993-1998), and the second is “Building Partnerships for the Environmental 
Protection and Management of the East Asian Seas ($16.22 million, 1998-
present).15  These two projects, after more than a decade’s implementation, have 
evolved into a regional program, PEMSEA.  Currently, PEMSEA covers twelve 
countries of East Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Viet 
Nam.  The program covers components as wide as the following: integrated coastal 
management, managing subregional sea areas and pollution hotspots, capacity 
building, environmental investments, scientific research, integrated information 
                                                 
15 GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Team.  2004.  GEF International Waters Program Study.  
www.gefweb.org. 
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management system, civil society, coastal and marine policy and regional 
mechanism.16 
The UNDP/GEF Yellow Sea Project started implementation in 2004, with 
total GEF funding of $13.328 million.17  Currently, the project covers only China 
and South Korea, with an intention to get the involvement of North Korea.  An 
indicator of the success of the project, according to the project manager, is to 
secure North Korea’s participation in the project.18 
 
                                                 
16 See PEMSEA website www.pemsea.org. 
 
17 See the Project Document (www.gefweb.org), and UNDP/GEF Yellow Sea Project website: 
http://www.yslme.org/.  
 
18 Interview with the project manager, Mr. Yihang Jiang. 
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Table 6.2. Participation by Countries bordering the South China Sea, in Regional and Sub-regional Organizations, Programs and 
Projects 





















        X Dialogue Partner X X
Lao PDR, Myanmar 
(dialogue partner) 
PEMSEA         1994 Inter-govt project X X X X X X X X X 
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Korea 
ADB         1986 Inter-govt organization X X X X X X X X X 
54 other members (19 





1981 Inter-govt program         X X X X X X X X 





program X        X X X X X X X X 
12 other members 
(Australia, France, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, 
Russia, UK and USA 
etc.) 
FAO Asia and 
Pacific Office 1947 
Inter-govt 
organization X        X X X X X X X X 
34 other member 
countries 
Source: Revised Information from UNEP/GEF/RTF-L.2/7 (www.unepscs.org)
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Lessons from UNEP’s Regional Seas Activities 
The development and implementation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan 
and the engagement of China in the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project should 
provide some lessons and experiences for other IO activities in the region, 
including prioritization of environmental problems, the definition of an ecological 
management region, approaches to environmental protection, and capacity 
building.    
 Prioritization of Transboundary Environmental Problems.  Although 
there is an increasing number of organizations and activities in the region 
addressing problems related to marine environmental problems in the East Asian 
Seas and South China Sea region, most lack activities to prioritize environmental 
problems and targets.  Oil pollution was never a high priority issue in the East 
Asian Seas, despite the enormous amount of attention focused on it during the 
early implementation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan (see Chapter 4).   In the 
early implementation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan, UNEP spent an 
extraordinary amount of financial resources on oil pollution matters.  PEMSEA in 
its early years also had focused on oil pollution.  There was no systematic effort at 
setting environmental priorities for the East Asians Seas region, after nearly three 
decades of the Action Plan, and more than ten years’ implementation of the 
PEMSEA project. 
Environmental priorities were decided mainly by donor preferences and 
major actors’ interests.  Scientific and objective prioritization efforts often fall 
short because actors have legitimate differences in what they consider to be the 
most important environmental priorities, and because environmental priorities 
often conflict with other issue priorities that compete for a donor’s financial 
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resources.19  The use of finite diplomatic and financial resources for low-priority 
problems diverted resources from more pressing problems.   
The transboundary diagnostic analysis undertaken by UNEP in developing 
the UNEP/GEF South China Sea Project provides good reference materials for 
future interventions, and should also be updated regularly to reflect the most recent 
changes of environmental status.  During the implementation of the project, a 
systematic regional cluster analysis and ranking process have been undertaken to 
develop priority sites in mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass and wetlands.  The 
regional priority portfolios should also not be limited to the use of UNEP, but 
utilized by other IO-initiated activities in the future.  Through the use of regional 
priority sites by all actors working in the region, IOs can achieve rationalization of 
projects and programs for marine environment protection, partly achieving the goal 
of inter-agency coordination. 
Defining a region.  Since 1990, the East Asian Seas region has witnessed 
an increasing trend of regional interests and management with regard to ocean 
affairs.  Regional solutions to the handling of ocean management problems are but 
one of a series of alternative strategies, ranging from unilateral approaches at one 
end of the spectrum to global regimes at the other extreme.  The idea of a regional 
solution to marine environmental problems raises the basic theoretical question of 
what constitutes a marine region.  The use of the term “region” with respect to 
                                                 
19 Barbara Connolly.  1996.  “Increments for the Earth: The Politics of Environmental Aid.”  In 
Institutions for Environmental Aid, Robert Keohane and Mark A. Levy, eds.  Cambridge, MA: the 
MIT Press. 
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states’ actions or interest is often ambiguous and may at times be found to lack any 
empirical support for the classification.20  
Lewis Alexander defines a region as: “an area of the earth’s surface which 
is set apart from other areas by existence of one or more distinctive 
characteristics.”21  Accordingly, the identifying element may be physical in nature, 
as in the case of desert or mountainous regions; conversely, some political, 
economic, or other nonphysical factor may distinguish the region as a separate 
geographic entity.  Alexander conceptualizes three types of marine regions: 1) 
Physical regions, which are considered sufficiently extensive and distinguishable 
from other ocean areas to be suitable for regional management activities.  They are 
finite and may be defined into two subgroups: ocean basins and semi-enclosed 
seas.   Globally, there are nine ocean basins and twenty-four semi-enclosed seas.22  
Because of the physical uniqueness of most physical marine regions, they represent 
logical sites for management programs.  This is particularly true for water bodies 
where there is little exchange of water with the open ocean and where there is, in 
effect, a relatively closed marine ecosystem.23  2) Management regions, which are 
functional in nature and responds to a situation where there is a well-defined 
management problem.  Alexander points out that “the important point is that the 
                                                 
20 Lewis M. Alexander.  1977.  “Regional Arrangements in the Oceans.”  The American Journal of 
International Law 71 (1): 84-109.  p.  89. 
 
21 Ibid.  p. 88. 
 
22 The nine ocean basins are: the North and South Atlantic, the Indian, Arctic, and Antarctic, and 
four units of the Pacific—North, South, West Central, and East Central.  The semi-enclosed seas 
are: Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Andaman Sea, Baffin Bay-Davis Strait, Baltic Sea, Bay of Bengal, 
Bering Sea, Caribbean Sea, Celebes Sea, East China-Yellow Sea, Gulf of Guinea, Sea of Japan, 
Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, North Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, Gulf of Oman, Persian (Arabian) 
Gulf, Red Sea, Solomon Sea, South china Sea, Sulu Sea and Timor-Arafura Seas.  See Alexander, 
p. 70-71.  
 
23 Alexander.  1977.  p. 91. 
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area in which the problem occurs may be distinguishable geographically from 
other maritime areas, thereby justifying its treatment as a separate marine 
region.”24  3) Operational regions, which are the sites of more formal regional 
arrangements, which may be defined by IOs to execute their activities due to the 
limits of competence, extent of ocean space within which scientific investigations 
are carried out or by the terms of a international treaty.  These regions may be 
more of a political and administrative than environmental or ecological nature.  
The UN’s regional economic and social commissions were established for 
operational regions. 
Action oriented projects and programs should address ecological 
management regions, rather than politically defined operational regions.  Without a 
well-defined ecological management region, where common problems can be 
easily identified and distinguished from outside of the region, regional activities, 
projects or programs will incur difficulties to generate real regional environmental 
benefits and ultimately mobilize countries’ support for regional cooperation.  This 
has been seen in the East Asian Seas Action Plan since its expansion, and will also 
inflict the PEMSEA project after the withdrawal of external funding.  Neither the 
“East Asian Seas” defined by UNEP or the “Seas of East Asia” by PEMSEA is a 
physical marine region.  Actually both do not offer a clear definition of their 
geographical coverage, and imply the entire sea areas bordering the countries of 
the “East Asia.”  The region covers entirely four semi-enclosed seas: the East 
China-Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, the Sulu Sea, partly the 
Timor-Arafura Sea, and other coastal areas of the East Asian countries.   
                                                 
24 Ibid.  p. 92. 
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I am not arguing for a purely ecological division for regional cooperation, 
but for a blended ecological and political definition, as political support is critical 
for any regional activities.  However, there are many regional political entities and 
organizations that exist in the region, but few have been built on common and 
shared environmental problems.  Emphasis should be given to base regional 
cooperation on defined transboundary environmental problems, because IO-led 
activities can help an ecological region to turn into a political region as well, but a 
political region cannot turn in into an ecological one.  As shown in Chapter 4 and 
5, UNEP helped to promote ASEAN cooperation and consolidate ASEAN identity, 
and fostered a regional community in the South China Sea.  IO-led environmental 
cooperation can help to foster a sense of region, based on littoral states’ shared 
environmental problems with international financial resources and regional 
networking.  However, if a region lacks regionally common or shared 
environmental problems, it is hard to have real operational environmental 
cooperation; activities will tend to be individualistic and country-based. 
Since COBSEA is an inter-governmental body established by governments 
which make regular contributions to its Trust Fund, there is a political justification 
for COBSEA to operate at a supra-regional level.  However, to ensure regional 
benefits and the effectiveness of regional interventions, COBSEA should consider 
examining the possibility of taking a subregional approach, and dividing the East 
Asian Seas into ecologically functional subregions for operational interventions.25   
The PEMSEA is a result of two consecutive projects funded by the GEF; 
hence it should be an action-oriented project, not a political entity.  The region it 
covers is so vast, that it is hard to identify shared common problems with 
                                                 
25 Subregion is in relation to the East Asian Seas.   
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operational meanings.  No transboundary diagnostic analysis has been conducted, 
and no regional priority issues have been systematically identified and set by all 
twelve participating countries.  Consequently, the two projects funded by GEF 
have gradually evolved into a regional program, which is a political bundle of all 
East Asian Seas countries, with a common interest to secure more and larger 
international funding.  The environmental and ecological sense of the region is less 
justified, with such diverse environmental problems.  This program, however, has 
gained considerable prominence and respect in the region, mainly due to the 
performances of some individual countries, the lengthy duration of the project, and 
its ability to generate international funding, especially from the GEF.  Despite 
individual countries’ benefits gained from PEMSEA over the past ten years, the 
regional benefits and the reasons to bundle these countries together cannot justify 
such a large operational region with high transaction costs.  There are already 
many regional organizations operating in the region, on the basis of political 
regions, such as the Asian Development Bank, the FAO regional office, ESCAP, 
and the UNEP regional office in Asia and Pacific.  GEF need not fund another 
regional organization or entity, with increased transaction cost and little sense of 
shared ecological or environmental problems.  The question remains—what are the 
ecological and environmental justifications for the high transaction costs occurring 
in such a large regional project, in terms of the number of countries involved?  
What will be the regional benefits that cannot be generated through subregional or 
individual countries’ approaches? 
Not denying the successes and achievements of PEMSEA in the region, the 
fact that GEF decided to fund such a supra-regional project is a typical case of 
GEF’s failure at inter-agency coordination.  UNEP, with its regional seas program, 
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had considerable comparative advantages and experience in dealing with regional 
marine environmental problems.  It has an established institutional ability and 
organizational structure in place for over a decade.  GEF’s funding for the UNDP-
initiated PEMSEA project actually creates a situation in the East Asian Seas that 
two entities under two UN agencies are focusing on the same supra-regional 
operational region, creating inter-agency competition and difficulties for inter-
agency coordination.  As a result, COBSEA has been marginalized by the large 
and well-funded PEMSEA project.  The implementation of the UNEP/GEF South 
China Sea Project and the UNDP/GEF Yellow Sea Project covers only parts of the 
East Asian Seas.  All these activities would have been better managed or 
rationalized if they were under the control of one implementing agency. 
Capacity Building.  Capacity encompasses a number of aspects, including 
financial, political, administrative and technical forms.26  Addressing each of these 
different forms of incapacity will require very different strategies of IOs.  Effective 
implementation of IO led regional activities depends on strategic choices about 
which actors on whom to focus capacity building efforts, including sectoral 
ministries, NGOs, and private sectors.  To sustain regional environmental 
cooperation beyond IOs’ involvement, it is important to identify the most needed 
form or location of capacity within the participating countries to support 
continuous regional cooperation.   
In the past, much effort has been made to build and increase the scientific 
and technical capacity of marine scientists.  Less has been done to build the 
political and financial capacity within the countries for sustained environmental 
cooperation.   The implementation of the East Asian Seas Action Plan has mainly 
                                                 
26 Haas, Kanie and Murphy.  2004.  p. 345. 
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focused on building scientific and technical capacity for marine research and 
management.  Among the numerous workshops organized under the Action Plan, 
very few focus on policy issues or legal matters.  The UNEP/GEF South China Sea 
Project also heavily concentrates on scientific research and regional consolidation 
of data and information in its first two years’ implementation, with less funding or 
efforts for policy or political related activities.  The Project Director has been 
overwhelmingly occupied with the demands of scientific and technical matters, 
with less attention to building political capacity for regional cooperation directly. 
Although scientific and technical capacity may increase the political 
capacity for regional cooperation, through the pressuring of the maturing 
“epistemic community”, IOs can play a more proactive and aggressive role in 
directly engaging the policy- and law-making groups at the domestic level, 
building the political capacity.  Suggested activities can include networking among 
environmental lawyers, regular meeting addressing policies and laws, and training 
workshops for policy analysts and lawyers.  There is no need for IOs to limit their 
influence through the mechanism of the epistemic community. A more direct and 
effective means to engage policy groups should be developed and strengthened. 
 
Generalizability of the Case 
I will discuss the generalizability of the case from two aspects: the roles of 
IOs and applicability to other regions.  To what extent can we generalize the 
conclusions about UNEP’s roles to the larger universe of IOs dealing with a variety 
of issue areas?  I believe the two types of powers/roles of IOs can be applied to IOs 
in various issues, although the mechanisms and strategies IOs apply to leverage 
their power may vary across issue areas.   
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IOs are created by states to address certain collective problems, and their 
instrumental roles are automatically derived from their daily work.  It is the 
inductive power that may vary between IOs.  The inductive power depends on how 
IOs present themselves as a legitimate, independent and knowledgeable actor in 
international affairs, and how staff of IOs utilize the power in negotiation and 
persuasion to change states’ interests and perceptions.  The World Bank appears 
powerful due to its financial resources, and it is normally backed up by western 
countries’ financial and economic policies, but its power as a legitimate or 
independent IO in mediating between countries is less than that of UNEP, which is 
deemed more independent from influences of western powers, with a concern 
about the interests of developing countries.   
When considering the applicability of the case to other regions, I believe 
the South China Sea case shed light to both developing and developed regions, 
because the case covers the development of environmental cooperation over three 
decades in a rapidly growing region.  In the early period of environmental 
cooperation, the region carried the main characteristics of a developing region: 
lack of scientific and technical capacity, lack of financial resources, lack of 
regional institution, and regional animosity.  UNEP played a significant dual role 
in providing scientific assistance, building the capacity and setting the issue 
priorities for the region.  On the one hand, UNEP catalyzed environmental 
cooperation in the region.  On the other hand, the environmental cooperation was 
much influenced by external priorities.  A typical case is the case of oil pollution, 
which was never a priority issue even though the Action Plan had invested large 
amount of financial resources in this issue.  This can happen to other developing 
regions which rely heavily on external scientific and technical assistance.  African 
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countries, for example, do not possess the capacities to formulate their own views 
and normally accept the arrangements presented to them, so the IOs’ conditionality, 
terms, and aid priorities of IOs’ aid may not be consistent with the region’s real 
needs. 
The South China Sea case also sheds some light for scholars to explore the 
interactions between a developed region and IOs.  In Joel S. Migdal’s terms, the 
region consists of a group of countries with strong and increasing state 
capabilities.27  The countries are jealously guiding their sovereignty, and can afford 
to resist financial and technical assistance from IOs, when their conditions are not 
met.  These countries have actively used IOs to explore their political utilities, and 
continued growing in regional integration and consolidation.  ASEAN 
environmental cooperation, for example, originally catalyzed by UNEP, has now 
evolved into an independent regional initiative under a strengthening region.  In 
this case, we have seen an increased role of ASEAN in the past decade in 
environmental cooperation, and agenda issues come from within the region more 
often than before.  This aspect of ASEAN is gradually approaching to the 
European Union’s dynamics, in which region has strong technical, scientific and 
financial capacity within itself.  IOs’ roles in the Union are relatively small and 
insignificant, in terms of issue framing, identification prioritization, and 
policymaking.  As I mentioned in chapter 1, there are many studies on the 
domestic aspects of international environmental politics, but there is much less 
literature on its regional aspects.  I hope other students will pick up the challenge 
in assessing regional differences in dealing with global initiatives.   
                                                 
27 See Joel S. Migdal.  1988.  Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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The South China Sea case proves that an authoritative and independent IO 
plays an important role in facilitating countries in dispute to reach multilateral 
marine environmental cooperation.  The less developed environmental cooperation 
in Northeast Asia and the Yellow Sea can at least be partly attributed to the lack of 
activities led by such a strong, authoritative, and independent IO in the region.  
 
Future Research 
In light of the main findings of this dissertation, I suggest three directions 
for future research: 1) how regions differ from one another in dealing with global 
initiatives; 2) how IOs vary in their powers in marine environmental issues; 3) how 
the considerations of non-environmental issues facilitate environmental 
cooperation, and furthermore the interplay between environmental and other issues.   
Regional comparative analysis.  A comparative analysis of regional seas 
action plans should shed light on why the same regional seas program operated 
from UNEP produce different institutional or legal arrangements in different sea 
areas.  Among the thirteen regional seas action plans supported by UNEP, there are 
four kinds of institutional and legal arrangements developed.  First, most regional 
seas involve the development of an action-oriented regional action plan and a 
regional seas convention as legal support for the action plan.  Normally, the 
development of a regional action plan leads to the development of a regional seas 
convention, with or without protocols.  However, some regional seas developed 
and adopted the action plan and regional convention simultaneously, and the Black 
Sea developed and ratified a regional seas convention before the development of 
an action-oriented regional action plan.  Despite the differences in the ordering of 
developing action-oriented action plan and legal backing, they all have both 
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components.  Second, some action plans were developed and adopted without 
regional conventions.  All the three regional seas action plans in Asia have not 
reached a regional convention as legal backup.  Third, in the Kuwait Sea, a 
regional organization was established to develop and implement the regional action 
plans and conventions.  Fourth, the South Asian Seas developed a regional 
environmental program, which became a legal entity.  Similarly, the South Pacific 
developed a regional environmental program, but with no action plan. 
While it is undeniable that UNEP has catalyzed the establishment and 
development of regional institutions for marine environmental protection, an 
intriguing question would be why the same global force has led to such different 
forms of institutional arrangements, and how different actors shape the process of 
institutional building and development.  Is there an ideal type of governance, i.e. 
action plan, program, convention or organization, in terms of institutional setting 
for the regional marine environmental protection? 
IOs’ different roles in regional seas.  More and more IOs follow the 
example of UNEP and take a regional approach to addressing marine 
environmental problems.  In the past decade, both UNDP and World Bank have 
increased their activities in regional seas, and are gradually moving ahead of 
UNEP in using a regional approach for addressing marine environmental matters.  
It would be highly interesting to examine how the three IOs vary in their 
approaches to dealing with marine environment, and how they leverage their 
powers to produce outcomes expected by them.  I suggest two angles to start 
exploring the differences.  First, both UNDP and the World Bank have their own 
country office, and rely heavily on their country office for services and execution 
activities.  UNEP only has regional offices and regional seas units, and they have 
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to rely heavily on their counterparts at the national level for executing the activities.  
The former is probably a more “efficient” approach in the eyes of international 
donors, but the latter requires extra efforts in training the local people to conduct 
the activities and turns out to be slower and less inefficient, in terms of procedures.  
However, the lack of UNEP country offices forced UNEP to build close 
relationships with their national level officials, and the capacity built through 
“learning by doing” will probably have a long-term impact on countries’ 
environmental policies and actions.  Second, both UNDP and the World Bank have 
their organizational focus on economic development, and environmental protection 
is not on the top of their agenda.  UNEP is the only agency a sole responsibility to 
focus on the environmental.  A possible result would be that the UNDP’s and the 
World Bank’s economic development priorities may marginalize their 
environmental considerations in the regional seas initiatives, while UNEP’s 
initiatives may be less integrated to an overall development agenda. 
Environment and security.  In a highly disputed area, countries in dispute 
may choose environmental issues as a testing ground for cooperation in other issue 
areas.  This is particularly true when IOs are involved.  It would be highly 
interesting to explore whether there are spillover effects of the cooperative habitats 
formed during environmental cooperation into other security areas, and the 
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